Norbert Elias (1897-1990)

Kant: Wir sind in hohem Grade durch Kunst und Wissenschaft kultiviert, wir sind zivilisiert bis zum Überlästigem zu allerlei gesellschaftlicher Artigkeit und Anständigkeit...Die Idee der Moralität gehört zur Kultur. Der Gebrauch dieser Idee aber, welcher nur auf das Sittenähnliche in der Ehrliebe und die äußere Anständigkeit hinausläuft, macht bloß die Zivilisierung aus.

Elias: Hier...steht eine Schicht, die weitgehend von jeder politischen Tätigkeit abgedrängt ist, die kaum in politischen und erst zaghaft in nationalen Kategorien denkt, deren ganze Legitimation zunächst in ihrer geistigen, ihrer wissenschaftlichen oder künstlerischen Leistung liegt; dort, ihr gegenüber, steht eine Oberschicht, die im Sinne der anderen nichts 'leistet', sondern bei der die Formung der distinguirten und distinguierenden Verhaltens im Mittelpunkt des Selbstbewußtseins und der Selbstrechtfertigung steht. (Prozess, b.I, s.8-9)

Bruno's Caballa dell cavallo pegaseo

Giordano Bruno was born in 1548 in a village of Nola in Italy. In the age of 23 he became a priest of the dominican order (Giordano is his order-name), but later he left it. After working as a scholar in Venice and Padua he left Italy, at first to Switzerland, then to France and during religious unrests to England, where he teached at Oxford and London. Later he visited many german cities and even the court of Emperor Rudolf II in Prague. In 1591 Bruno returns to Venice, but in next year he is arrested by the local inquisition, which sends him to Rome. After a long process, Bruno is sentenced to death for heresy and in 1600 burned at stake.

In his major works like "De l'infinito universo e mondi" he tried to create a new system of theology, on the one hand synthetizing neoplatonism and copernican cosmology, on the other being independent on the aristotelian teachings. He described the structure of the universe in very symbolical terms, partly to present it as a sensation to a wider auditory, partly to fit it into his mnemotechnical schemes, of which he only very reluctantly shared. His works are presented as new, pioneering attempts, which can't be refuted by existing authorities (either of text or of his contemporary professors), and yet to make a sufficient authority of himself. But not all of his books were positive in their nature: satire and criticism played a vital role in his project. If his theory could not become the predominant by itself, it could be supported by a harsh attack on existing authorities. These are, however, not on a personal level. As Bruno was in Geneva, he criticized a certain priest, what led into his own arrest. Because of this, he later employs various means against the censorship like a dialogue or generalizing.
Dialogue was an especially popular writing style in this era, but also it is a form in which different opinions may be presented without a clear relation to the author's opinion. Unlike the platonic dialogues, in his work come up debateers on quite similar levels of intelligence, what would seem to be a fair analysis of a problem, if the problem itself weren't a parody.

His first great satirical work was "Il candelaio", a comedy making fun of certain general human characters. "Caballa del cavallo pegaseo" deals particularily with scholars, philosophers, founders of religions, with intellectuals. Bruno published Caballa in 1585 in London. In the text, he plays with symbolical interchanging of an ass and a winged horse Pegasus as the perfect embodiments of mystical truth - with kabala being the technical term used for jewish mysticism (which by itself inspired Bruno in many ways, and although he makes fun out of it in this text, his interest in some of its elements, like gematry or syncretistic theory of emanations, the Sephiroth, may have been serious). It comprises four general parts: an ironical dedication, a "declamation to a pious student", a triple dialogue criticizing various philosophical schools: including scholastics, skeptics and kabalists, and finally another appended dialogue, where an ass tries to persuade a pythagorean fool-scholar to let him study in his academy; all interlinked by short poems, which give the right taste to the text.

Bruno identifies the idea of a winged horse, which makes heavens accessible to heroes who can ride it, with an ass, a stubborn and dumb animal with long ears (open to verbal nonsense) and thick mouth (able to consume it), a beast of burden which carried Jesus Christ into Jerusalem. The idea of asinity recalls a modified form of "learned ignorance" of Cusanus. A truth doesn't arise from knowledge but from ignorance. The three traditions he criticizes - scholastics, skeptics and kabalists - all represent different types of ignorance (s.48). Kabalists, or also Pythagoreans and any "mystical theologians", try to deny any knowledge (or, from the other point of view, never dare to affirm; described as young asses, unable to hold an opinion). Skeptics are characterized by doubt, their reluctance to determine or define things (an ass staying between two roads, unable to choose one of them). Scholastics then have no problems denying or accepting things, if they find an authority, problem is that they see it as a sufficient proof (the asses carrying a redeemer). The scholastical and mystical foolishness are embodied in the character of Onorio, who enters in the second part of the dialogue. He is a Pythagorean and believes that he is reincarnated Xenophon and even Aristotle himself (who didn't understand what he was learning from Plato, but as he grew up there were no other philosophers left, so he could teach anything, and as it had a reference, despite being false and deceiving, it was widely accepted as a work of an educated scholar); and even before yet a reincarnated ass, who after drank water from a sacred fountain instead of river Lethe, and thus received wings, thanks to which he could fly to stars and serve Jove himself.

Skeptical schools are in this dialogue defined as those, who desire no learning at all. The question is, in how for this very idea itself (or asinity/ignorance in general) can be learned. Through the words of Saulino, Bruno speaks of two of them. The first are Realists, who affirm the truth is incomprehensible because of its vicissitude and complexity on the one hand, as well as of limited capabilities of human senses. The other school are Pyrrhonians, who saw even the idea, that nothing can be determined, to be uncertain. To this reacts Sebasto, accusing the first school of laziness ("These sluggards - by escaping the labor of providing reasons behind things, by not acknowledging their laziness and the envy they have toward the industry of others, wishing to appear better than they are, and not satisfying themselves with concealing their own unworthiness, unable to move ahead of others either by running with their peers or by possessing the means of doing something of their own, by not risking their vain presumption, confessing the imbecibility of their own mind, their coarseness of sense, and privation of intellect, and their own blindness, by making others seem to be without proper illumination of judgement - lay the blame on nature for the evil things they represent, and not principally on the bad understanding of the Dogmatics;" s.75), the other of trying to "appear like archscholars", making a personal vice coherent in a philosophic way.

Then Onorio enters the debate again, presenting a little from the skeptic way of thinking. Truth can be understood only when formulated in a certain doctrine, which may be taught by a certain teacher to a student. If we have a false doctrine about truth, it can't be learned, because it relates to nothing and nothing can happen to something non-existent. If we have a true doctrine, then it can't be thought as well, because either is its content obvious to everybody (and thus it needs no doctrine and no learning) or controversial (and thus depending on mere opinion). If teachers had nothing to learn, they won't be teachers at all, as they have no special properties in comparision to their students. But the conclusion goes to the teaching they all are searching for - the ignorance, asinity. And, if we follow the Skeptic reasoning, these can't be learned for sure.

Marc Auge ist ein französischer ethnologe, geboren in 1935 in Poitiers. Er hat in 70.jahren Elfenbeinküste (Côte d'Ivoire) besucht, um die geschichte des volks der Alladianen zu erforschen. Später hat er sich mit der französischen gesellschaft beschäftigt, wo er auch mehrere methoden, die er zwischen Alladianen entwickelt hat benutzt.

In letzter dekade beschäftigt er sich viel mit der methodologie und dem sinn seiner disziplin. Im Buch "Orte und Nicht-Orte" stellt er eine Methode der ethnologischen Forschung vor, die die Umgebung des Forschers selbst als Gegenstand hat. Seiner Meinung nach, wurde der traditionelle Dualismus "hier/anderswo" durch den des "nahe/ferne" ersetzt. Die vorherige Untersuchungsmethode stellt sich den Gegenstand (der "anderswo" als "hier" ist, sich also anderswo als an Stelle des Ethnologen befindet; zB. ein Dorf in Afrika) als verschieden vor, unterentwickelt im Vergleich zu "hier" (Frankreich, Europa). Das "hier" gewinnt dadurch auch an Identität. Was Auge versucht, ist, dass "hier" als Forschungsgegenstand zu betrachten. Das "nahe" wird nicht im Kontrast definiert, sondern beschrieben durch den gegenwärtigen Zustand seiner Elemente (wie soziale Institutionen oder Gebräuche). Das "nahe" also enthält nicht nur bloss räumliche Umgebung, sondern auch die spezifische Eigenschaften seines Zeitalters:

"Es geht...um Gegenwart schlechthin, um die aktuellste Aktualität in ihren aggressivsten und beunruhigendsten Momenten" (s.18)

Auge bezeichnet seine Gegenwart als "Übermoderne". Sie unterscheidet sich von der Moderne in zwei Aspekten : zeitlich in dem Übermaß der Ereignisse (dass viel, viel Unterschiedliches, schnell und oft passiert) und räumlich in scheinbarer Verkleinerung der Welt (durch Verkehrsmittel und Urlaubungsreisen, Tourismus, Distribution der Werbebotschaften). Wegen Verdichtung der Städte und Vielvalt der Bilder wird der Raum reorganisiert durch Migration und Nicht-Orte, die den Verkehr und die Orientierung erleichtern. In so einer Zeit, in der die Grenzen der typischen Gegenstände der Ethnologie (Ethnie: Stamm, Stadt, Kommune) unklar werden, da die Leute nicht mehr so zwingend mit ihrem Raum verbunden sind. Jedes Individuum kann als ein vollständiges ethnologisches Forschungsobjekt betrachtet werden.

Um den Begriff "Nicht-Ort" zu verstehen, muss man zuerst sein Gegenteil, den anthropologischen Ort, begreifen. Solche Orte sind Stellen der Geburt, des Lebens, der Arbeit etc. (s.53), die auf die Identität der Bewohner wirken, ihre Beziehungen reflektieren und erst historisch bestimmt werden. Sie sind Häuser, Altäre, öffentliche Plätze, Territorien oder Geburtsorte.

Der anthropologische Ort verbindet die Rollen seiner Bewohner (dem Gegenstands der Ethnologie) und die des Ethnologen. Die beiden erfahren illusorische Definitionen der beobachteten Kultur. Der Eingeborene sieht seinen Ort als ewig präsent. Die Welt ändert sich für ihn nicht. Wenn ein unvorsehbares Ereignis (wie Tod, Geburt, Krankheit; s.55) eintritt, wird es als bekannte Sache erkannt und durch Riten behandelt, in denen ihre Normalität und Wohlbegründung ausgedrückt wird. Ethnologie erschafft eine andere Illusion: nämlich das Denken, dass der Bewohner seine Kultur als transparent und klar definiert wahrnimmt. Diese Vorstellung wird durch die Suche nach "Durchschnittsmenschen" verursacht, die die beobachtete Kultur am besten repräsentieren. Die individuellen Haltungen zur Umgebung werden aber übersehen.

Sowohl die Bewohner des afrikanischen Dorfes als auch die Ethnologen haben das Gefühl, dass ihre eigene Welt geschlossen und selbstgenügend ist. Unsere Identität und Wohnstatt wird durch unseren Geburtsort bestimmt (Kinder, die in Afrika ausserhalb eines Dorfes geboren werden, bekommen deswegen besondere Namen, die die Umgebung umschreiben; s.64). Der Ort verbindet die Identitäten mehrerer Personen, reflektiert ihre Raumordnung, ihre Residenzregeln. Es geht um eine stabile Vorstellung, die nicht als veränderbar wahrgenommen wird ("der Bewohner eines anthropologischen Ortes wohnt in der Geschichte, er macht sie nicht", s.67). Die Bewohner haben eigene Vorstellungen über den Ort ihres Lebens (Territorium) und versuchen sie zu verwirklichen und zu materialisieren. Mit der Zeit verschwinden alte Traditionen, der Untergang selbst wird aber nicht beobachtet, nur die Versuche der Wiederbelebung (Feste, s.67).

Diese Vorstellungen wurden nach Auge geometrisch kategorisierbar und man kann sie in der Raumordnung der Siedlungen beobachten: es geht um eine Linie (der Weg; nämlich von einem Ort zum anderen, zB. zwischen zwei Städten), die Schnittpunkte zweier Linien (Kreuzungen; Versammlungsplätze, Märkte) oder den Schnittpunkt selbst (Zentren; Monumente, politische oder religiöse Gebäude).

Wenn der Weg als teil eines anthropologischen ortes betrachtet wird, wird er als eine Reihe der "ausgezeichneten Punkte" (s.70) der wichtigen Sachen verstanden. Sie durchgeht die Grenzen verschiedener Sphären menschlicher Tätigkeiten, kurz gesagt, sie verbindet. Die Relationen reflektieren sich zeitlich auf die Geschichte, sowie sie sich räumlich auf den Wegen reflektieren. Hier bringt Auge wieder ein Beispiel aus Afrika vor, die Gründungsgeschichten der Dörfer werden als ein "Weg mit mehreren Zwischenstationen" (s.71) beschrieben. Die beiden, sowohl Weg als auch Geschichte, können zeitlich gemessen werden, und zwar durch ihre Beständigkeit. Eine Kreuzung der Wege, wie ein gemeinsames Ereignis, passiert dann in zyklischen Perioden (zB. Märkte, s.72). Menschen versuchen die interessantesten Ereignisse, Taten und andere "Zwischenstationen" von Weg oder Geschichte auf Ewig in Form von Monumenten zu materialisieren.

Ein Zentrum ist das klarste Kennzeichen eines anthropologischen Ortes. Jeder einzelne Weg hat ein Ziel, reflektiert die Verbindungen zwischen individueller und kollektiver Erfahrung. Auge beschreibt das Zentrum mit der Metapher des Herrschers, der Doppelgänger von sich erschafft, um sich sichtbar machen (s.76) oder sich mit seinem Thron oder Palast identifiziert (dies gilt auch für moderne Staaten: zb Kreml, Weisses Haus; s.77). Eine verbindende Rolle lässt sich hier als ewig präsent und unbeweglich wahrnehmen. Deswegen drückt sich auch die politische Sprache mit Hilfe von Begriffen aus, die auch zur Orientierung im Raum benutzt werden: "links" und "rechts", Hauptstadt als Ersatz für Ansichten der Regierung usw.

Auge bespricht nichts abstraktes: sein Modell ist Frankreich selbst. Hier hat jedes Dorf ein Zentrum, centre-ville, einen Platz, der normalerweise auf der Kreuzung der Hauptwege liegt und beinhaltet die meisten kulturellen, religiösen und politischen Gebäude (Kneipe, Kirche, Rathaus), die zu bestimmten Zeiten (Sonntag, Markttag) intensiver genutzt werden. Viele Dörfer und Städte bezeichnen sich als ein Zentrum eines Raumes (zb Lyon als Hauptstadt der Gastronomie, oder Tiers als Hauptstadt der Schneiderwarenindustrie; s.82). Paris ist das Zentrum der Zentren, aber es wurde lang nicht als eine einzige Entität verstanden (das heisst sie hatte keinen Bürgermeister bis zur Chirac-Ära), sondern als Ansammlung von Palästen, die für verschiedene Machtelemente stehen.

Zweck des Staats beim Hegel und Machiavelli


1.Einleitung

Der Objekt dieser Arbeit ist primärweise Hegels Verfassungsschrift. Es ist ein Artikel, nicht vor seiner Tod veröffentlicht, wo er kritisiert die Situation seines Landes nach letzter Krieg mit Frankreich. In zwei Konflikten, nämlich im Jahren 1797 und 1800, wurden die Deutschen, geführt vom österreichischen Kaiser, besiegt. Das führt zur Verlust grosser Menge des Landes, inklusive Elsatz und Belgien. Friedensvertrage von Campo Formio und Lunéville dadurch zwar konsolidierte das Gebiet der kaiserliche direkte Macht ins einzige Grenze hinein, aber auf die andere Seite es hat die Zerfalligkeit (als schon das Frieden von Westfalen) des Deutschlands bestätigt. Nach dem Vertrag von Lunéville sollte der Kaiser sogar alle Anspruche für die römisch-deutsche Krone abgeben. Vor dem Hegel standen viele Fragen: nicht nur ob es möglich ist, das Deutschland als ganze als ein Staat zu sehen, sondern auch was eigentlich heisst es, ein Staat zu sein; ob Deutschland war überhaupt ein Staat bevor. Der Resultat dieser gedanken war ein kritisches Artikel. Die Kritik klingt ähnlich wie die von Machiavelli; deswegen wäre eine Vergleichung interessant. Machiavelli schreibte seine grosste Werke in der Zeit, wenn Italien zerbrochen war und Venedig, der einzige "heimatliche" Macht, war im Verfall. Einige Ansichten zwischen ihm und Hegel waren unterschiedlich, sie vereinigen sich im Kritik der Verteilung ihres Volkes, Eigenwille der Teilen ohne Wahrnehmung des Ganzes. Beide sahen Staat als ein Organismus, der könnte von Verfall leiden, wenn man nicht darum pflegt. Kraft eines Staats zeigt sich beim Krieg, nicht im Frieden - im Gegenteil, Frieden kann dem Verfall befördern. Hegel schrieb den Verfassungsschrift am Anfang seiner Karriere; Machiavelli beim schreiben seiner Arbeiten war schon ein erfahrener Diplomat, der selbst wusste, was heisst es, die eigene Macht zu verlieren. Verstehen des Ideals und Praxis war sehr unterschiedlich bei jeden von ihnen, und zwar es ist möglich das Verfassungsschrift als Applikation der Ideen von Machiavelli zu lesen, aber auch als ihre Kritik.



2.Umore und Massen

Hegel sieht den Staat nicht als eine formale Institution, die von Verfassung, Steuerzahlung oder Armee definiert ist. Ganz im Gegenteil, Staat sollte eine Stadium der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft sein, oder ihres Geistes, welchen hat er im ihren Kern vorstellt. Die Grundidee der Verfassungsschrift war, dass ein Staat ist keine Summe der Begrenzungen, die die Gesellschaft für Zusammenleben braucht, wie zB Hobbes gelernt hat. Ein Staat ist primärweise ein Mittel, wodurch die Gedanken ins Tatsachlichkeit verwechselt werden. Diese Gedanken, die vom Staat durchgeführt werden, sind rational und moralisch per se, wie er das auch später in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts definiert*. Mit einem Staat kann man die Impotenz die schwere Problemen zu lösen abschaffen; durch Unterordnung des einzelnen Wille unter Wille der Masse. Vollkommenheit des Staates ist nicht relevant, es gibt nur eine Masstab, in wie fern die Resolutionen und Gesetze, die aus zentrale Macht ausgehen, die Bevölkerung beeinflussen können. Die Autorität soll alles durchsetzen können. Hegel benutzte dafür ein Beispiel aus Historie: die alte Fürste können die Religion ihres Landes oft kontrollieren. Nach Reformation, Pluralität der Kirchen und zB Betensweisen wurden unter Wille der Herrscher untergeordnet; jeder Andersglaubiger war inheräntlich suspekt. Nur später die Glaube wird wieder Privatsache; und die deutsche Staaten verlieren die Macht insofern dass sie die (über)lebenswichtige Sachen sichern können. So kleinen Staaten könnten nicht sich als unabhängig selbst behalten. Sie hatten kleine "Paradenarmee", genug Geld für bauen vielleicht eines Kirche und Erhaltung der wichtigsten Wegen, aber sie könnten keine grosse Projekten leisten. Es ist nicht so wichtig, wer die Machthebel in Hände hat, sondern ob sie überhaupt stattfinden; im Deutschland war das ins 300 Staaten zerkrümelt und nur formalweise vom einen Kaiser beherrscht.

Für Vergleichung, Machiavelli sah nicht Staat als gewisse Form der Menschenentwicklung. Idee der Staat ist immer in der Gesellschaft present. Es hängt ab von ihrer Form, ob der Staat "krank" oder "gesund" ist. Genau wie es Hegel formuliert, auch hier heisst es die Haltzeit des Systems. In der Formulierung des Hegels hat das eine andere Bedeutung - ein Staat im Zustand der Anarchie ist nur eine Formalität, nichst reales. Beim Machiavelli, allgemeine "Gesundheit" eines Staates hängt ab von Equilibrium der Macht der Reiche und Freiheit der Arme. Machiavelli hat diese vereinfachte Gruppen, Reiche und Armen, als "umore" genannt. Er hat es gesehen ähnlich wie die vier Säfte, die im menschlichen Organismus waren. Für galenische Medizin, Gegenwicht dieser Säften war gedacht als das Kern der Gesundheit. Diese Gegenwicht wird aber im Konflikt gegeneinander gestellt. Im guten Zustand, jede Seite versucht die andere zu verschwächen durch Gesetze. Als aber keine davon eine Macht dazu hatte, die andere völlig zu unterwerfen, also es führt zur Entstehung einer detailierter Legislative, ein verbindendes Element für beide Gruppen. Dann sowohl die Reiche als auch die Arme glauben, dass nur ein gemeinsames Staat, Republik, gibt für beiden genug Platz. Sobald eine von diesen Gruppen wird so stark, dass sie die andere beherrschen (oder kontrollieren) kann, die Resultät ist Auseinandertrennung von beiden. Sie fallen ins Hass und Trennung, die schwächere versucht auf der anderen unabhängig zu sein. Es entstehen keine weitere Gesetze, es gibt keine Bedürfniss für einem Staat, der wurden die beide Gruppen verbinden. Die Gruppen leben ein eigenes Leben, politische Probleme sind nur in ihren interne Rahmen. Machiavelli sieht aber dieses Zustand der Anarchie (licentia) nicht als hilflos: es kann immer eine starke Persönlichkeit kommen, die die Stärke einer Gruppe für seine eigene Aufstieg ausnutzt und durch Diktatur wieder in der Bevölkerung eine Gegenwicht schaffen kann. Wenn die Republik war für renaissantische Florence ein zu schweres Projekt, im Il Principe versuchte er mindestens die potentielle Diktatoren dafür inspirieren. Er hat keine Illusionen über ihnen, dass die andere können seine antische Ideale wiederfolgen, er hat mindestens für sie ihre Tate summarisiert.

Wir haben ein ähnliches Problem in dem Verfassungsschrift. Das Recht zur Freiheit, sich teilen lassen, war im Deutschland eine Selbstverständlichkeit, die wird eine Obligation. Das unabhängige Teil war, mindestens im Sinne Machiavellis, ein Staat, aber viel schwächer. Die Gründe, wonach sich diese politische Einheiten teilen, untergehen, wenn das kleinere Staat unabhängig wird. Aber das Ideal vom Staat ist dasselbe für Hegel als auch für Machiavelli: es geht um eine Sehnsucht nach ein Nationalstaat. Hegel sah die Deutschen als ein Volk, der sucht aber nach Freiheit** so tief, dass es nur als eine Monarchie geordnet sein kann***. Die Monarchie soll aber auch eine spezifische Form beinhalten, die ein Kompromis wäre zwischen turkischer Despotie und österreichischem System, wo der Kaiser war nur der erste man der Aristokratie. Im Deutschland war der Kaiser ein externelles Phänomen, ein Garant der Rechte der einzelne Staaten. Hegel am ende des Schriftes**** definiert der Zustand, wenn eine Menge von Leute zwar formiert ein Volk, aber nicht ein Staat, als Barbarei. Es ist ein Zustand, wo gibt es eine gewisse Autorität, die aber nur minimales Einfluss auf die Aktivität der Einzelne hat. Deutschland war im diesen Zustand; die Frage war, was ist der Zweck des Staats für ein Volk und nicht im Gegenteil, was für ein Zweck für den Staat hat ein Volk. Staat war nur eine Formalität hier, keine Institution, die der Wille ins Tatsachlichkeit verwechseln könnte. Vom aussen sieht es aus, dass auch Machiavelli wollte der Wille des Volkes zu vereinigen. Er hat aber die formale Seite des Staats nicht so tief wahrgenommen, wenn überhaupt. Das war ein Detail, der hat dem Hegel oft gebremst. Ein Staat war für ihm oft primärweise eine Idee, Summe der Gesetzte der Gesellschaft, nicht ihr Zustand.

* §258
** VfS, "Sollte das politische Resultat...", 50, auch "Diese Form des deutschen Staatrechts...", 64
*** VfS, "Diese Form des deutschen Staatrechts...", 67
**** VfS, "Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr...", 42



3.Schluss

Am ende haben wir die Frage, ob der Zweck des Staats, als geschrieben vom Hegel und Machiavelli, wurde in der Geschichte erfüllt. Italien in der Zeit Machiavellis hat keine vereinigende Persönlichkeit gefunden und blieb für drei Jahrhunderte ein Kampffeld für die ausländische Mächte. Deutschland, auf der andere Seite, wurde nach dem Fall des Napoleons schrittweise vereinigt von Preussen, die 70 Jahre später hat das ganze Land beherrscht. Es ist ein gebrauch heute dem Hegel als ein Oberideologe der Preussen zu sehen. Es war aber auch König Friedrich der Grosse selbst, der hat kurz von seiner Tod gezeigt ein Rezept für Kontrolle über der interne Politik - nämlich die äussere. In Preussen hat er ein mehr orientales Model der Gessellschaft gegründet, der zwei "umore" beinhaltet, hier die Armee und Zivilen. Innerhalb des Staates war ein gewisses "pax Romana", der investiert grosse Energie für Unterstützung des Heers. Es war nicht das Ideal von Machiavelli; keine Römische Republik, die mit dauernde Expansion genug Profit für Patricii als auch dem Freiraum für Plebs gegeben hat. As war aber auch kein Ansicht Hegels. Es geht hier um einen "tatsächlichen Staat", der vereinigt alle Bevölkerung für gemeinschaftliche Zusammenarbeit. Ein Mitglied wurde sich nicht gegen Opponenten innerhalb des Staat setzen; es gibt keine. Die vollkommene Form davon waren jedoch die totalitare Staaten des 20.Jahrhunderts. Die Vergleichung also ist interessant, sowohl von Ursachen als auch von Wirkung. Der Prozess der Lösung der Probleme ist aber ganz unterschiedlich.

1.Preface

For many scientists - either of humanities or of natural disciplines - is Francis Bacon known primarily as one of the pioneers of the modern research methods. He didn't only critically reflected contemporary scholastics, thus at least paving the way for these methods, but also helped to spread a new way of thinking in a much wider society, repelling superstition and mythical thinking in general. In his time, a superstitious worldview wasn't characteristic only for the uneducated folks, but also for the elite, which could afford good schools for their children. Bacon himself, as many contemporary scientists, was studying various occult disciplines like alchemy or astrology, which still seemed to be of a serious importance those days1.

These problems, of course, weren't bound to those, whom Bacon considered as real scientists of his time. Despite all the harsh critics, which he imposed on their methods, aristotelian scholars were similarily hostile to superstitious thoughts of their contemporaries. Bacon's methods have proven, however, to be not only much more effective, but also more accessible and motivating to those, who tried to study nature. The main problem of these was perhaps not as much the nature of their studies as the fact it was neither presented for public nor it gave way for a technical application. The first problem was, of course, not linked to the scholars only. Various solute experimenters, like alchemysts or engineers, often weren't very eager to publish their discoveries, nor merely to share it with other collegues, speaking only cryptically about them with their students2.

Superstitious thoughts and occult sciences are bound together, supporting each other. By hiding (or simply avoiding) the true nature of a presented process, the "scientist" himself tries to call this superstition upon the observers, who then can't help themselves not to describe the process in a fantastic way. The fantasy spreads unless it is refuted by somebody learned enough to counter it. This image of a "scientist", who presents his work as a "magic", is built by the cooperation of both sides - the observer and the "scientist". The magical science was of a spectacular character, which seems to be changed by Bacon, who described a new way how to experience its discoveries by its widescale technical application. The technology isn't aimed at thoughts and fantasy of an observer, but to the matter itself. How could this preference of a harder and more risky way develop? And what kind of development did Bacon expect?

1 - Zagorin p.29; Bacon himself (NO II §9) defines "magic" as a practical division of metaphysics, the science of eternal, immutable forms.
2 - Rossi p.44; As Zagorin writes (p.43), Bacon was inspired by this esoteric aspect of occult sciences too. He was aware that an unlimited spread of scientific knowledge would cause its misunderstanding and abuse. It was



2.Arguments

Paolo Rossi in his "Geburt der modernen Wissenschaft in Europa" doubts the role of Bacon in the establishment of modern ways - both methodical and ethical - of technological research. In his age there were thousands of technical manuals and studies being published already, and only few of them were referring to his ideas of "neutral technicism"1. Also, his main credit isn't the creation of modern methods in science and formulation of motives, why we should apply them, but more the sole fact, that he was the first who handled the phenomenon of "mechanical art" as a subject of philosophy2. In a machine he didn't see only a means of attaining a concrete end unattainable by bare hands, but also a form, a depiction of clear natural laws; he also gave attention to its rapid development and universal accessibility of its theories, bound more to hard physical work than to a peaceful study3. Nevertheless, the progress and spreading of technology itself began sooner, with the engineers and inventors, and also with new means of information, like press4.

A similar stance, though from another point of view, is presented by Perez Zagorin. According to him, many of our contemporary epistemologists - and most notably Popper - didn't give very much credit for development of science to the inductive research methods, for which propagation was Bacon deeply respected in the previous centuries5. According to those, Bacon didn't comprehend the meaning of theoretical presumptions, even if based on empirical data, and thought that by amassing the observations one doesn't need to make any hypotheses at all. Zagorin consideres this a myth based on an overseeing of Bacon's distinction between "anticipation" and "interpretation" (of nature)6. Similarily to modern deductivists, even Bacon wasn't limited to a thought, that the hypotheses, which become the object of inquiry, should be merely intuitive; their testing should be complex and refined by every instance of experiments, thus not repeating the same situation over and over again7.

However, it is clear that even a superstitious desription would be based on a loose observation; no other source than empirical sphere can be imagined. It is the systematic interpretation of observation on which useful conclusions and new theories may be based; without any observation, no idea about a phenomenon (even if only "rash and premature") can be made at all. Zagorin's point is to show Bacon's inductive method as perfectly empiric, without need of intuitive or by tradition acquired knowledge.

To sum up, we have two main arguments against Bacon's credit. On the one hand, we can see Bacon's work as a result, or as a reflection of contemporary technological progress. His contribution was the theoretical review of it. On the other, we have an idea, that as he didn't recognize the value of intuition, his method is suitable for particular experiments. He could contribute to the experimental method, but not to the theoretical process preceding the experiments. If Rossi's view was to show Bacon as a theoretist of technology, in the latter we may see his work vice-versa as a technical supplement for theories. Both views try to find a positive knowledge in Bacon's work. However, his true role may be much better understood, when we would read his epistemological works not as a primary literature, but as a critique of what we may call his contemporary scientific worldview.

1 - Rossi p.70
2 - Rossi p.67
3 - ibid
4 - Rossi p.72
5 - Zagorin p.90
6 - ibid, NO I §26
7 - Zagorin p.91; NO I §70: "no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself; the inquiry must be enlarged so as to become more general"



3.Bacon's Model

From previous, it would seems Bacon commented either engineers or scientists of theoretical disciplines, like mathematicians. However, in Novum Organum he primarily faced the methods employed by scholars. The theoretical knowledge, which he criticized, was in no way of an intuitive, but of traditional nature. Scientific dogmas of his age weren't original projects like for example those of present theoretical physics, but norms defined by the works of Aristoteles. It seems he thought the humans are somehow creating knowledge at any time, while the problem is in the way how they interprete it1. That was the base of Bacon's famous theory of Idols. The first category (idola tribus) reflected human nature, its limits or general setting2. They reflect a material, corporeal form, whose abilities can be partially enhanced through various tools. The others (idola specus, fori and theatri) were more of a social or didactical character.

The first class, tribal Idols, doesn't reflect only the incapability of senses of perceiving subtleties in the structure of particles or spiritual activity, but also the effects of passions3. People were simply impatient to make deep inquiries into the things they didn't comprehend by mere sight, and thus they imagined the solution4. Specular Idols are similar in the way they are caused by passions as well. They are caused by individual differentiation of setting, as everybody lives his own life. The people tend to focus on one thing and describe by its means the whole world. When we discover a system between few particular phenomena, we tend to apply it on the others as well. Most notably Aristotle was the main victim of these Idols, while the Atomists, being fascinated by the true substance of matter, are perfectly avoiding the problem, not speaking of any systems at all5.

The third class of Idols could are at most the immediate result of "premature anticipation" - and as Bacon says, they are the worst of problems6. The problem had to be in definitions, first objects of contemporary science7. The problems of language, interchanging of a sign and signified object, are still problematic nowadays. Similarily to the root of the problem, seen in the tribal Idols, people tend not only to choose more simple and familiar descriptions of the material phenomena, but also of cultural ones. Either in a way of the specular Idols - to adapt a thought onto an own worldview - or in various possible errors provided by the structure of language, like homonyms and vaguely defined terms; in short vain or ill-chosen words8. Theatrical Idols then present a worldview, culturally accepted mistakes, which reflect themselves on philosophies and, especially, speculative theologies9.

1 - NO I §28
2 - NO I §41: "all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe"; According to Zuna, these words are taken from Protagoras, reflecting more a skeptic, negative nature of this problem. Impossibility to fully comprehend an object of experience by senses only is matter of a major importance in the New Organon, but surely not its foundation. Actually Bacon himself criticizes the Platonists of making the skepticism towards sensual knowledge a tenet (NO §67), an idea presented by many thinkers of renaissance as well.
3 - Zagorin p.83
4 - NO I §49; but as the next aphorism says, of course "by far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the senses"
5 - NO I §54 and 57
6 - NO I §59
7 - NO I §30: "Though all the wits of all the ages should meet together and combine and transmit their labors, yet will no great progress ever be made in science by means of anticipations; because radical errors in the first concoction of the mind are not to be cured by the excellence of functions and subsequent remedies."
8 - NO I §60
9 - NO I §62



4.New Theater

Of course, if Bacon would just skeptically question the present state of science and call all the contemporary technological progress a mere "chance"1, then we wouldn't speak of him as the one, who gave the "for long time an unmatched program of a massive and glorious scientific and technological struggle"2. Theory of Idols was to show the causes of his contemporary state of science. Its goal was to clear the way for induction as the "only hope" for creating true image of things3. This view, to show New Organon as a work of scientific methodology, is the one questioned by Rossi and questioned by Zagorin. However, to call it a methodology wouldn't suffice; it tries to affect a much wider field, like worldview.

It doesn't see a qualitative distinction between a theoretical text and an experiment. It evaluates both as same category of a source of knowledge; both are being affected by different Idols, but both may lead to truth, when these Idols are recognized and overcome. Bacon saw a text as a collection of empirical data, composed of a personal experiences and opinions. People tend to prefer expertise from general overview, what reflects, due to the Idols of Cave, on any of their opinion about the general nature. Bacon remarks, that this is because of the social nature - no artisan nor philosopher works for some abstract truth, for comprehension of the nature, but is motivated by the fruits of the work in which he is an expert, and which he tries to present4. A natural philosophic opinion (be it in a form of an axiom or of a wider system of metaphysics) is not the end, a goal of their study, but, inversely, a tool for justification of their real work. Knowledge was always reflecting an individual skill.

The first problem opened - the difference between the effectivity of mechanical and magical arts - could have been easily avoided, when the magician had the skill ("power") to fascinate and persuade the spectators. A mechanist could have set an opinion based on his works, but still it would be only in a competition with that of a magician5. What was needed, was a common language for both, which would reflect the nature of their works with one terminology and one set of axioms; like he says, to "pass from Vulcan to Minerva"6. And it could become effective only if the works of such art would bring fruits of higher effectivity than those of lone artisans, relying on their personal skills. The axioms have no value without application on the matter7, but when proven to be generally valuable, every artisan would have to be aware his work is reflecting it.

Such a possibility gave enough space and meaning to a new phenomenon: experiments with an abstract goal, "experimenta lucifera". In comparision to "experimenta fructifera", experiments which prove a particular quality of concrete object, these are touching that, what Bacon calls causes. They aren't dependant much on the theory, as any result of them would "enlighten" the understanding of the problem8. There has to be, of course, a certain theory behind the experiment. Their problem is, that they carry no definite meaning by themselves. It is hard to say, in how far the theories may be based on reason; what does exactly Bacon see as an inductive conclusion and what is already a mere expectation. How much is it needed for a conclusion to become an axiom, sufficient for being a base for practical (fruitful) experiments? The limits of this method weren't expected to show themselves at once. Also, we should be aware, that the induction is only a part of Bacon's method. What we seek for are "forms"9, whose definition seems to be purely nominal. His practical advice was to define terms basing on their presence or absence (as well as other relative qualities like degree or proximity) in the observed instance. By experiments we would find, in which instance the form doesn't appear, thus limit the number of cases relevant for studying the object.

When the As he himself couldn't comprehend all the possible instances of one form (ie heat), the projected method of tables was far from being influental, in comparision to the generally propagated ideas about induction. Not only the mere presence of a phenomenon did not mean a relation between its nature and the nature of an observed instance, but the number of all the instances, in which a form can be researched may not be always finite10. In so far remained Bacon a theoretist, not a practical experimenter, what Zagorin calls a "failure" of New Organon11. It didn't give a description of the process, in which empirical stimuli become knowledge, it remained a critical work, serving to make a new scientist aware of errors (Idols) he may encounter. That's why despite the efforts the expectations of the work to create some new "theater" of science weren't fulfilled.

1 - NO I §8: "Moreover, the works already known are due to chance and experiment rather than to sciences; for the sciences we now possess are merely systems for the nice ordering and setting forth of things already invented, not methods of invention or directions for new works."
2 - Zuna p.9
3 - NO I §14
4 - NO I §70
5 - NO I §74: "what is founded on nature grows and increases, while what is founded on opinion varies but increases not"
6 - NO II §7
7 - NO I §106
8 - NO I §99: "Now experiments of this kind have one admirable property and condition: they never miss or fail. For since they are applied, not for the purpose of producing any particular effect, but only of discovering the natural cause of some effect, they answer the end equally well whichever way they turn out; for they settle the question."
9 - NO II §1; "or true specific differences, nature-engendering natures, or source of emanation...", in short laws of physics; reasons explaining why one instance is different from another.
10 - It seems Bacon was quite an optimist: "Meantime, let no man be alarmed at the multitude of particulars, but let this rather encourage him to hope." (NO I §112)
11 - Zagorin p.101



5.Conclusion

At first, for Bacon himself it has no meaning, whether we find his work of greater or lesser value for the development of modern science. He didn't finish his work, and perhaps didn't even expected to do so. For us, it is important to discover, what were the methods of contemporary, or rather pre-Baconian science, what kind of inquiry was generally understood as "serious" and, perhaps of the highest importance, how and into what did he change these attitudes. What we could have find was at first the mistrust towards any knowledge but empirical. Abstraction had a meaning only when its relation to an empirical experience is clear and sufficient; also it should be proven to be a general for the most cases. Tradition was of no value when it can't be related to the empirical knowledge as well. Secondly there is a principle of insufficiency; no question may be answered without opening new ones. An individual knowledge doesn't have an ability to comprehend the whole science at once. A science becomes a cultural phenomenon, basing itself on a shared language and worldview, instead on an interest and skill.

What we have today of the New Organon is in no way a manual for amassing knowledge. Despite the fact, that the "great instauration" wasn't completed, and remained a process of numerous, usually autonomous changes in methods of individual disciplines, Bacon's work remained to be a text, which gave a single reason to question the contemporary methods as well as superstitious thoughts, handling them on a same level.

"For creation was not by the curse made altogether and forever a rebel, but in virtue of that charter "In the sweat of thy face shall thou eat bread," it is now by various labors (not certainly by disputations or idle magical ceremonies, but by various labors) at length and in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread, that is, to the uses of human life." NO (end)



Literature


Bacon, Francis - Advancement of Learning, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bacon/francis
Bacon, Francis - New Organon, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bacon/francis/ (quoted as NO)
Rossi, Paolo - Geburt der modernen Wissenschaft in Europa
Zagorin, Perez - Francis Bacon

1.Einleitung

V sociálnej filozofii je jednou z hlavných tém vzájomné usporiadanie vzťahov súkromných (rodinných, priateľských) a verejných (obchodných, právnych). Rozdiel týchto dvoch sfér je zrejme úloha a cieľ dôvery voči druhým (die Anderen). Zatiaľ čo súkromný vzťah charakterizuje dôvera voči druhému (teda priateľovi či príbuznému) ako spriaznenej osobe, vo verejných je dôvera zameraná voči spoločnosti ako celku, jej súboru noriem, ktorých dodržiavanie u druhých predpokladáme. V mnohých spoločenstvách, ako napríklad politických stranách či rodinných firmách, sa toto rozlíšenie neraz úplne stráca. Až pri riešení konfliktov môže jeden alebo druhý typ vzťah prevládnuť. Možnosti jedného (apelovanie na priateľstvo resp.právne možnosti) sa stávajú prostriedkom riešenia problému vzniklého v rámci obmedzených možností druhého. Dichotómia morálnej a legálnej sféry sa v takom prípade zrazu stáva kontrastnejšou a menej preklenuteľnou. V jednom prípade sa môže stratiť vzájomná dôvera a vzťah nadobudne pevné neosobné pravidlá. V druhom zas relativizácia spoločných pravidiel kvôli dôvere voči druhému môže vzbudiť očakávanie, že aj v ďalších prípadoch bude prevládať podobný prístup. Levinas v Totalität und Unendlichkeit ponúkol systém, v ktorom verejné a privátne nieje na spoločenskej úrovni jasne oddelené. Namiesto toho je poskytnutý obraz druhého ako nedosiahnuteľného a neovládateľného. Ale nakoľko jeho teória vystihuje konanie ľudí v inštitúciách, v ktorých sa tieto sféry miešajú?



2.Historische Einblick

V dejinách vzniklo množstvo koncepcií, ktoré ontologicky podriaďovali jednu sféru vzťahov druhej. Už v klasickom období boli prítomné dve podobne rozdeliteľné koncepcie. Na jednej strane Platón podriaďuje štát priateľským vzťahom. Spoločnosť vzniká, keď spriatelení občania si navzájom pomáhajú a svojim nepriateľom škodia1. Keďže svojim priateľom dôverujem a máme spoločné ciele, resp.hodnoty, vytvárame si zákony, aby sme toto spoločenstvo spevnili. Tie platia len pre obmedzené množstvo občanov, ostatní ľudia sú vyčlenení (alebo podčlenení) mimo tento okruh ako nedôveryhodné, resp.nedokonalé bytosti. U stoikov je to z tohto pohľadu naopak: podľa Zenónovho ideálu spoločnosti, múdri ľudia by mali rozpoznať hodnotu druhých ľudí2. Na spoločne rozpoznateľných hodnotách by bola spoločnosť usporiadaná a priateľstvá by potom vznikali už len kvôli tomu, že ten druhý by bol, podobne ako "ja", rozumný človek. Občianstvo nemá byť vymedzené len pre tých, čo sa preukázali lojalitu. Veľkosť štátu je tiež logicky odvoditeľná z týchto koncepcií: Platónov štát je neveľkým mestom, kde by sa zhruba všetci občania (prinajmenšom v rámci jednej z tried) mohli osobne poznať, zatiaľ čo ten Zenónov je, naopak, svetovou ríšou. V oboch koncepciách je priateľstvo resp.právo založené na fakte, že ľudia vo vzťahu (či už v rámci platónskej malej skupiny alebo kozmickej spoločnosti stoikov) si sú podobní. Majú spoločné vlastnosti a práve preto si navzájom môžu dôverovať.

1 - Cartledge
2 - Cassirer s.100



3.Metaphysik und der Andere

Levinas pritom z dôvery voči druhému nevychádza. Z faktu podobnosti ľudí odvíja úplne opačnú skutočnosť. Druhý je podľa neho neobsiahnuteľná skutočnosť, sféra nekonečných možností. Sociálny vzťah je vzťahom metafyzickým; v tom zmysle, že nieje obmedzeným na dokončenie vývinu určitého celku (dejín, ako hovorí Levinas1), ale skôr rozvinutím idey nekonečna. V kontakte s neživím svetom dokážeme ovládať svoje vnímanie pomerne konkrétnymi zámermi (Intention). Intencionalita je prostriedok kritiky vnemov. Pomocou nej svet zvecňujeme, premieňame neurčitý element (hmotu) na vec, ktorý potom slúži k napĺňaniu a vollziehungu života2. Keďže ale celok subjektívneho sveta je vlastne zložený z ovládateľných elementov a vecí, sféra vzťahov s druhými je mimo neho. "Ja" som v tomto chápaní "metafyzikom", disponujúcim subjektívnym svetom zloženým z prežívania (Erfahrung, Genuss), "ten druhý" je vždy "metafyzičnom", ktorého prežívanie je mne samo o sebe neprístupné3. Vzťah vychádza zo zjavenia (Epiphanie) tvárí4, teda z toho, čím sa jeden druhému predstavíme. Tvár je tvorená rečou; resp.je to vždy tvár, "kto" hovorí. Vzťah z tváre do tváre je neredukovateľný na poznatky. Naproti dôvere (ktorá si vyžaduje určité poznanie o myslení druhého) je základom ľudských vzťahov skôr priznanie slobody druhému, dokonalej nezávislosti jeho činností od mojej vôle.

1 - TU s.66; Metafyzičnom sa v TU označuje zhruba sféra nekonečna. Človek môže (a zvyčajne asi aj má) v sebe ideu nekonečna mať - do tej miery sám je metafyzikom. Význam ale vychádza z etymológie slova: ide o skutočnosti nezahrnuteľné do reality fyzickej, do sféry známych pravidiel pohybu, zhruba teda objektívne poznateľného sveta.
2 - TU s.184; V Levinasovej terminológii element je objekt ktorý, na rozdiel od veci, nemôže nikomu patriť. Človek svojou rozumovou (intencionálnou) činnosťou extrahuje časti elementu ako veci pre svoje životné túžby. Ak za element teda môžeme považovať napríklad more, vecou bude potom loď, ktorou sa snažíme využiť možnosti, ktoré nám ten element ponúka. Človek môže, ako Levinas hovorí, pomocou určitých prostriedkov elementy ovládať, no nie obsiahnuť a mať; ide o "obsah bez formy".
3 - TU s.87
4 - TU s.318



4.Pluralismus

V podstate, drvivá väčšina ľudských vzťahov by z aspektu dôvery bola opísateľná ako verejné vzťahy: ľudia jednajú podľa noriem, nie vzájomných citov. No z pristupu k druhym sa ale neodvadzaju len socialne vztahy. V nich sa totiz formuluju ludske nazory, poznanie, predstava o "totalne", teda dosiahnutelnom svete. Pri objaveni druheho1 objavujeme aj detaily svojho subjektivneho sveta. Základným poznatkom, sa môže zdať, ktoré ponúka Levinasova definícia druhého, je pluralita týchto svetov. Pravda o ňom, nech už je akokoľvek definovaná, vždy predstavuje osobný názor. Pre spoločenstvo je teda dôležitou ani nie tak pravda sama, ako skôr sloboda určiť si ju. Slobodná bytosť je v spravodlivom systéme2 definovaná ako spontánna, čo (tautologicky) motivuje svoju činnosť svojou slobodou. Vo vzťahu s druhými sa ale vynára práve potreba prehodnotenia takejto slobody. Spontánnosť sa totiž nikdy nezdá absolútna; činnosť v rámci subjektívneho sveta, v rámci celku vychádza z prehodnocovania vnemov, chápania činností, ktorými sa život napĺňa3. Snáď len v prípade, keď ju človek predstaví ako súčasť svojej "tváre", reči voči druhému, je možné takúto činnosť považovať za slobodnú, nezávislú, lebo je súčasťou "môjho" subjektívneho celku. Tento pluralizmus má ohromný význam pre reč a vzájomné pochopenie, avšak aj pre dve sféry ľudských vzťahov, v ktorých dominuje skôr vôľa než reč - pre vojny a obchod.

1 - TU s.319; Levinas využíva pojem "zjavenia tváre" (Epiphanie). Cez toto zjavenie vzniká medzi "mnou" a "druhým" vzťah, ktorý nieje opísateľný v rámci celku, je to teda vzťah metafyzický. Objektivizujúca filozofia (ktorú na mieste Levinas nekonkretizuje; ide ale zrejme o spinozovsko-hegeliánsky typ, "filozofiu neutrálna", ktorý opisuje v záverečných kapitolách TU, napr.na s.432) sa pritom snaží o úplne opačný pohľad: snaží sa vychádzať z jednotného Bytia (Sein), kde sú jednajúce strany spočítateľné a zasaditeľné do jednotného celku (Totalität).
2 - TU s.114: "Die politische Theorie begründet die Gerechtigkeit mit dem selbstverständlichen Wert der Spontaneität; es kommt darauf an, mittels der Erkenntnis der Welt den grösstmöglichsten Spielraum für die Spontaneität zu gewinnen, indem meine Freiheit mit der Freiheit der Anderen in Einklang gebraucht wird."
3 - TU s.154; Levinas tieto príčiny činností, zvonka hodnotené niekedy ako "spontánne", každopádne odmieta nazývať "potrebami", ale skôr "túžbami". Rozdiel je v krátkosti podaný tak, že túžba nevychádza z nedostatku (TU s.432). Ako príklad spomína potravu. Chlieb je prostriedok k predĺženiu života, ako aj cieľ mnohých jeho činností. Ide o jednu z častí života, nie len o nejaké palivo, bez ktorého život zaniká alebo stráca zmysel. Má vplyv na myslenie a jeho rola je nakoniec obohatením, nie obmedzením. Život sa snaží rozvinúť, nieje vonkajším javom mimo "mňa", ktoré by bolo ním tlačené.



5.Krieg

Levinas nerieši hlbšie príčiny resp.ciele vojen. Problém otvára len natoľko, koľko môže povedať o ľudských vzťahoch. Vojna je stav, v ktorom dve strany (na rovnakej úrovni ako "ja" a "ten druhý") odmietnu prináležať tomu istému celku1. Je ťažké povedať, či stranami sú dvaja vojaci v službách znepriatelených mocností; dve mocnosti alebo ich ideológie; alebo či ide o akýkoľvek konflikt medzi ľuďmi na akejkoľvek úrovni. Levinasova charakteristika vojny v TU sčasti zodpovedá všetkým týmto úrovniam. To, čo v reči (a minulom paragrafe) môžeme objavovať, je vo vojne dané ako predpoklad2. Spoločnosť, spoločné zákony, normy, sú v tomto vzťahu zámerne obchádzané a relativizované. Na druhej strane ale Levinas tiež hovorí, že bez vojny, stavu bezvládia, bez "totality", nieje možné spoločné pravidlá vytvoriť3. Vo vojne je nutné predpokladať, že druhý je svojim spôsobom nevypočítateľný, v "mieri", teda reči, je také tvrdenie skôr záverom. Ide tu o trochu hobbsovskú predstavu. Tým, že sú dvaja proti sebe postavení ako možní protivníci, majú dve možnosti: buď vzájomnú reč alebo pokúsiť sa o donútenie silou. Sila vojny vychádza v prvom rade z obmedzenia vôle smrťou: keďže telo je jej najvlastnejším prostriedkom a smrť je teda zánikom všetkých možností4. Už samo obmedzovanie cez utrpenie je skúškou ľudskej slobody. Po smrti už niesme prítomní pri "posúdení" svojho bytia, ide len o tieň vôle v dejinách. Keď ale človek trpí, cíti nátlak, svojou výdržou (Geduld) môže násilie vnímať ako púhy akt v rámci cudzej totality, v rámci sveta vecí5. Vôľa v utrpení naberá abstraktný ráz.

1 - TU s.323
2 - ibid; "Der Krieg setzt die Transzendenz des Gegners voraus. Er wird gegen den Menschen geführt...er zielt auf ein Seiendes, das in einem Antlitz erscheint. Er ist weder Jagd noch Kampf mit einem Element. Die Möglichkeit, die der Gegner hat, die besterstellten Berechnungen zu überlisten, drückt die Trennung aus, den Bruch mit der Totalität, durch den hindurch die Gegner sich angehen."
3 - TU s.322
4 - TU s.352
5 - TU s.351; "In der Geduld, an der Grenze zum Verzicht, versinkt der Wille nicht in der Absurdität; denn von jenseits des Nichts, das den Zeitraum, der von der Geburt zum Tod verfliesst, zu etwas bloss Subjektivem, Innerlichem, Illusorischem, Unbedeutenden machen würde, kommt die Gewalt, die der Wille erträgt, wie eine Tyrannei vom Anderen, aber ereignet sich eben dadurch wie eine Absurdität, die sich vor dem Hintergrund der Bedeutung abhebt. Die Gewalt ist nicht das Ende der Rede; es ist nicht alles unerbittlich."



6.Handel

V obchode niesú strany ani v konflikte ani v osobnej reči. Prebieha tu komunikácia "cez vec", pomocou práce. Význam rozumu a vôle vo vzťahu subjektu s hmotou sme už stihli načrtnúť. Vnem identifikuje element, rozum vyčlení v jeho rámci veci a vyvolá vôľu pracovať na nich. Prácou pretvoríme vec na výrobok a ktorý potom môžeme ponúknuť ako tovar. Tovar nesie odtlačok svojho tvorcu, aj keď sama jeho vôľa sa z neho "sťahuje", ako hovorí Levinas1. Výrobok ostáva ako pamiatka na vôľu, ako jej dejiny2. Levinas predstavuje hierarchiu založenú na zmysluplnosti vecí. Keď veciam dodáme zmysel svojimi úmyslami a prácou, vzniká výrobok (Werk), ktorý stojí na úrovni iných vyjadrení ľudskej "tváre"3. Na nižšej úrovni je tovar (Ware), ktorý nieje spojený už s osobou výrobcu, ale skôr s druhotným nosičom hodnoty, peniazmi. Ide o špecifickú vlastnosť vôle, že generuje veci navyše, iné vyjadrenia niesú tak ľahko nahraditeľné4. V Levinasovom chápaní sú dejiny tvorené práve výrobkami, vplyvmi vôle na vonkajšiu skutočnosť. Pokúsil sa tým ukázať, že vôľa nikdy nie čisto vnútornou vecou, že nikdy nezáleží len na ideálnej stránke predstáv. Výrobok tiež nieje chápaný len materiálne; je to akákoľvek zmena v objektívnom svete, ktorú človek úmyselne zanechal. Výrobcu samozrejme nepochopíme úplne len skúmaním jeho výrobkov, ono je to ale len výrobok, ktorý nás "má" zaujímať. Ponúka len výrobok, nič viac. V obchodnom vzťahu neskúmame, "kto" je pracujúci, ale len to, "čo" robí. Je to vzťah vyložene neosobný, verejný. Tak ako pri vojne sa vôľa začína viac zaoberať zbraňou než protivníkom, tak aj v obchode sa stávajú najdôležitejšími peniaze ako sprostredkovateľ vzťahu5.

1 - TU s.329; "das Werk gewinnt den Charakter einer Anonymität der Ware, in der sogar der Arbeiter als Lohnempfänger verschwinden kann"
2 - TU s.331
3 - TU s.431
4 - ibid; "Die Gegenwart verhält sich nich zum Ausdruck wie der Wille zu seinem Werk; der Wille zieht sich aus seinem Werk zurück, indem er es seinem Schicksal überlässt, am Ende hat er 'eine Menge Dinge' gewollt, die er nicht gewollt hat."
5 - TU s.337



7.Politik

Je ťažké povedať, nakoľko sa Levinas stavia k potrebe hľadania spravodlivosti v rámci spoločenskej organizácie. V podstate sme videli dva rôzne prístupy k druhému: buď osobný (konfliktný alebo komunikatívny) alebo masový (peňažný či vojenský). Z toho môžme prísť k rovnakému rozdeleniu sociálnych vzťahov, aké sme načrtli na začiatku. Nedá sa prihovoriť k masám (alebo bojovať s nimi), je možné im len dať určitú odosobnenú ponuku, ktorá funguje práve ako zbrane či peniaze vo vojenskom resp.obchodnom vzťahu1. A tiež naopak, akákoľvek ponuka v súkromnom vzťahu je inak hodnotená, ako keď príde z mora trhu. Politická strana je jedným z prostriedkov, ktoré sa tieto dve sféry snažia spojiť. Jej moc je zvonka založená na "trhu": podpora voličských más vychádza z toho, čo je jej odosobnene ponúknuté. Môže ísť o idey, interpretácie skutočností, na ktoré strana vplyv nemá, ale aj o konkrétne zmeny, ktoré v štáte už vykonala. Štát sám, pretvorený na jej obraz, je jej "tovarom". Zvnútra je strana založená na "vojne": jednotlivci zhromažďujú kolegov na podporu vlastných idejí, ktoré chcú dostať do ideológie strany. Úspech pri prehlasovaní v rámci strany je pre jednotlivca, politika, potom významnejší ako úspech v zákonodarnom zbore. V rámci strany totiž nadobúda dominanciu, jeho hlas môže byť stotožnený s hlasom kolegov. Tí sa môžu brániť tvorbou vnútrostraníckych platforiem, ktorými si zachovávajú svoju vlastnú tvár; strana ako celok ich ale potlačuje. Navonok, "tovar" strany je teda na jednej strane dokonale odosobnený cez stanovami predurčeným procesom schvaľovania; na druhej môže byť predstavený predsedom alebo "straníckym expertom" či tieňovým ministrom ako osobný názor. Či už človek chce počuť ľudského vodcu alebo neosobnú, nadčasovú ideu, práve pomocou straníckych ideológií je možné nasýtiť obe túžby naraz.

1 - TU s.333; "Im Handel und Krieg bleibt die Beziehung mit den Werken eine Beziehung mit dem Werker. Aber mittels des Goldes, das ihn kauft, oder des Stahls, der ihn tötet, tritt man dem Anderen nicht von Angesicht zu Angesicht gegenüber; der Handel meint den anonymen Markt, der Krieg wird gegen eine Masse geführt, obwohl Handel und Krieg das Intervall einer Transzendenz durchschreiten."



8.Konklusion

Oproti klasickým teóriám spoločenských vzťahov sa tá Levinasova ďaleko viac zaoberá hmotnými prostriedkami, ako je to bežné od čias Smitha a Marxa. Pri konštitúcii širšieho spoločenského celku - či už štátu, strany alebo inej inštitúcie - prechádzajú neosobné vzťahy do popredia. Súkromné vzťahy niesú ani princípom, ani odvodené z verejných; obe sféry sú navzájom nezávislé. Pre verejné vzťahy je oveľa dôležitejší postoj voči hmote, resp.k "elementom", sfére ľudských možností. Súkromný postoj k druhému je síce v strede pozornosti celého diela, no ten vychádza práve z toho, že druhého nemôžeme medzi elementy zaradiť. Podľa Levinasa je politika pokus o vládu pomocou univerzálnych zákonov1, čo ale vôbec nezodpovedá reálnej politickej činnosti - bojového poľa názorov a vzťahov dopytu a ponuky medzi stranou a voličmi. Štát je pre neho tyranská inštitúcia oktrojujúca svoje zákony tak, ako by za nimi nestála ľudská skúsenosť a spolupráca. Ak teda platónsky a stoický model štátu vychádzal z predstáv o spoločných vlastnostiach človeka, tak ten Levinasov akoby ukazoval, nakoľko nemá štát s ľudskou prirodzenosťou nič spoločné.

1 - TU s.435




Literatur

Cassirer, Ernst - Myth of State
Levinas, Emmanuel - Totalität und Unendlichkeit
Cartledge, Paul (Hg.) - Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998

0.
Yi-Fu Tuan (*1930) je emeritný profesor geografie na Wisconsinskej univerzite. V Topophilii rieši všeobecne vzťah a reakcie (chápanie, hodnotenie, obmeny) človeka na svoje prostredie, ich príčiny, dynamiku. Využíva predovšetkým poznatky geografie a kultúrnej antropológie, popri nich ale aj biologické, etologické, psychologické či kunsthistorické. Topofilia je jedna z foriem takýchto reakcií, predstavujúca citové puto k prostrediu. Príčiny jeho vzniku sú v človeku aj prostredí samotnom. V snahe o ich formulovanie, Tuan skúma vnímanie a hodnotenie prostredia na úrovni individuálnej, skupinovej a druhovej. Dva hlavné koncepty - ľudská činnosť (kultúra) a prostredie - sú odlišované, aby bola zvýraznená práve ich súčinnosť pri tvorbe tohto vzťahu.


1.(VIII)
Človek prirodzene pristupuje k svojmu prostrediu jednak vnímaním (perception), čo zahrňuje tak stimul zmyslového orgánu ako aj cielenej reakcie naň; tiež postojom k nemu (attitude), teda činnosťami alebo názormi na prostredie, ktoré vychádzajú skôr z osobnej skúsenosti, výchovy a kultúry; a napokon svetonázorom (worldview), teda hodnotovým systémom, predstavou o "realite". Okrem týchto prístupov samotných Tuan rieši predovšetkým ich zmeny (napríklad nahradenie starého svetonázoru vedeckým modelom sveta, zmeny v chápaní mesta, predmestia, vidieka a divočiny). Vnímanie i tvorba postojov sú často podmienené individuálnymi vlastnosťami (ako ostrosťou zmyslov či temperamentom). Svetonázor je pritom z väčšej časti ovplyvňovaný spoločnosťou (jazyk, forma obživy, hierarchia), spoločné fyziologické a psychologické vlastnosti naň majú všeobecne menší vplyv. Jednotlivé vplyvy biologických, individuálnych a spoločenských faktorov Tuan opisuje na príkladoch, kde stavia odlišné kultúry (a svetonázory) do kontrastu napriek tomu, že ich prostredia sú z hľadiska geografie podobné alebo rovnaké (ako multietnický Sumer a Egypt, rozličnosť kultúr v Novom Mexiku a pod.). Na svoje prostredie sa viažeme trojako: vizuálnym vnemom krajiny, priamym vzájomným kontaktom (teda taktilným vnemom jej elementov - vzduchu, vody, zeme) a dlhodobou skúsenosťou (návykom). Príjemný pohľad na krajinu je pritom tým najmenej trvácim, i keď na druhej strane intenzívnym a prekvapivým. Možnosť cestovať v dnešnej dobe znižuje efekt prekvapenia; mnoho výletov si teda pamätáme skôr vďaka iným, nečakaným zážitkom; na druhej strane prístupnosť dráždi zvedavosť, chceme stále viac "objavovať", nachádzať (a fotiť) pohľady, ktoré iní nezažili (Cornish Vaughn). Mestský človek sa od prírodného prostredia sám oddeľuje, vníma ho buď ako vzdialenú, pozorovanú krajinu, alebo ako protivníka pri extrémnych športoch. Pohľad dištancuje pozorovateľa od prostredia; na druhej strane dotyk ho s ním zbližuje. Človek, na ktorého prostredie viac vplýva, ako roľník alebo malé dieťa, si vytvára pevnejšie, no tiež podvedomejšie puto voči nemu. Tuan spomína aj pojmy svätosti (holiness), zdravia (health) a celistvosti (wholeness), ktoré sú podľa neho etymologicky prepojené: ide o otvorenosť vnemov, radosť z vecí v prostredí vďaka zdraviu či temperamentu. Šťastný pocit viac závisí na vnútornom rozpoložení ako na okolnostiach. Napokon telesnejší a častejší kontakt s určitým prostredím vytvorí naviazanie. Tuan to prirovnáva k naviazaniu na osobné staršie oblečenie; tiež platí, že čím je človek starší, tým ťažšie sa chce presťahovať. V tomto môžu byť vlastnosti miesta akékoľvek: ak si určité miesto spájame so spomienkami, vždy bude vzbudzovať lásku. Láska k domovu môže presiahnuť celé generácie, z čoho vzniká patriotizmus, láska k rodnej zemi; podľa Tuana ale láska nieje naviazateľná k štátu, ten je príliš abstraktný a jeho teritórium premenlivé. Tento návyk je plne podvedomý a uvedomujeme si ho najviac práve mimo domova ("Water is taught by thirst; land - by oceans crossed"; Emily Dickinson). Čo do histórie, zmeny topofilného ideálu podmienilo práve to, čo ľuďom paradoxne chýba: v starovekej civilizácii tvorba poriadku, v postmodernej zas preferencia takých prostredí, kde umelý poriadok nevznikol. Mesto (city), vidiek (countryside) a divočina (wilderness) sú vnímané odlišne podľa ich rozsahu. Pred vznikom miest je dichotómia jasná, kultúrna krajina (záhrada, dedina, farma; symbolicky sväté miesto) pohlcuje divočinu (púšť, les; profánny svet). Keď mestá vzniknú, preberú úlohu ideálneho prostredia mestá, ako symboly usporiadania, kozmu; divočina stále predstavuje nekontrolovateľný svet, chaos, postupne zaberaný menšími dedinami. Dediny sa stávajú prechodným svetom, nie dokonale usporiadaným, no ani nie plne divokým (Enúma Eliš). Ako sa mesto rozvíja a stáva sebestačným, pomaly vzniká popri "kozmickom" ideáli mesta aj ideál "rajskej" prírody (Epos o Gilgamešovi) vypĺňajúci medzery v tom, čo nám mesto nemôže poskytnúť. Rajský ideál má tendenciu postupne prevládať: rastúce mestá pohlcujú vidiek, ktorý ďalej zaberá divočinu. V čase priemyselnej revolúcie sa mesto aj divočina stávajú rovnako profánnymi. Ideál raja napokon zahrnie aj samotnú divočinu, v zmysle prirodzených, kultúrou nezasiahnutých prostredí. Mesto stráca kozmický charakter, ktorý sa, naopak, snaží po ňom prebrať vidiek. Samo mesto sa napokon stáva "divočinou", nekontrolovateľným svetom; nezasiahnutá príroda pre turistov a k prírode ohľaduplný vidiek sa spájajú v jeden ekologický ideál. Na kraji mestskej "divočiny" pritom vzniká nový prechodný svet, predmestie s rodinnými domami a záhradami.


2.(IX)
Čo ale z nášho prístupu podmieňuje samo prostredie? Tuan sám odmieta predstavu, že niektoré typy prostredí sú vyslovene predurčené k tomu, aby topofiliu v človeku vyvolali, vždy záleží od jeho subjektívnej chuti ("tastes"). K problému pristupuje skúmaním, aké prostredia považovali ľudia za ideálne v minulosti, v rámci etológie, umenia či mýtov, z čoho odvodzuje štyri typy prostredí, ktoré majú na ľudí všeobecne väčší vplyv. Pre Tuana všeobecne platí, že čím je kultúra menej vyvinutá, tým jej svetonázor viac závisí od fyzických faktorov prostredia (a naopak, čím je vyvinutejšia, tým viac od nich závisí jeho vizuálne potešenie). Najvýznamnejšími z nich sú tvar reliéfu (človek nížin si zamieňa výšku s horizontálnou vzdialenosťou), pestrosť života, typ pôdy a prístupnosť potravy vôbec: čo v nich vyvoláva bázeň, aj pocit bezpečia. Prvým je les, najmä tropický prales, ktorý považuje za pôvodné prostredie ľudského druhu. Jeho uzavretosť má vplyv na
chápanie priestoru, predstavy horizontu, hierarchií či cyklov. Stromy pôsobia ako prirodzená strecha a všadeprítomný život poskytuje potrebnú potravu. Tuan spomína napríklad kmeň Lele (Kongo; Mary Douglas), v ktorom muži-lovci vnímajú les ako svoj "druhý domov", kde sa odohráva všetka významná činnosť: trávnaté čistiny sú pre nich nudné. Ďalším je breh mora, ktorý vzbudzuje dvojakú geometriu: nekonečný obzor vyvoláva chuť na dobrodružstvá, pláž vystupujúca do pevnej zeme zas pocit bezpečia. Voda a piesok sú príjemné a vnímané viac než len vzduch a pevná zem. Tuan tiež spomína hypotézu (Carl Sauer), že ľudská rozumová činnosť sa rozvinula práve na pobreží jazera či mora; praveká spoločnosť, ktorá ešte nepozná poľnohospodárstvo, sa lepšie uživí lovom rýb než zveri. Až s rozvojom poľnohospodárstva začína druh viac osídľovať vnútrozemie. Kvôli návyku ale aj moderný človek rád navštevuje prímorské oblasti pre zábavu. Tretím typom podmanivého prostredia je údolie, najmä podliate riekou stekajúcou z hôr. Po lese a brehu predstavuje tiež tretie "prirodzené" prostredie človeka, spájané s rozvojom poľnohospodárstva. Rieka síce spôsobuje záplavy a robí pôdu ťažkou, no tiež výživnou, a tak životné prostredie je veľmi pestré. Človek pritom osídľuje skôr bezpečné boky údolia než divoko obrastené brehy rieky. Konkávny tvar údolia pôsobí prívetivo, symbolicky prehlbuje kontakt s pevnou zemou. Pocit stability prehlbuje aj menšia premenlivosť teploty a vetrov oproti pláni. Hora napokon predstavuje tak možnosť úniku, ako aj miesto širšieho prekonania každodennosti, transcendencie, kontaktu s bohmi. Napokon štvrtým je ostrov. Nemá síce významný vplyv na evolúciu druhu, ale na ľudskú predstavivosť áno. Nekonečná voda predstavuje prvotný chaos, Tiámat, pri stvorení sveta/zeme vzniká teda najprv ostrov v nekonečnom mori. Ostrov symbolizuje vznik, plodnosť, raj; i keď na rozdiel od lesa či údolia dostatok živín zvyčajne neposkytuje. Predstava ostrovných rajov a utópií, hnala objaviteľov do ďalekých morí, kým sa niektoré z týchto rajov neukázali ako jeden, nesmierne veľký a hrozivý svetadiel, Amerika. Neskôr sa ostrov stal symbolickou možnosťou úniku pred kontinentom. V umení sa odzrkadľovala topofilia viac podľa spoločenského postoja a svetonázoru. Starogrécke spisy ukazujú more ako zdroj a symbol tak prosperity, ako aj strachu. Európske obrazy zo stredoveku a renesancie ukazovali učenosť maliarov, ktorí sa snažili v prvom rade zobraziť na plátne svoj svetonázor; namaľovaná krajina mala v prvom rade symbolický význam. Tuan ju kladie do kontrastu so stredovekou čínskou maľbou, kde sa autori zameriavali skôr na vernú kópiu krajiny. Náboženský význam hory sa v nej spája s profánnou, horizontálnou dimenziou riek.


3.
Človek je biologický, sociálny aj individuálny tvor. Biologická rovina je upravovaná sociálnou; tým sú naše vnemy, postoje a predstavy. Individualita sa ale snaží sociálnu rovinu presiahnuť. Radosť z prítomnosti v nejakom prostredí sa nedá umelo vytvoriť, nedá sa nájsť, ale len prežiť. V skutočnom svete zisťujeme, čo nám v prostredí chýba, čím vznikajú idealizované predstavy "raja" či "kozmu", ovplyvnené prirodzenými geografickými úkazmi, s ktorými sa stretávali naši predkovia. Tieto objavy sa snažíme následne implementovať do života migráciou, umením, architektúrou alebo turizmom, avšak práve pri tom si neraz uvedomíme, čo sme zo svojho pôvodného prostredia milovali najviac.

It is a commonplace of nineteenth-century German intellectual history that with the collapse of post-Kantian Idealism, philosophy ceded its claim of scientificity to the positive sciences.[31] The special sciences made rapid and startling progress, continually adding to the store of human knowledge. Philosophy, meanwhile, seemed to have lost its way, and many thinkers pinned their hopes for a rehabilitation of philosophy on a return to Kant. The Marburg School in particular interpreted this to mean that philosophy should orient itself with respect to the sciences, rather than strive—as German Idealism had—to forge a scientific system of its own, independent from the results of the positive sciences: only in this attenuated sense would philosophy be “scientific.” For all that, Natorp by no means conceived philosophy as a humble handmaiden. On the contrary, its task is to discover and establish the highest principle(s) of rational understanding, and thereby the principles not only of the sciences, but also of ethics and aesthetics, in short, of all the domains of human culture.[32] It must however take science as its primary object of inquiry because science represents the paradigm of knowing (Erkenntnis). Only a critique of science can therefore elucidate rationality or, as the Marburgers call it, the “logic” of thinking, for it is only in science that we can most reliably witness thinking at work, successfully achieving knowledge. Thus the question of the “concept of science” becomes “the chief question of logic and the foundational question of philosophy” (Cohen 1902: 445). The Marburgers identify the unifying principle of science and ethics in particular[33] as the concept of law (Gesetz), and, as Cohen puts it, “it is the business of logic to determine the meaning of law, or rather, the meanings of law” (Cohen 1902: 445).

Natorp and Cohen find general affirmation of this train of thought in Kant's project of seeking the conditions of possibility of the “fact” of mathematical natural science.[34] However, the similarities end there, for by rejecting or modifying several basic aspects of Kant's philosophy, they also end up with a radically transformed conception of the nature of scientific experience and the meaning of knowledge. The first of their modifications stems from an anti-psychologistic critique of Kant himself, namely of what they see as a confusion in the first Critique between the task of a transcendental grounding of the sciences and that of a transcendental logic of human cognition.[35] The former is in their view the genuine critical enterprise, for it promises to reveal the autonomous sources of objective knowledge, whereas the latter threatens to trace science back to psychological, and therefore contingent, subjective (albeit a priori) wellsprings.[36] Second, they deny any scientific role to intuition as conceived by Kant, either pure or empirical. Partly this is a result of their anti-psychologism, which forbids them from grounding the objectivity of science in the subjective faculties of cognition; but it is also because they see, with Kant, the essence of thinking in its activity and spontaneity, whereas intuition (at least as defined by Kant) is passive and affective.[37] Hence, intuition thus conceived threatens to introduce a heteronomous, and therefore rationally unacceptable, factor into science. Finally, the Marburgers follow their German Idealist predecessors in dismissing all talk of things in themselves, conceived as things existing independently of knowledge. We can see how these three important modifications of Kant's philosophy stem from the same basic concern with rational autonomy. For reason to be autonomous, its activity must be spontaneous; but this spontaneity cannot be conceived of psychologically, because human cognition as a matter of fact has a passive, and therefore heteronomous, intuitive element, namely sensibility. Furthermore, things in themselves can play no explanatory role here because they are ex hypothesi alien to reason.

These modifications have two radical consequences for Kantian doctrine, consequences that characterize the Marburgers' own theory of science and cognition. The first is a new conception of science; the second is a new conception of the categories (see Section 4). It might seem that science, as the achievement of an autonomous rationality, must fail to be objectively true of the world, if reason's autonomy implies that it can have no intuitive, receptive link to the world via sensibility. How in general could the rationally constructed system be related to the constraints of experience? How in particular could physics, the science of motion in space and time, be possible if the pure forms of intuition, space and time, were banished from science?[38]

If Natorp often seems to embrace the troubling thesis that science is not of the phenomenal world, this is because he holds, first, that the meaning of “phenomenon” is problematic; and second, that the aspect of science relevant to philosophy has nothing to do with its relation to a phenomenal realm. In this he follows Cohen's dictum:

Not the stars in the heavens are the objects which [the transcendental] method teaches us to contemplate in order to know them; rather, it is the astronomical calculations, those facts of scientific reality which are the “actuality” that needs to be explained…. What is the foundation of the reality which is given in such facts? What are the conditions of that certainty from which visible actuality takes its reality? The laws are the facts, and [hence] the objects [of our investigation]; not the star-things. (Cohen 1877: 27, f.)[39]

The point is that the scientific or epistemic value of, say, astronomy, is not to be found in what is given and observable by the senses, but rather in the mathematical exactness of its equations. These alone constitute and underwrite the truth-value of astronomy's propositions, and they are solely the achievements of reason's activity. As noted above, the essential characteristic of science lies in its objectivity, and that objectivity is rooted in its lawfulness. It is this formal feature of objectivity that constitutes the philosophical interest in science, not the material content of a particular science's theorems; in other words, the philosophical question is: “How is this lawfulness possible?” This question is distinct from the psychological question, “What are the psychological laws that make it possible for me (as a psychophysical being) to observe a star?” or the astronomical question, “What are the laws governing the ’being’ of this star in its states and properties?”

Hence, it is not so much the case that science on the Marburgers' conception loses all traction on the phenomenal or “actual” world, as that they are asking an entirely different question. While for Kant himself such traction is the only warrant that we are cognizing a genuine object, for Natorp the nexus of science and apparent reality is irrelevant to the spontaneous, legislating factor of science that is the activity of reason alone and therefore of paramount interest to philosophy. How such essentially subjective application of categories to sensible phenomena in fact happens is a problem of psychology, not philosophy, to investigate. Thus we must be very careful in interpreting the Marburg talk of “scientific experience.” Yes, it is not experience in general or psychological (subjective) experience (Erlebnis), but scientific (objective) experience (Erfahrung) which is the “fact” whose transcendental sources philosophy is to seek.[40] Yet we must not in turn take this scientific “experience” to mean “experience cleansed by experiment” (to paraphrase Helmholtz[41]): experiment by definition obviously remains empirical. Rather, by “scientific experience” Natorp just means the “legislative” act of categorial “Grundlegung,” of “hypothesis.”[42]

Now by the end of the nineteenth century, it was obvious to any informed observer of science that its categorial structures were in fact hypothetical and dynamic: the fact of scientific experience could no longer be taken as the essentially complete edifice of Newtonian physics, as Kant had done. In Natorp's rewording of Kant, science is not a factum at all, but a fieri, i.e., not an accomplished deed, but an ongoing doing.[43] Hence, what makes science scientific—i.e., productive of genuine knowledge—cannot possibly be founded on a set of fixed (physical) principles, analogous to mathematical axioms the certainty of which somehow flows into its theorems. Instead, the Marburgers argue, its scientificity can only reside in its method, i.e., in the regular and regulated manner of its progress. And since its scientificity is equivalent to objectivity or lawfulness, transcendental critique must determine the relation of lawfulness to method.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natorp/#2

Lotze's monism — or his belief in the substantial unity of everything that exists — stands opposed to Herbart's earlier pluralistic atomism. His redescription of causality likewise coheres with his prior conviction that there must exist a human soul endowed with freedom of the will. Correlatively, Lotze encourages us to think of the world as the product of the will of God, of an infinite spirit: reality is, hence, that which corresponds to self-consciousness. But is this particular self-consciousness or spirit — which we may identify with the absolute — also personal in nature? Our first impulse yields a negative response simply because personality normally is associated with the notion of fixed limits (which would, of course, be inappropriate in an infinite, unlimited being). And yet, Lotze contends that we must conceive of God as the preeminent personality and so, once again, God's own personality is “an immediate certainty,” grasped as a necessity of the human mind.

While the centrality of ‘person’ is correctly associated with Kant, the idea undergoes a number of critical developments in the various strands of post-Kantian idealism. On the one hand, Kant had relied on personality in distinguishing rational being from mere things, by reference to the former's capacity for self-government or autonomy. Further, Kant had insisted that persons have “worth” or “value” and that this serves as a critical characteristic separating them from mere things (which may be said to have only a “price”). On the other, the scientific approach, when applied directly to human beings, appear to have rendered the notion of personality incomprehensible and superfluous. (Indeed, Lotze would probably not be at all surprised by the threat posed to personal identity resulting from reflection on the quantum theory!). Also, if Christianity is re-described as an ethical religion — stressing the essential aspects of interior life and, henceforth, abandoning all claims to metaphysical or cosmological significance — then it cannot stand as a bulwark against the materialist onslaught on inessential aspects of our subjectivity.

Against these and similar considerations Lotze argued that our own subjectivity is not founded in opposition to objectivity: the ‘I’ is not opposed and formed in reaction to the ‘not-I’ but rather in its encounter with a ‘thou’ (OutRel, pp. 65ff). Consequently, personality is an ethical concept par excellance and is, qua ethical, identifiable as the “ultimate reality.” Of course we cannot identify the world with our own subjective consciousness without falling into either solipsism or subjective idealism. Hence, we arrive, instead, at the necessary conclusion of objective idealism; this view Santayana aptly expresses as follows:

The seat of the value of the world is consciousness, but of course not exclusively human consciousness. These moments that contain the sense of things, the consciousness of the cosmic law, — those in fact that contain the personality of cosmic life — contain also its value, and the happiness to which it gives rise. To us the divine life is revealed in beauty, in our own seasons of happiness, and our faith in the deep roots that good has in nature. Our consciousness, however, constitutes but an echo of that consciousness in which the purpose of the world is realized; the goal of things is the happiness of God … (Santayana, 1971, p. 223).

Reality is purposive and its contents form an ideal unity and this conclusion is fostered by an awareness of the view of the world comprised sub specie aeternitatis in the nature of supreme consciousness.

Further, Lotze's peculiar investigations into morality provide a case study in Lotzean dialectic. Moral rules cannot be understood as merely prudential maxims or as essentially self-regarding in nature: moral principles must possess an “intrinsic worth.” However, this fact should not capitulate us into either a mystical or religious position, on the one hand, or the “empty formalism” of Kantianism, on the other. For both utilitarians and egoists are so far right when they insist upon the necessary presence of pleasure and pain (as concrete content) in moral deliberation. But to escape such subjective egoism in morality is possible only “if we change our conception of our personality and its position in the world” (OutRel, p. 159). Characteristically, our untutored convictions suggest the idea that moral laws express and embody the will of God. To escape the subsequent Euthyphro-style questions and difficulties, we must identify God with the Good:

God is nothing else than that will whose purport and mode of action can be conceived of in our reflection as that which is good in itself — as a will which can only be separated by abstraction from the living form in which it exists in the real God (ibid., p. 161).

Likewise our will expresses its moral nature in the ability to freely choose between competing values, without compulsion. But this choice is always rooted in a concrete reality — our feeling, for instance, that truth is to be pursued because it is good.

The reduction of cognition, emotion and volition to values was to fit hand-in-hand with other thinkers' preoccupation with the spectre of relativism. Although Lotze himself took refuge in a quasi-Platonic account, the neo-Kantians, among others, pushed farther in the attempt to ground value in some account of the nature of consciousness itself. Windleband, for example, developed the notion of a “normal [i.e., normative] consciousness,” which is to say a consciousness that was itself productive of norms or values. The further particulars here must await another occasion. But Schnädelbach's observations of a fundamental shift from Lotze's to Windelband's position — or, from a “teleological value—relevance of reality … as a relation of transcendental constitution in which value stood to valuation” to one which emphasized “the evaluating normal consciousness … [as] the basis of both axiology and ontology” (cf. Schnädelbach, 1984, p. 182) — surely calls out for a detailed investigation. Yet, in any event, it remains clear that only by tracing the fate of his singular contribution — the very concepts of value and validity — can Lotze's continuing relevance can be spotlighted.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermann-lotze/#7

Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science

It was noted above that Cassirer's early historical works interpret the development of modern thought as a whole (embracing both philosophy and the sciences) from the perspective of the philosophical principles of Marburg neo-Kantianism, as initially articulated in [Cohen 1871]. On the “genetic” conception of scientific knowledge, in particular, the a priori synthetic activity of thought — the activity Kant himself had called “productive synthesis” — is understood as a temporal and historical developmental process in which the object of science is gradually and successively constituted as a never completed “X” towards which the developmental process is converging. For Cohen, this process is modelled on the methods of the infinitesimal calculus (in this connection, especially, see [Cohen 1883]). Beginning with the idea of a continuous series or function, our problem is to see how such a series can be a priori generated step-by-step. The mathematical concept of a differential shows us how this can be done, for the differential at a point in the domain of a given function indicates how it is to be continued on succeeding points. The differential therefore infinitesimally captures the rule of the series as a whole, and thus expresses, at any given point or moment of time, the general form of the series valid for all times,

Cassirer's first “systematic” work, Substance and Function [Cassirer 1910], takes an essential philosophical step beyond Cohen by explicitly engaging with the late nineteenth-century developments in the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic that exerted a profound influence on twentieth-century philosophy of mathematics and natural science. Cassirer begins by discussing the problem of concept formation, and by criticizing, in particular, the “abstractionist” theory characteristic of philosophical empiricism, according to which general concepts are arrived at by ascending inductively from sensory particulars. This theory, for Cassirer, is an artifact of traditional Aristotelian logic; and his main idea, accordingly, is that developments in modern formal logic (the mathematical theory of relations) allows us definitively to reject such abstractionism (and thus philosophical empiricism) on behalf of the genetic conception of knowledge. In particular, the modern axiomatic conception of mathematics, as exemplified especially in Richard Dedekind's work on the foundations of arithmetic and David Hilbert's work on the foundations of geometry, has shown that mathematics itself has a purely formal and ideal, entirely non-sensory and thus non-intuitive meaning. Pure mathematics describes abstract “systems of order” — what we would now call relational structures — whose concepts can in no way be accommodated within abstractionist or inductivist philosophical empiricism. Cassirer then employs this “formalist” conception of mathematics characteristic of the late nineteenth century to craft a new, and more abstract, version of the genetic conception of knowledge. We conceive the developmental process in question as a series or sequence of abstract formal structures (“systems of order”), which is itself ordered by the abstract mathematical relation of approximate backwards-directed inclusion (as, for example, the new non-Euclidean geometries contain the older geometry of Euclid as a continuously approximated limiting case). In this way, we can conceive all the structures in our sequence as continuously converging, as it were, on a final or limit structure, such that all previous structures in the sequence are approximate special or limiting cases of this final structure. The idea of such an endpoint of the sequence is only a regulative ideal in the Kantian sense — it is only progressively approximated but never in fact actually realized. Nevertheless, it still constitutes the a priori “general serial form” of our properly empirical mathematical theorizing, and, at the same time, it bestows on this theorizing its characteristic form of objectivity.

In explicitly embracing late nineteenth-century work on the foundations of mathematics, Cassirer comes into very close proximity with early twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Indeed, Cassirer takes the modern mathematical logic implicit in the work of Dedekind and Hilbert, and explicit in the work of Gottlob Frege and the early Bertrand Russell, as providing us with our primary tool for moving beyond the empiricist abstractionism due ultimately to Aristotelian syllogistic. The modern “theory of the concept,” accordingly, is based on the fundamental notions of function, series, and order (relational structure) — where these notions, from the point of view of pure mathematics and pure logic, are entirely formal and abstract, having no intuitive relation, in particular, to either space or time. Nevertheless, and here is where Cassirer diverges from most of the analytic tradition, this modern theory of the concept only provides us with a genuine and complete alternative to Aristotelian abstractionism and philosophical empiricism when it is embedded within the genetic conception of knowledge. What is primary is the generative historical process by which modern mathematical natural science successively develops or evolves, and pure mathematics and pure logic only have philosophical significance as elements of or abstractions from this more fundamental developmental process of “productive synthesis” aimed at the application of such pure formal structures in empirical knowledge (see especially [Cassirer 1907b]).

Cassirer's next important contribution to scientific epistemology [Cassirer 1921] explores the relationship between Einstein's general theory of relativity and the “critical” (Marburg neo-Kantian) conception of knowledge. Cassirer argues that Einstein's theory in fact stands as a brilliant confirmation of this conception. On the one hand, the increasing use of abstract mathematical representations in Einstein's theory entirely supports the attack on Aristotelian abstractionism and philosophical empiricism. On the other hand, however, Einstein's use of non-Euclidean geometry presents no obstacle at all to our purified and generalized form of (neo-)Kantianism. For we no longer require that any particular mathematical structure be fixed for all time, but only that the historical-developmental sequence of such structures continuously converge. Einstein's theory satisfies this requirement perfectly well, since the Euclidean geometry fundamental to Newtonian physics is indeed contained in the more general geometry (of variable curvature) employed by Einstein as an approximate special case (as the regions considered become infinitely small, for example). Moritz Schlick published a review of Cassirer's book immediately after its first appearance [Schlick 1921], taking the occasion to argue (what later became a prominent theme in the philosophy of logical empiricism) that Einstein's theory of relativity provides us with a decisive refutation of Kantianism in all of its forms. This review marked the beginnings of a respectful philosophical exchange between the two, as noted above, and it was continued, in the context of Cassirer's later work on the philosophy of symbolic forms, in [Cassirer 1927b] (see [Friedman 2000, chap. 7]).

Cassirer's assimilation of Einstein's general theory of relativity marked a watershed in the development of his thought. It not only gave him an opportunity, as we have just seen, to reinterpret the Kantian theory of the a priori conditions of objective experience (especially as involving space and time) in terms of Cassirer's own version of the genetic conception of knowledge, but it also provided him with an impetus to generalize and extend the original Marburg view in such a way that modern mathematical scientific knowledge in general is now seen as just one possible “symbolic form” among other equally valid and legitimate such forms. Indeed, [Cassirer 1921] first officially announces the project of a general “philosophy of symbolic forms,” conceived, in this context, as a philosophical extension of “the general postulate of relativity.” Just as, according to the general postulate of relativity, all possible reference frames and coordinate systems are viewed as equally good representations of physical reality, and, as a totality, are together interrelated and embraced by precisely this postulate, similarly the totality of “symbolic forms” — aesthetic, ethical, religious, scientific — are here envisioned by Cassirer as standing in a closely analogous relationship. So it is no wonder that, subsequent to taking up the professorship at Hamburg in 1919, Cassirer devotes the rest of his career to this new philosophy of symbolic forms. (Cassirer's work in the philosophy of natural science in particular also continued, notably in [Cassirer 1936].)


The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms

At Hamburg Cassirer found a tremendous resource for the next stage in his philosophical development — the Library of the Cultural Sciences founded by Aby Warburg. Warburg was an eminent art historian with a particular interest in ancient cult, ritual, myth, and magic as sources of archetypal forms of emotional expression later manifested in Renaissance art, and the Library therefore contained abundant materials both on artistic and cultural history and on ancient myth and ritual. Cassirer's earliest works on the philosophy of symbolic forms appeared as studies and lectures of the Warburg Library in the years 1922-1925, and the three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms itself appeared, as noted above, in 1923, 1925, and 1929 respectively. Just as the genetic conception of knowledge is primarily oriented towards the “fact of science” and, accordingly, takes the historical development of scientific knowledge as its ultimate given datum, the philosophy of symbolic forms is oriented towards the much more general “fact of culture” and thus takes the history of human culture as a whole as its ultimate given datum. The conception of human beings as most fundamentally “symbolic animals,” interposing systems of signs or systems of expression between themselves and the world, then becomes the guiding philosophical motif for elucidating the corresponding conditions of possibility for the “fact of culture” in all of its richness and diversity.

Characteristic of the philosophy of symbolic forms is a concern for the more “primitive” forms of world-presentation underlying the “higher” and more sophisticated cultural forms — a concern for the ordinary perceptual awareness of the world expressed primarily in natural language, and, above all, for the mythical view of the world lying at the most primitive level of all. For Cassirer, these more primitive manifestations of “symbolic meaning” now have an independent status and foundational role that is quite incompatible with both Marburg neo-Kantianism and Kant's original philosophical conception. In particular, they lie at a deeper, autonomous level of spiritual life which then gives rise to the more sophisticated forms by a dialectical developmental process. From mythical thought, religion and art develop; from natural language, theoretical science develops. It is precisely here that Cassirer appeals to “romantic” philosophical tendencies lying outside the Kantian and neo-Kantian tradition, deploys an historical dialectic self-consciously derived from Hegel, and comes to terms with the contemporary Lebensphilosophie of Wilhelm Dilthey, Henri Bergson, Max Scheler, and Georg Simmel — as well as with the closely related philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

The most basic and primitive type of symbolic meaning is expressive meaning, the product of what Cassirer calls the expressive function (Ausdrucksfunktion) of thought, which is concerned with the experience of events in the world around us as charged with affective and emotional significance, as desirable or hateful, comforting or threatening. It is this type of meaning that underlies mythical consciousness, for Cassirer, and which explains its most distinctive feature, namely, its total disregard for the distinction between appearance and reality. Since the mythical world does not consist of stable and enduring substances that manifest themselves from various points of view and on various occasions, but rather in a fleeting complex of events bound together by their affective and emotional “physiognomic” characters, it also exemplifies its own particular type of causality whereby each part literally contains the whole of which it is a part and can thereby exert all the causal efficacy of the whole. Similarly, there is no essential difference in efficacy between the living and the dead, between waking experiences and dreams, between the name of an object and the object itself, and so on. The fundamental Kantian “categories” of space, time, substance (or object), and causality thereby take on a distinctive configuration representing the formal a priori structure, as it were, of mythical thought.

What Cassirer calls representative symbolic meaning, a product of the representative function (Darstellungsfunktion) of thought, then has the task of precipitating out of the original mythical flux of “physiognomic” characters a world of stable and enduring substances, distinguishable and reidentifiable as such. Working together with the fundamentally pragmatic orientation towards the world exhibited in the technical and instrumental use of tools and artifacts, it is in natural language, according to Cassirer, that the representative function of thought is then most clearly visible. For it is primarily through the medium of natural language that we construct the “intuitive world” of ordinary sense perception on the basis of what Cassirer calls intuitive space and intuitive time. The demonstrative particles (later articles) and tenses of natural language specify the locations of perceived objects in relation to the changing spatio-temporal position of the speaker (relative to a “here-and-now”), and a unified spatio-temporal order thus arises in which each designated object has a determinate relation to the speaker, his/her point of view, and his/her potential range of pragmatic activities. We are now able to distinguish the enduring thing-substance, on the one side, from its variable manifestations from different points of view and on different occasions, on the other, and we thereby arrive at a new fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. This distinction is then expressed in its most developed form, for Cassirer, in the linguistic notion of propositional truth and thus in the propositional copula. Here the Kantian “categories” of space, time, substance, and causality take on a distinctively intuitive or “presentational” configuration.

The distinction between appearance and reality, as expressed in the propositional copula, then leads dialectically to a new task of thought, the task of theoretical science, of systematic inquiry into the realm of truths. Here we encounter the third and final function of symbolic meaning, the significative function (Bedeutungsfunktion), which is exhibited most clearly, according to Cassirer, in the “pure category of relation.” For it is precisely here, in the scientific view of the world, that the pure relational concepts characteristic of modern mathematics, logic, and mathematical physics are finally freed from the bounds of sensible intuition. For example, mathematical space and time arise from intuitive space and time when we abstract from all demonstrative relation to a “here-and-now” and consider instead the single system of relations in which all possible “here-and-now”-points are embedded; the mathematical system of the natural numbers arises when we abstract from all concrete applications of counting and consider instead the single potentially infinite progression wherein all possible applications of counting are comprehended; and so on. The eventual result is the world of modern mathematical physics described in Cassirer's earlier scientific works — a pure system of formal relations where, in particular, the intuitive concept of substantial thing has finally been replaced by the relational-functional concept of universal law. So it is here, and only here, that the generalized and purified form of (neo-)Kantianism distinctive of the Marburg School gives an accurate characterization of human thought. This characterization is now seen as a one-sided abstraction from a much more comprehensive dialectical process which can no longer be adequately understood without paying equal attention to its more concrete and intuitive symbolic manifestations; and it is in precisely this way, in the end, that the Marburg “fact of science” is now firmly embedded within the much more general “fact of culture” as a whole. (The final volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, The Phenomenology of Knowledge [1929b], articulates this embedding most explicitly, where the significative function of symbolic meaning is depicted as dialectically evolving — in just the sense of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit — from the expressive and representative functions.)


Cassirer and Twentieth-Century Philosophy

As noted above, in the same year (1929) that the final volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms appeared, Cassirer took part in an historically significant encounter with Martin Heidegger in Davos — where, in particular, Cassirer challenged Heidegger's radical “finitism” by reference to the presumed necessary (and eternal) universal validity found in both the mathematical sciences and human moral or practical experience. Heidegger had already distanced his own “existential analytic of Dasein” from Cassirer's analysis of mythical thought in Being and Time (see [Heidegger 1927, §§ 10, 11]), and he had then published a respectful but critical review of Cassirer's volume on mythical thought [Heidegger 1928]. Cassirer, for his part, added five footnotes on Being and Time before publication of his final volume in 1929, and he then published a similarly respectful but critical review of [Heidegger 1929] alluding to the Davos disputation at the end [Cassirer 1931]. Unlike in his remarks at the Davos disputation itself, Cassirer here places his primary emphasis on the practical and aesthetic dimensions of Kant's thought, as expressed in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgement. His main point is that, whereas the transcendental analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason may indeed be written from the point of view of human temporality or finitude, the rest of the Kantian system embeds this particular theory of human cognition within a much wider conception of “the intelligible substrate of humanity.” Cassirer's remarks here thus mirror his own attempt to embed the Marburg genetic conception of mathematical-scientific knowledge within a much wider theory of the development of human culture as a whole, and thereby reflect, as indicated at the beginning, his distinctive mediating role between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften — and thus between the analytic and continental philosophical traditions.

The Logic of the Cultural Sciences [Cassirer 1942] presents Cassirer's most developed and systematic articulation of how it is possible to achieve objective and universal validity in both the domain of the natural and mathematical sciences and the domain of practical, cultural, moral, and aesthetic phenomenon. Cassirer argues, in the first place, that an ungrounded prejudice privileging “thing perception [Dingwahrnehmen]” — based on the representative function (Darstellungsfunktion) of thought — over “expressive perception [Ausdruckswahrnehmen]” is a primary motivation for the widespread idea that the natural sciences have a more secure evidential base than do the cultural sciences (and it is here, in particular, that he presents his criticism of Rudolf Carnap's “physicalism” alluded to above). In reality, however, neither form of perception can be reduced to the other — both are what Cassirer calls “primary phenomena [Urphänomene].” Thus, whereas the natural sciences take their evidential base from the sphere of thing perception, the cultural sciences take theirs from the sphere of expressive perception, and, more specifically, from the fundamental experience of other human beings as fellow selves sharing a common intersubjective world of “cultural meanings.” In the second place, moreover, whereas intersubjective or objective validity in the natural sciences rests ultimately on universal laws of nature ranging over all (physical) places and times, an analogous type of intersubjective or objective validity arises in the cultural sciences quite independent of such universal laws. In particular, although every “cultural object” (a text, a work of art, a monument, and so on) has its own individual place in (historical) time and (geographical-cultural) space, it nevertheless has a trans-historical and trans-local cultural meaning that emerges precisely as it is continually and successively interpreted and reinterpreted at other such times and places. The truly universal cultural meaning of such an object only emerges asymptotically, as it were, as the never to be fully completed limit of such a sequence. In the end, it is only such a never to be fully completed process of historical-philosophical interpretation of symbolic meanings that confers objectivity on both the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften — and thereby reunites the two distinct sides of Kant's original synthesis

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cassirer/

Nishida Kitarô was the most significant and influential Japanese philosopher of the twentieth-century. His work is pathbreaking in several respects: it established in Japan the creative discipline of philosophy as practiced in Europe and North America; it enriched that discipline by infusing Anglo-European philosophy with Asian sources of thought; it provided a new basis for philosophical treatments of East Asian Buddhist thought; and it produced novel theories of self and world with rich implications for contemporary philosophizing. Nishida's work is also frustrating for its repetitive and often obscure style, exceedingly abstract formulations, and detailed but frequently dead-end investigations. Nishida once said of his work, “I have always been a miner of ore; I have never managed to refine it” (Nishida 1958, Preface). A concise presentation of his achievements therefore will require extensive selection, interpretation and clarification.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro/

Theodor W. Adorno was one of the most important philosophers and social critics in Germany after World War II. Although less well known among anglophone philosophers than his contemporary Hans-Georg Gadamer, Adorno had even greater influence on scholars and intellectuals in postwar Germany. In the 1960s he was the most prominent challenger to both Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. Jürgen Habermas, Germany's foremost social philosopher after 1970, was Adorno's student and assistant. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the interdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt School to which he belonged. It also stems from the thoroughness with which he examined Western philosophical traditions, especially from Kant onward, and the radicalness to his critique of contemporary Western society. He was a seminal social theorist and a leading member of the first generation of Critical Theory.

Unreliable translations have hampered the reception of Adorno's published work in English speaking countries. Recently, however, better translations have appeared, along with newly translated lectures and other posthumous works that are still being published. These materials should both facilitate an emerging assessment of his work in epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy and strengthen an already advanced reception of his work in aesthetics and cultural theory.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno/
http://mythosandlogos.com/Adorno.html
http://www.philosophenlexikon.de/adorno.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_Adorno
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_W._Adorno

Heidegger's lifelong project was to answer the "question of Being" (Seinsfrage) (See the Why page). In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that, to understand Being, one must first understand the human kind of being, Dasein ("Being-there"), the kind of Being who asks the question of Being. To even ask the question, remarks Heidegger, implies that at some level the answer is already understood. As a student of Husserl, Heidegger felt that phemenology, which lets the phenomena "show itself from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself," was the only method by which to do ontology, the study of Being. On the other hand, for Heidegger, modern philosophy had forgotten the question of Being; that is, modern philsophy has become concerned with the ontic (beings), and, thus, covers over that which makes such an understanding of beings possible: the "isness" (Being) of beings such that beings can presence. And the concealing-revealing presencing of Being is Dasein. However, contrary to Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology, Heidegger argues that ontology as phenomenology must necessarily be hermeneutic, or interpretive. For Heidegger, truth or aletheia is always both concealing and revealing. When one interpretation is opened up, other interpretations are necessarily closed off. In this sense, ontology is always provisional.

In Being and Time, Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein, the human kind of Being, reveals that Dasein is uncanny -- that is, "not-at-home" -- as Being-in-the-world. Dasein, Heidegger will conclude, is, proximally and for the part, not as itself as it is lost in the "they." Therefore, as "fallen" into the "they-self," in which Dasein exists in its "average everydayness," Dasein's authentic self as "uncanny" has been "covered up." Dasein's authentic, "ownmost" self as uncanny "pursues" Dasein via the call of conscience through the attunement of anxiety in which Dasein's 'world' is revealed as that which it is unable to fall into.

Heidegger's existential analytic follows the progression from an analysis of Dasein in terms of that which is "closest" to it: its "average everyday," existentiell, pre-ontological, pre- thematic, "lived" understanding of itself, towards the hidden meaning and ground of Dasein's primordial existential structure which lies concealed in its "everyday" understanding. The "who" of "everyday" Dasein is that which is closest to Dasein. Yet, proximally and for the most part, one's own Dasein is not itself. This "who" of "everyday" Dasein is the "they" [das Man], which is characterized by distantiality, averageness and levelling down and constitutes "publicness." The "they" is both everybody and nobody "to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another." The "they-self" is the "not itself" of Dasein to be distinguished from authentic Dasein. Authentic Being-one's-Self, therefore, is an existentiell modification of the "they" as an essential existentiale, and, therefore, the former is the more primordial disclosure of Dasein.

Heidegger uncovers the Being of Dasein as "care" [Sorge]: "Ahead-of-itself-Being- already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world)." Through his analysis of anxiety, as a state-of-mind which provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being, Heidegger reveals Dasein's Being to itself as care.

Falling, explains Heidegger, is a turning-away or fleeing of Dasein into its "they-self." This turning-away is grounded in anxiety. Anxiety is what makes fear possible. Yet, unlike fear, in which that which threatens is other than Dasein, anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere and nothing. In anxiety, Dasein is not threatened by a particular thing or a collection of objects present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. In anxiety, first and foremost, the world as world is disclosed as that which one cannot fall into.

Heidegger defined Being-in as "residing alongside" and "Being-familiar with." This Being-in is understood in the everyday publicness of the "they" as a 'Being-at-home," a tranquillized self-assurance. However, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world' and "everyday familiarity collapses." Thus, Dasein is individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential mode of the "not-at-home" of uncanniness. Thus, "Being-not-at-home" is the basic kind of Being of Dasein, even though in an everyday way Dasein flees from this understanding in the tranquillized "at-homeness" of das Man. Yet, what is the nature of this uncanniness which pursues Dasein as the "they"? Dasein, writes Heidegger, is uncanny in that uncanniness "lies in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being."

From an existential-ontological viewpoint, uncanniness ("not-at-home") is the more primordial phenomenon, the hidden meaning and ground of Dasein as fleeing into the "they" in its everyday concern and solicitude. In the state-of-mind of anxiety, Dasein's care structure is uncovered from its concealment in which Dasein, as lost in the "they" in its everyday engagement with things, understands itself in terms of the world as a thing present-to-hand. For, anxiousness is a way of Being-in-the-world in which Dasein flees in the face of its thrownness (facticity), has anxiety about its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world (existentiality), and flees into the "they-self" in its fallenness. Thus, Dasein's care structure is revealed as existentiality, facticity and fallenness. State-of-mind reveals Dasein as it is in its factical thrownness, understanding reveals that Dasein is its possibilities as "Being-ahead-of-itself," and, finally, Dasein's fallenness is its "Being-alongside" as, proximally and for the most part, it is occupied by its average everyday engagement with the world as the "they."

What compels Dasein's flight into the "they" as fallenness? Dasein is tempted into the lostness of das Man by the tranquility which disburdens Dasein from having to face its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. In its inauthentic tranquility, Dasein compares itself with everything and thereby drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Dasein engages in a downward plunge in which it becomes closed off from its authenticity and possibility. Dasein, as fallen, is characterized by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity which involves a levelling down of all possibilities of Being. In idle talk, the "they" closes off the hidden meaning and ground of what is talked about. In curiosity, Dasein is constantly uprooting itself and concerned with the constant possibility of distraction. As ambiguous, the "they" acts as though it "knows everything," yet, at bottom, this understanding is superficial in that nothing is genuinely understood. The "they" is essentially death-evasive in that it conceals Dasein as Being-towards-death.

Death is a way of Being which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. "Dying," therefore, stands for the way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death. Death, as "Being-towards-the- end," is defined by Heidegger in terms of the basic state of Dasein as care. Death is "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein." Death reveals itself as that "possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped." Dasein stands fully before itself as assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being as death, the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. Moreover, Dasein will die alone in that death cannot be shared, and, finally, death cannot be avoided. Anxiety, as state-of-mind, discloses Dasein as it exists as thrown Being towards its end. Yet, proximally and for the most part, Dasein covers up its Being-towards-death by falling.

How does Dasein, as its "they-self", "cover up" its Being-towards-death? The 'they" does not deny death, but, instead, understands death in the "indifferent tranquility" in which death is seen as an actuality rather than as possibility. The "they" covers up what is peculiar in death's certainty: that it is possible at any moment. By assigning definiteness upon death (i.e., "I will die someday"), everyday Being-towards-death evades the indefiniteness of the "when" of the certainty of death. When death is understood authentically, it is understood as the possibility of not having anymore possibilities. In anticipation, Dasein is as an authentic Being-towards-death as letting death be as possibility. When we are closest to our death, it is as far as it will ever be as an actuality. If Dasein makes death an actuality, then it is no longer death. Dasein cannot understand death in terms of the world as the "they" -- for death is the possibility which radically individualized Dasein in that it can only be taken up as its own possibility. Death discloses what Dasein cannot have: All the possibilities.

Being-towards-death is essentially anxious. Anxiety is the attunement of anticipation, and, being so, becomes a way for Dasein to understand itself in an authentic disclosure of itself. Anxiety reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self in that Dasein is unable to understand itself in terms of the world as concernful solicitude. As lost, Dasein can be brought back to itself since, as fallen, Dasein has neglected to choose itself. Authenticity is an existential modification of the existentiell manner of existing. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality- for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this attested. This attestation is disclosed as the call of conscience.

Conscience is the call from Dasein's ownmost self to its "they-self" which recalls Dasein from its lostness back to its ownmost, authentic self. In the state-of-mind of anxiety, Dasein is wanting-to-have-a-conscience. The call discourses in the mode of silence. As reticent, Dasein is disinclined from engaging in the idle talk in which Dasein fails to hear itself. The call tells us nothing. It is the voice which Dasein, as "lost in the manifold 'world' of its concern," finds as the "alien" voice of the self which has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness. The call of conscience calls out "Guilty!" in recognition of itself as a null basis; that Dasein is in the process of not being any more possibilities and must, therefore, eliminate choices whenever it makes a choice. Dasein is revealed as thrown, as delivered over to Being without Being the author of itself. Yet, as this null basis, Dasein is its basis. Conscience calls us to appropriate ourselves as the kind of Being that we are.

Dasein is authentic in its resoluteness: a "reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being- guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety." In resoluteness, Dasein is most fully disclosed to the kind of Being that it is. Resoluteness brings Dasein into solicitous Being with others alongside things as one's ownmost self, not as the "they." Dasein's authentic self as uncanny, therefore, pursues Dasein and threatens the "they-self" in which it has become lost. Dasein, at first, understands itself in terms of its concernful solicitude as the "they" in which it understands itself as a thing. This existentiell familiarly, however, covers up Dasein's existential, primordial understanding of itself as uncanny. Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenological approach to his existential analytic of Dasein uncovers the phenomenal structure of existing in such a way that it uncovers what would have been missed had the analysis followed the "order of the sequence in which experiences run their course."

Through this existential analysis of Dasein, Heidegger then pursues an understanding of time, including his understanding of history. For a thorough examination of Heidegger's understanding of history, I recommend my paper, Kuhn in Light of Heidegger as a Response to Hoeller's Critique of Giorgi. In this paper, I also introduce the reader to "later" Heidegger after his "turning." Heidegger had intended to complete a third part of Being and Time (there are two parts), but he never completed the project.

In Heidegger's later writings, he moved away from the kind of humanism that characterized Being and Time. That is, Heidegger no longer placed Dasein at such a central place in the presencing of Being. Rather, the human being is understood as the "shepherd of Being." Though Being is needful of human beings, so that beings can presence, the human being is, consistent with Being and Time, finite. More importantly, Heidegger's understanding of "resoluteness" is replaced by the idea of releasement or Gelassenheit. With releasement, the human being engages in a meditative thinking which is characterized by a profound humility, which understands the "gift" of Being and holds itself open to the "call" of language. With Gelassenheit, Heidegger turned toward the subject of language, the logos, by which beings are gathered and named. Yet, in naming, Being remains concealed. In my opinion, Heidegger's conception of Galessenheit truly reveals his indebtedness to Lao Tzu, whose writings on "wu wei" (non-action) hold greater similarities to Heidegger's releasement-toward-things.


http://mythosandlogos.com/heidegger.html
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schcom/rojc/mdic/martin1.html
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Heidegger
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Heidegger

http://kyberia.sk/id/1503990

Modern Harvard philosopher. In his most famous book, Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls proposed the idea of "original position", a mental exercise whereby a group of rational people must establish a principle of fairness (such as distribution of income) without knowing beforehand where on the resulting pecking order they will end up themselves. Rawls used this device to argue that the optimal arrangement will be to "maximize the welfare of society's worse-off member", which effectively justifies an egalitarian "no-substitution" social welfare function.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Rawls
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/rawls.htm
http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~piccard/entropy/rawls.html
http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/johnrawl.htm

Quine falls squarely into the analytic philosophy tradition, while also being the main proponent of the view that philosophy is not conceptual analysis. Quine spent his entire career teaching philosophy and mathematics at Harvard University, his alma mater, where he held the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy from 1956 to 1978. His major writings include "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," which attacked the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and advocated a form of semantic holism, and Word and Object which further developed these positions and introduced the notorious indeterminacy of translation thesis.


http://www.wvquine.org/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willard_Van_Orman_Quine
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/quine.htm
http://genealogy.math.ndsu.nodak.edu/html/id.phtml?id=73831
http://www.philosophynow.org/archive/articles/31ogrady.htm

J. L. Austin was born in Lancaster and educated at Oxford, where he became a professor of philosophy following several years of service in British intelligence during World War II. Although greatly admired as a teacher, Austin published little of his philosophical work during his brief lifetime. Students gathered his papers and lectures in books that were published posthumously, including Philosophical Papers (1961) and Sense and Sensibilia (1962).

In "A Plea for Excuses" (1956), Austin explained and illustrated his method of approaching philosophical issues by first patiently analyzing the subtleties of ordinary language. In How to Do Things with Words (1961), the transcription of Austin's James lectures at Harvard, application of this method distinguishes between what we say, what we mean when we say it, and what we accomplish by saying it, or between speech acts involving locution, illocution (or "performative utterance"), and perlocution.


http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Langshaw_Austin
http://dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophers/A/Austin
http://www.spectrum.uni-bielefeld.de/Classes/Summer98/PragSemHypertext/FehnMuencker/jlaustin-John.html
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Langshaw_Austin

Arthur Danto is an American analytic philosopher and art critic who has spent the last half century teaching at Columbia University. He is wide-ranging in his interests, but his most influential work falls into two areas. Firstly he has been one of the bridges between the two divergent traditions of thought in modern Western philosophy, by taking some major figures from the history of Continental philosophy, particularly Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean-Paul Sartre, and writing about their works treating them as if they were Anglo-American analytic philosophers. Purists may pale at the very idea, but Danto's deep scholarship and clear writing style has pulled this stunt off with considerable success, reconnecting these thinkers to ongoing debates in the analytic tradition and thus vastly increasing their influence among the academics of Britain and North America. Until quite recently many professional philosophers in Britain dismissed Nietzsche by saying that he was more a poet or a literary figure rather than a philosopher as such; this attitude has now completely disappeared and Danto is due some of the credit for that. He has illuminated these thinkers from a new angle and introduced the complexities of their ideas to people who might otherwise have shied away because of the unfamiliar terminology and unexplained background assumptions in their works. Arthur Danto's reputation in this area is illustrated by the affectionate play on his name which appears in The Philosophical Lexicon (edited by Daniel Dennett):

arthurdantist, n. One who straightens the teeth of exotic dogmas. "Little Friedrich used to say the most wonderful things before we took him to the arthurdantist!" - Frau Nietzsche

Danto's second major area of influence has been in aesthetics, where he has worked on the classic problem of how you decide whether or not something is a work of art. Danto has argued that what all works of art have in common is that they all relate in some way to an `artworld', to an accepted artistic theory, or to the history of art as a whole. So if someone puts a toilet in the middle of an art gallery and calls it art, then it is art if (and only if) it makes sense in the history of the development of art over the centuries. Maybe the history of art was just ready for a toilet in an art gallery then, and what distinguishes it from ordinary toilets are the interpretations which those educated in art history put upon it. Danto has a view of the development of the history of art inspired by Hegel. He claims that eventually, through its growing consciousness of itself, art becomes philosophy and thus comes to an end.

Some critics claim that the Danto approach is overly inspired by a few movements in modern art and doesn't take into account the diversity of art over the centuries, but Danto has written as an art critic on a very wide range of artistic forms, even including science fiction writing (of which he is dismissive: "Nothing so much belongs to its own time as an age's glimpses into the future."). Despite his insistence that art becomes philosophy, Danto has never been under any illusions about the status of aesthetics in contemporary debate, wryly commenting that aesthetics is currently "about as low on the scale of philosophical undertakings as bugs are in the chain of being."

http://www.rowan.edu/philosop/clowney/Aesthetics/philos_artists_onart/danto.htm
http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/361_r1.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_C._Danto
http://www.rowan.edu/philosop/clowney/Aesthetics/AestheticsClasses/class_sessions/session05_Hegel/pages/Arthur%20Danto.ppt

Rudolf Carnap, a German-born philosopher and naturalized U.S. citizen, was a leading exponent of logical positivism and was one of the major philosophers of the twentieth century. He made significant contributions to philosophy of science, philosophy of language, the theory of probability, and classical, inductive and modal logic. He rejected metaphysics as meaningless because metaphysical statements cannot be proved or disproved by experience. He asserted that many philosophical problems are indeed pseudo-problems, the outcome of a misuse of language. Some of them can be resolved when we recognize that they are not expressing matters of fact, but rather concern the choice between different linguistic frameworks. Thus the logical analysis of language becomes the principal instrument in resolving philosophical problems. Since ordinary language is ambiguous, Carnap asserted the necessity of studying philosophical issues in artificial languages, which are governed by the rules of logic and mathematics. In such languages, he dealt with the problems of the meaning of a statement, the different interpretations of probability, the nature of explanation, and the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori, and necessary and contingent statements.


http://www.austrian-philosophy.at/carnap_kurzbiographie.html
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/c/carnap.htm
http://sk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Carnap
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Carnap
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logischer_Empirismus

Considered by some to be the greatest philosopher of the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein played a central, if controversial, role in 20th-century analytic philosophy. He continues to influence current philosophical thought in topics as diverse as logic and language, perception and intention, ethics and religion, aesthetics and culture. There are two commonly recognized stages of Wittgenstein's thought -- the early and the later -- both of which are taken to be pivotal in their respective periods. The early Wittgenstein is epitomized in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By showing the application of modern logic to metaphysics, via language, he provided new insights into the relations between world, thought and language and thereby into the nature of philosophy. It is the later Wittgenstein, mostly recognized in the Philosophical Investigations, who took the more revolutionary step in critiquing all of traditional philosophy including its climax in his own early work. The nature of his new philosophy is heralded as anti-systematic through and through, yet still conducive to genuine philosophical understanding of traditional problems.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
http://www.ilwg.eu/
http://www.hd.uib.no/wab/
http://www.philosophenlexikon.de/wittgen.htm

http://kyberia.sk/id/860188

Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (b. 1848, d. 1925) was a German mathematician, logician, and philosopher who worked at the University of Jena. Frege essentially reconceived the discipline of logic by constructing a formal system which, in effect, constituted the first ‘predicate calculus’. In this formal system, Frege developed an analysis of quantified statements and formalized the notion of a ‘proof’ in terms that are still accepted today. Frege then demonstrated that one could use his system to resolve theoretical mathematical statements in terms of simpler logical and mathematical notions. One of the axioms that Frege later added to his system, in the attempt to derive significant parts of mathematics from logic, proved to be inconsistent. Nevertheless, his definitions (of the predecessor relation and of the concept of natural number) and methods (for deriving the axioms of number theory) constituted a significant advance. To ground his views about the relationship of logic and mathematics, Frege conceived a comprehensive philosophy of language that many philosophers still find insightful. However, his lifelong project, of showing that mathematics was reducible to logic, was not successful.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/
http://mally.stanford.edu/frege.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege-logic/
http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~brianwc/frege/

Feuerbach is best known for his book The Essence of Christianity which burst like a bombshell on the German intellectual scene in the early Forties and was soon translated into English by the English novelist, George Eliot. It quickly became like a Bible to an entire generation of intellectuals who thought of themselves as reformers and revolutionaries, including Arnold Ruge, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Richard Wagner, and David F. Strauss, who wrote that the book was the "truth for our times."

Superficially, the central thesis is deceptively simple: the self comes to consciousness over against another self and in the process of self-differentiation realizes that it is a member of a species. The imagination under the pressure of wish, feeling, and the imagination seizes on the idea of the species and converts it into an individual being.

Man — this is the mystery of religion — objectifies his being and then again makes himself an object to the objectivized image of himself thus converted into a subject … . (GW 5:71; EC 29f).

But this simplicity vanishes as soon as the reader turns to the first chapter. There one is confronted with argumentation and terminology that are obscure and speculative by contemporary standards. It is argued that (a) religion is identical with self-consciousness, (b) that consciousness is in the strict sense identical with the "infinite nature of consciousness," and (c) that a limited consciousness is no consciousness. These sweeping assertions are then interwoven with such claims as "man is nothing without an object" or that "the object to which a subject necessarily relates is nothing else than the subjects own objective nature" (GW V:28-32; EC. 1-4). The reader, hoping to understand the ramifications of the simpler thesis, is suddenly wrestling with obscure arguments that seem to be the tip of a greater conceptual iceberg.

The analogy of an iceberg is apt because as Marx Wartofsky has shown, the allusive nature of the book is best accounted for if one understands that it is only intelligible against its Hegelian background; more particularly, The Phenomenology of Spirit. Not only does it recapitulate the theory of self-differentiation in that work but the central ideas of objectification, alienation, and reconciliation are drawn from it. Indeed, what made Feuerbach's book appear to be "the truth for our times" was that it enabled an entire generation of young intellectuals to appropriate the most important elements of Hegel's philosophy of Spirit without accepting his metaphysics and his endorsement of Christianity. Feuerbach, it is said, simply stood Hegel's philosophy of Spirit on its head. Just as Absolute Spirit achieved self-knowledge by objectifying itself in the finite world, so the finite spirit comes to self-knowledge by externalizing itself in the idea of God and then realizing that this externalization is only the form in which the human spirit discovers its own essential nature.

So considered, the argument is an example of Feuerbach's "transformative method," which he first stated in his Vorläufige Thesen and which Karl Marx thought was Feuerbach's contribution to philosophy. The method states that Hegel's philosophy is based on the reification of abstract predicates like "thought" which are then treated as agents. Since this is the clue to understanding Hegel, it follows that what is valid in Hegel can be appropriated by inverting the subject and predicate and restoring them to their proper relationship. For example, instead of construing the predicate "thinking" as an agent, one transforms the equation and asserts that thinking is the activity of existing individuals. Thought comes out of being, not being out of thought.

Although the central argument is undoubtedly influenced by Hegel, there are other important elements intertwined with it that make it misleading to say that the book is simply an inversion of the Hegelian paradigm. One of the most important of these elements is Feuerbach's interpretation of the role of feeling. Unlike Hegel who regarded religion as basically the apprehension of ideas in symbolic form, Feuerbach believed, with Schleiermacher, that religion was principally a matter of feeling which then manifests itself in longing. Moreover, he regarded feeling as "unrestricted subjectivity;" that is, as unfettered by reason or nature. It assumes the deepest wishes of the heart to be true.

Longing is the necessity of feeling, and feeling longs for a personal God. But this longing after the personality of God is true, earnest, and profound only when it is the longing for one personality… Longing says: There must be a personal God, i.e., it cannot be that there is not; satisfied feeling says he is. (GW V:257f; EC 146)

It is in the chapters dealing with feeling that strike the modern reader as most contemporary because what we find there is a picture of the human self in the grip of the rage to live and longing for a reality that can grant its deepest wishes. In feeling "the whole world, with all its pomp and glory, is nothing weighed against human feeling" (GW V:220; EC 121). This "omnipotence of feeling" breaks through all the limits of understanding and manifests itself in several religious beliefs, all of which Feuerbach explored: the faith in providence, which is a form of confidence in the infinite value of one's own existence; faith in miracle, the confidence that the gods are unfettered by natural necessity and can realize one's wishes in an instant; and faith in immortality, the certainty that the gods will not permit the individual to perish.

Feeling, however, is not the only faculty involved in the religious objectification. The second is imagination (Phantasie) which Feuerbach argued is the original organ of religion. It is original for three reasons. First of all, the imagination, unlike abstract thought, produces images that have the power to stir the feelings and emotions. Human beings are sensuous creatures who require sensuous images as vehicles for their hopes and dreams. Second, the imagination corresponds to personal feelings because it can set aside limits and all laws painful to the feelings. It can make objective to man the immediate, absolutely unlimited satisfactions of his subjective wishes. Third, the imagination, unlike feeling, can deal with abstractions taken from the real world. In this sense it is a mode of representation, but, unlike thought, drapes its abstractions in sensuous imagery.

The imagination, however, is deceptive in the nature of the case, especially when it becomes allied with feeling and wish. It can cheat the reason. It can screen contradictions and set aside limits. It can exercise its deceptive power by confusing the abstract with the concrete, which is precisely what has happened in the Christian religion. The imagination has taken the species characteristics of human consciousness — thought, will, and feeling — and unified them in a single, perfect divine being.

God is the idea of the species as an individual…freed from all limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling of the individual … . (GW V:268f; EC 153)

The strategy of Feuerbach's book is to convince his readers that this explanation best accounts for the form and content of Christian doctrines and practices as well as the contradictions in them. In Part I, which he regards as positive, he attempts to show how each Christian doctrine — creation, Incarnation, Logos, Trinity, immortality — is best understood either as an objectification of some distinctively human predicate or as an imaginative expression of wish and feeling. The doctrine of God and of the Trinity are examples of the former and the practice of prayer and the belief in providence and immortality are examples of the latter. In Part II, "The False or Theological Essence of Religion," he attempts to show what is harmful in Christianity when it transforms its naïve expressions into theology.

One of the most sensational chapters in the book has to do with Feuerbach's interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation. He had argued that Christians assign to the deity those predicates which are the perfections of the human species and which are absolute for it. A predicate is not divine because God possesses it; rather, God possesses it because it is in itself thought to be divine. Without these predicates, God would be a defective being. Consequently, when Christians affirm that God is love, it is the predicate that is decisive. The Christian could not permit the possibility of a subject behind the predicate, so to speak, who could or could not love. But if love is the defining predicate, and if the Christian is affirming that God renounced his Godhead for the sake of humanity, then Feuerbach argued that this is an unconscious confession that love is more important than God.

Who then is our Saviour and Redeemer? God or Love? Love; for God as God has not saved us, but Love, which transcends the difference between the divine and human personality. As god has renounced himself out of love, so we, out of love, should renounce God; for if we do not sacrifice God to love, we sacrifice love to God, and in spite of the predicate of love, we have the God — the evil being — of religious fanaticism. (GW V:109; EC 53)

Just as Hegel held that the Absolute alienates itself when it objectifies itself in creation, Feuerbach argued that the human alienates itself when it objectifies its nature in the Divine. He argued, first, that the very act of attributing human predicates to an external divine being necessarily withdraws these same predicates from the human species to which they properly belong by denying to itself what it attributes to God. Secondly, he argues that when individual feeling is the focus of religion there is a loss of species consciousness and, consequently, a loss of unity with nature and other human beings. It involves a discrepancy between a given individual and his/her essential nature. The only valid object of human veneration should be the species/being.

This argument will probably be convincing only to those who embrace the Hegelian notion of Spirit. But in the second part of his book, Feuerbach leveled a number of criticisms at Christianity that do not depend on this paradigm. Here the crucial term is not "alienation" but "contradictions" and the latter arise when the naïve and involuntary projection of religion is made into an intentional object of theology. Among these contradictions are those doctrines that exhibit the paradoxes of the religious illusion, logical contradictions which arise out of mutually incompatible predicates attributed to the deity, and, finally, incompatible virtues that are inherent in religious faith. For example, Feuerbach argues that one of the contradictions in Christianity is that it teaches that the truth will make human beings free but it also corrupts the "sentiment of truth" by claiming that God revealed himself only at a particular time and place and enables some to believe and not others. This necessarily leads to superstition and sophistry.

Two of these contradictions are especially important. The first is that the theological notion of God contains two incompatible types of predicates: metaphysical and personal. On the one hand, the divine being is said to be omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, and impassible; on the other hand, this God is a loving, compassionate being moved by human suffering. Contemporary critics of theism have often remarked on this, especially process philosophers, but Feuerbach tried to explain why the contradiction is inherent in theistic religions. He argues that the metaphysical predicates spring out of the objectification of the human attribute of reason while the personal predicates arise out of the projection of love. The second contradiction is not so much intellectual as psychological. It is the "inward disunion" that arises out of the difference between faith and love. Faith, Feuerbach argued, depends on a determinate intellectual judgment as to what is true and false. The concept of heresy is inherent in a religion when faith is made the primary virtue. It follows that those who do not accept the Christian revelation are not merely in error but damned. Faith is essentially partisan. This is why Christians have a special obligation to evangelize non-believers and to reject those among themselves who do not adhere to correct belief, to dogma. But so construed, faith stands opposed to love because love is by its very nature universal and inclusive. This contradiction accounts for why Christian theologians themselves have from the beginning attempted to soften or marginalize the concept of Hell.

Feuerbach was willing to acknowledge that Christian faith does give "a person a peculiar sense of his own dignity and importance" (GW V:413; EC 249). In this sense he might have agreed with Kierkegaard who later argued that the notion of an individual recognized by the Creator of the Universe stretches individual consciousness to its extreme limits. But he also argued that this same belief is not only narcissistic but contributes to the arrogance and fanaticism of Christianity. Furthermore, this dignity is conveyed circuitously, so speak. Believers do not possess dignity in themselves but only acquire it mediated through a deity just as a servant sometimes identifies himself with the social class of the employer.

Feuerbach's book received criticism from two quarters: expectedly from Christian theologians but surprisingly, from the atheists Max Stirner and Bruno Bauer. A well-known Protestant theologian argued that Feuerbach's thesis might apply to Catholicism but not to Protestantism, and Stirner complained that despite Feuerbach's criticism of Idealism, he had merely substituted another abstraction, the human essence, as the basis of morality and veneration. Both criticisms forced Feuerbach to shift his position although the latter criticism shook Feuerbach most deeply. He took care of the Protestant criticism by writing a small book on Luther that enabled him to emphasize even more than he had that the certitude of Christian faith is grounded in a sensuous anthropomorphism in which human welfare is the aim of the Divine. For Luther, everything depends on the conviction that God became man "for us". To believe in Christ, he argued, is to believe that God has presented mankind with a visible exact image of himself. And as against Stirner, Feuerbach moved towards nominalism and conceded that in his book he had been "still haunted by the abstract Rational Being…as distinct from the actual sensuous being of nature and humanity" (GW X: 188). From this point on, his writings emphasized human sensuousness, the concreteness of experience, and the rejection of any dualism of spirit and matter.

Perhaps smarting from these criticisms, Feuerbach once more revised his explanation of religion in 1845 with a small book entitled Das Wesen der Religion which then became the basis for his Heidelberg Lectures on the Essence of Religion in 1848. Although he sought to convey the impression that his revisions were only minor, a careful reading reveals that he no longer appeals to the Hegelian paradigm of Spirit coming to itself but argues that the origin and ground of religions is the encounter with nature. The human self is an embodied sensuous being immersed in a field of natural beings that impinge on it and upon which it is dependent. Because the human being does not first relate to nature through abstract thought but is concerned with those qualities of nature that strike it emotionally, it does not perceive an objective nature determined by laws but the physiognomic character of things. Things in nature appear to it as beautiful or disturbing or comfortable or threatening. Indeed, it takes considerable social conditioning and education for these perceived quality of nature to be treated as merely subjective. The imagination or Phantasie of archaic humanity fastens on these immediate qualities and under the pressure of desire and wish transforms the beings of nature into ensouled beings, beings that have intentions. Thrown into a world in which it does not feel at home, the human self wishes to change the uncanny being of nature into a known and comfortable nature. Monotheism arises when civilizations sufficiently evolve to regard nature as a whole.

The tendency to personify nature is reinforced by the fact that the imagination is in the service of egoism and the drive-to-happiness (Glückseligkeitstrieb). Impelled by the love of life, the humans self instinctively transforms its desires into a being capable of granting them, into a subjective, feeling being. Religious faith is basically the confidence that the gods are concerned with the well-being of human beings in general and the individual in particular. But the imagination does not create out of nothing. It requires raw materials, whether these be the impressionable events and being in nature, sense impressions, or even abstractions that the mind has drawn from sensuous experience.

The differences among religions are due in part to the difference in the raw materials upon which the imagination works. In archaic times, the imagination took flight from natural objects and things — earth, fire, animals, and astronomical bodies. But the imagination can also be fueled by historical personages, such as the Buddha or Jesus, or, indeed, by abstractions themselves, such as "the whole" or "Being as such". For example, Feuerbach explained the difference between polytheism and monotheism as a result of the imagination being fascinated by the multiplicity of beings, in the former case, and by the coherence and unity of the world, in the latter case.

There are even different ways in which a given abstraction, such as the coherence of nature, can provide fuel for the imagination. One can distinguish two types of monotheism, the metaphysical, which is characteristic of Christianity, and the practical-poetic, which is characteristic of the Hebrew Bible and the Koran. In the latter, the activity of God is indistinguishable from the activity of nature so that it is indifferent whether one says that God or nature provides food, makes the rain to fall, or endows creatures with sight. Because nature is omnipresent, God is omnipresent; because nature is all-powerful, God is all-powerful. The Christian imagination, however, closes its eyes to nature, separates the personified essence of nature entirely from sense perception and transforms what was originally nature into an abstract unified metaphysical being. Consequently, while there is something lively and animated about Yahweh and Allah, the god of the Christians is a "withered, dried-out God in whom all traces of His origin in nature is effaced" (GW VI: 362; LER 321).

Whereas Feuerbach had sought in The Essence of Christianity to show how every Christian doctrine could be explained as a projection of the species concept or as a wishful illusion, the burden of his Lectures is to reveal the intellectual errors arising from the misinterpretations of nature and, especially, the misinterpretation of monotheism; that is, when Christians unify the whole of nature under the abstraction "Being". Consequently, many of the lectures are discussions of the so-called "proofs" for the existence of God and they plod unimaginatively over ground that has been packed down by philosophers such as David Hume. But there are some interesting lectures based on the assumption that the secret of metaphysics and theology is the transformation of names and universals into causes. And there is also an interesting lecture on how the dualism of soul and body arises where he argued, among other things, that our sense of two distinct ontological realms arises because we utilize two distinct linguistic categories for thinking about each sphere. But it does not follow that because we use one sort of language to talk about the body and another about the mind that they are separable. The distinction has to do with the perspectives we are compelled to adopt, and not with reality itself.

Just as the explanation of religion is different in the Lectures from what it is in the Essence of Christianity, so, too, are the criticisms. In the earlier work, Christianity was a form of alienation from the human essence. In the latter, Christianity is a disorder of the desires and, hence, a grotesque form of self-understanding. The Christian's desires, unlike the pagan's, "exceed the nature of man, the limits of this life, of this real sensuous world" (GW VI: 259; LER 231). Christians do not accept and affirm themselves as parts of nature. And this reveals itself in two forms: (a) the wish not to be bound by the causal nexus, as seen in the importance given to miracles, and (b) the desire for immortality, a personal existence free from necessity. For a Christian, the "only guarantee that his supernatural desires will be fulfilled lies in his conviction that nature itself is dependent on a supernatural being and owes its existence solely to the arbitrary exercise of this being's will" (GW VI: 262; LER 234). Christianity is a form of diseased Eros resulting in fantastic and unearthly wishes that involve a rejection of embodied, sensuous existence.

It could be argued, as Van Harvey has, that the explanation and interpretation of religion in these later works is a more adequate and less speculative than proposed in the Christianity, with one exception. In the earlier view, Feuerbach attributed the psychological hold of Christianity on humans to lie in its assurance of personal recognition by the Divine and the hope of immortality. Consequently, Feuerbach concedes that religion serves an existential function that no other human practice has yet filled; and he argued that it can only be banished if human beings were to give up their narcissistic hope for recognition and their desire to live forever. But if, as he seems to argue in these later works, religion is simply a misinterpretation of how to use nature, then it will diminish as our understanding of nature increases. Religion, in short, is a prescientific mode of thought. Anthropology and psychology, I think, tend to support the earlier view.

Feuerbach returned once again to the interpretation of religion in 1857 and published Theogonie nach den quellen des hebräischen und christlichen Altertums. A second, unchanged version appeared in 1866 under a slightly altered title. Here Feuerbach concentrated upon the subjective grounds of religion. The argument is that the gods do not spring out of the human feeling of dependence or the encounter with nature but are, rather, the reified wishes of humankind. As a conscious being bent on its own fulfillment, the person has purposes, needs, and desires, the shadowside of which is the awareness that these may be frustrated. Hence, all wishes are accompanied by anxiety and fear, a pervading sense of the nothingness that clings to all human activity. With the wish that this nothingness be removed, the conception of the gods arises. When one sees the many intermediate links in the chain between the wish and the realization of that wish the imagination seizes upon the notion of a being that is not subject to limitation and failure, a being that can do what it wishes to do. The gods represent the unity of willing (Wollen) and being able to succeed (Können). A god is simply a being in which this distinction has been annulled. "Where there are no wishes there are no gods". One might call the book a phenomenology of the wish because the discussion ranges imaginatively over the relationship between the fundamental wish for happiness and such cultural phenomena as systems of morality, law, conscience, the taking of oaths, dreams, miracles, pain, the desire for immortality, and, of course, religion. The arguments are copiously illustrated from classical Greek, Hebraic, and early Christian sources. Indeed, one of the defects of the book is that the arguments tend to deteriorate into a mass of learned historical and philological discussion, a defect the Bolin and Jodl edition of Feuerbach's works in 1907 tried to remedy by the dubious device of eliminating the illustrative materials.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/
http://www.kreudenstein-online.de/Querdenker/Feuerbach/Wesen_des_Christentums/wesen_der_religion_allg.htm

Even though Harris and Brokmeyer were first inspired to philosophical pursuits by the Transcendentalists, the thought of the St. Louis group was distinguished from the latter by its greater concentration on philosophical understanding guided by Hegelian method, without the literary and theological concerns of the New England movement, and a greater stress on social responsibility and reform. The emerging views of the various members of the group varied somewhat in details, but they shared a common conviction in the relevance of a Hegelian social philosophy, inspired mainly by Hegel's The Philosophy of Right and The Philosophy of History, to the problems and challenges facing the American society of their day, and the importance of education as a means of effecting necessary social change. Brokmeyer insisted on the necessity that thought issue in practical action directed to the social good, and the St. Louisians took this imperative to heart. The emphasis on education is evident in the pages of their journal, which were largely dedicated to the dissemination of European idealism, either through translations of Hegel and other German writers or summations of their work. They also shared a common enthusiasm for the prospects of their home city, divining by a clever but highly questionable use of the Hegelian dialectic what they believed to be historical forces that would propel St. Louis into an era of cultural supremacy in American society.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hstlouis.htm

aka Johann Caspar Schmidt

Max Stirner (1806-56) is best known as the author of the idiosyncratic and provocative Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum (1844). Familiar in English as The Ego and Its Own (a more literal translation might be The Individual and his Property), both the form and content of Stirner's work are disconcerting. He challenges expectations about how political and philosophical argument should be conducted, and seeks to shake confidence in the superiority of contemporary civilisation. He provides a sweeping attack on the modern world as dominated by religious modes of thought and oppressive social institutions, together with a brief sketch of a radical ‘egoistic’ alternative in which individual autonomy might flourish. The historical impact of The Ego and Its Own is not easy to assess. However, Stirner's book can plausibly be claimed to have had a destructive impact on his left-Hegelian contemporaries, to have played a significant role in the intellectual development of Karl Marx (1818-1883), and to have influenced the tradition of individualist anarchism.


http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Stirner
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/max-stirner/

STRAUSS, David Friedrich, ev. Theologe, * 27.1. 1808 Ludwigsburg, + 8.2. 1874 Ludwigsburg. - Studium der Philosophie u. Theologie in Blaubeuren u. Tübingen, vor allem bei F.C. Baur, im Winter 1831-32 in Berlin, wo er Schleiermacher u. dessen Vorlesungen über das Leben Jesu kennenlernte; 1832-35 Repetent im Tübinger Stift; 1839 Berufung auf die Dogmatikprofessur in Zürich, aber sofortige Pensionierung infolge kirchlichen Einspruchs; von da an meist freier Schriftsteller bei wachsender Distanz vom kirchlichen Glauben. - Sein Hauptwerk »Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet« (Tübingen 1835) machte S. berühmt u. führte zu heftigen Auseinandersetzungen; damit war seine akademische Laufbahn zugleich beendet. In dieser Zeit erwies sich S. als radikaler Vertreter der spekulativen Theologie. Er versucht darin, »an Stelle der veralteten supranaturalen u. natürlichen Betrachtungsweise der Geschichte Jesu eine neue zu setzen«, nämlich die »mystische«, da in den Evangelien, abgesehen von einem »einfachen Gerüst des Lebens Jesu« durchgehend die »mythischen«, vor allem »messianischen« Vorstellungen des AT auf Jesus übertragen seien, so daß die Evangelienerzählungen nichts anderes seien als »geschichtsartige Einkleidungen urchristlicher Ideen, gebildet in der absichtslos dichtenden Sage«. S. will keinen historischen Kern oder den geschichtlichen Jesus aus der Schale der Evangelien herausarbeiten noch gar den Mythus eliminieren, sondern die im christologischen Mythus sich verbergenden »ewigen Wahrheiten« durch philosophische Interpretation erheben. Darum ist »Christologie« das theologische Grundanliegen von S., aber nicht als Lehre über Jesus von Nazareth, sondern als Lehre über die Menschheit. Nachdem S. zunächst mit »Streitschriften« seinen Gegnern geantwortet hatte, verwässerte er unter dem Eindruck der Argumente in der 3.Auflage (1838-39) seinen eigenen Entwurf, kehrte aber in der 4. Auflage (1840) wieder zu ihm zurück. Die Hauptschwäche von S.s Position liegt in der bloßen Negation der nt. Geschichte. S. hätte zeigen müssen, wie es von der Idee und vom Mythos zum Christentum und zu den nt. Schriften gekommen ist. Dieser Aufgabe hat sich besonders sein Lehrer F.C. Baur zugewandt, mit erheblichen Korrekturen an S.s Ergebnissen. - Den nächsten Schritt tat S. in seinem zweiten Hauptwerk »Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung u. im Kampf mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt« (Tübingen 1840-41). Die Enwicklung dazu wurde sehr viel weniger beachtet: Noch hält er am Programm einer spekulativen Theologie fest, sieht sich aber außerstande, es zu erfüllen. Vergeblich versuchte er, die in der Dogmengeschichte des Glaubens entstandenen »Vorstellungen« in reine »Begriffe« umzuwandeln, ohne die Glaubenswahrheiten selbst aufzugeben. - Der letzte Schritt endete mit der förmlichen Absage S.s an das Christentum. In seinem zweiten »Leben - Jesu - Werk« (»Das Leben Jesu, für das dt. Volk bearbeitet«, Leipzig 1863) bleibt Jesus nur noch als Verkünder einer reinen Kultur- und Humanitätsreligion übrig. 2 Jahre später erschien seine Abrechnung mit Schleiermacher »Der Christus des Glaubens u. der Jesus der Geschichte« (Berlin 1865). In seinem letzten Werk »Der alte und der neue Glaube« (Bonn 1872) erscheint das Christentum völlig überflüssig. Das letzte Werk erregte wiederum einen Sturm der Entrüstung; S. wurde u.a. von Nietzsche nun als Bildungsphilister verspottet.

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Friedrich_Strau%C3%9F
http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/s/s4/strauss_d_f.shtml

Bruno Bauer (1809-1882), philosopher, historian, and theologian. His career falls into two main phases, divided by the revolutions of 1848. In the 1840's, the period known as the Vormärz or the prelude to the German revolutionary events of March 1848, Bauer was a leader of the Left-Hegelian movement, developing a republican interpretation of Hegel, which combined ethical and aesthetic motifs. His theory of infinite self-consciousness, derived from Hegel's account of subjective spirit, stressed rational autonomy and historical progress. Investigating the textual sources of Christianity, Bauer described religion as a form of alienation, which, because of the deficiencies of earthly life, projected irrational, transcendent powers over the self, while sanctioning particularistic sectarian and material interests. He criticized the Restoration state, its social and juridical base, and its orthodox religious ideology. Analyzing the emergence of modern mass society, he rejected liberalism for its inconsequent opposition to the existing order, and for its equation of freedom with property, but he accused socialism of an inadequate appreciation of individual autonomy. After the defeats of 1848, Bauer repudiated Hegel. He predicted a general crisis of European civilization, caused by the exhaustion of philosophy and the failure of liberal and revolutionary politics. New prospects of liberation would, he believed, issue from the crisis. His late writings examined the emergence of Russia as a world power, opening an era of global imperialism and war. These writings influenced Nietzsche's thinking on cultural renewal. Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky claimed Bauer's religious criticism for the socialist movement, while the anti-traditionalist conservatism and anti-Semitism of his late work link him to the revolutionary right in the twentieth century.


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bauer/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruno_Bauer
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1882/05/bauer.htm

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) is, along with J.G. Fichte and G.W.F. Hegel, one of the three most influential thinkers in the tradition of ‘German Idealism’. Although he is often regarded as a philosophical Proteus who changed his conception so radically and so often that it is hard to attribute a clear philosophy to him, Schelling was in fact often an impressively rigorous logical thinker. In the era during which Schelling was writing, so much was changing in philosophy that a stable, fixed point of view was as likely to lead to a failure to grasp important new developments as it was to lead to a defensible philosophical system. Schelling's continuing importance today relates mainly to three aspects of his work. The first is his Naturphilosophie, which, although its empirical claims are largely indefensible, opens up the possibility of a modern hermeneutic view of nature that does not restrict nature's significance to what can be established about it in scientific terms. The second is his anti-Cartesian account of subjectivity, which prefigures some of the best ideas of thinkers like Nietzsche and Jacques Lacan, in showing how the thinking subject cannot be fully transparent to itself. The third is his later critique of Hegelian Idealism, which influenced Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others, and aspects of which are still echoed in contemporary thought by thinkers like Jacques Derrida.


The significance of the work of the early Schelling (1795-1800) lies in its attempts to give a new account of nature which, while taking account of the fact that Kant has irrevocably changed the status of nature in modern philosophy, avoids some of the problematic consequences of Kant's theory. For the Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) nature is largely seen in the ‘formal’ sense: nature is that which is subject to necessary laws. These laws are accessible to us, Kant argues, because cognition depends on the subject bringing necessary forms of thought, the categories, to bear on what it perceives. The problem this leads to is how the subject could fit into a nature conceived of in deterministic terms, given that the subject's ability to know is dependent upon its ‘spontaneous’ self-caused ability to judge in terms of the categories. Kant's response to this dilemma is to split the ‘sensuous’ realm of nature as law-bound appearance from the ‘intelligible’ realm of the subject's cognitive and ethical self-determination. However, if the subject is part of nature there would seem to be no way of explaining how a nature which we can only know as deterministic can give rise to a subject which seems to transcend determinism in its knowing and in its ethical doings. Kant himself sought to bridge the realms of necessity and spontaneity in the Critique of Judgement (1790), by suggesting that nature itself could be seen in more than formal terms: it also produces self-determining organisms and can give rise to disinterested aesthetic pleasure in the subject that contemplates its forms. The essential problems remained, however, that 1) Kant gave no account of the genesis of the subject that transcends its status as a piece of determined nature, and 2) such an account would have to be able to bridge the divide between nature and freedom.

The tensions in Schelling's philosophy of this period, which set the agenda for most of his subsequent work, derive, then, from the need to overcome the perceived lack in Kant's philosophy of a substantial account of how nature and freedom come to co-exist. Two ways out of Kantian dualism immediately suggested themselves to thinkers in the 1780s and 90s. On the one hand, Kant's arguments about the division between appearances and things in themselves, which gave rise to the problem of how something ‘in itself’ could give rise to appearances for the subject, might be overcome by rejecting the notion of the thing in itself altogether. If what we know of the object is the product of the spontaneity of the I, an Idealist could argue that the whole of the world's intelligibility is therefore the result of the activity of the subject, and that a new account of subjectivity is required which would achieve what Kant had failed to achieve. On the other hand, the fact that nature gives rise to self-determining subjectivity would seem to suggest that a monist account of a nature which was more than a concatenation of laws, and was in some sense inherently ‘subjective’, would offer a different way of accounting for what Kant's conception did not provide. Schelling seeks answers to the Kantian problems in terms that relate to both these conceptions. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the conceptions are in one sense potentially identical: if the essence of nature is that it produces the subjectivity which enables it to understand itself, nature itself could be construed as a kind of ‘super-subject’. The main thinkers whose work establishes these alternatives are J.G. Fichte, and Spinoza.

The source of Schelling's concern with Spinoza is the ‘Pantheism controversy’, which brought Spinoza's monism into the mainstream of German philosophy. In 1783 the writer and philosopher F.H. Jacobi became involved in an influential dispute with the Berlin Enlightenment philosopher Moses Mendelssohn over the claim that G.E. Lessing had admitted to being a Spinozist, an admission which at that time was tantamount to the admission of atheism, with all the dangerous political and other consequences that entailed. In his On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn, (1785, second edition 1789), which was influenced by his reading of Kant's first Critique, Jacobi revealed a problem which would recur in differing ways throughout Schelling's work. Jacobi's interpretation of Spinozism was concerned with the relationship between what he termed the ‘unconditioned’ and the ‘conditioned’, between God as the ground of which the laws of nature are the consequent, and the linked chains of the deterministic laws of nature. Cognitive explanation relies, as Kant suggested, upon finding a thing's ‘condition’. Jacobi's question is how finding a thing's condition can finally ground its explanation, given that each explanation leads to a regress in which each condition depends upon another condition ad infinitum. Any philosophical system that would ground the explanation of a part of nature thus ‘necessarily ends by having to discover conditions of the unconditioned’. For Jacobi this led to the need for a theological leap of faith, as the world's intelligibility otherwise threatened to become a mere illusion, in which nothing was finally grounded at all. In the 1787 Introduction to the first Critique Kant maintains this problem of cognitive grounding can be overcome by acknowledging that, while reason must postulate the ‘unconditioned (...) in all things in themselves for everything conditioned, so that the series of conditions should thus become complete’, by restricting knowledge to appearances, rather than allowing it to be of ‘things in themselves’, the contradiction of seeking conditions of the unconditioned can be avoided. As we have already seen, though, this gives rise precisely to the problem of how a subject which is not conditioned like the nature it comes to know can emerge as the ground of knowledge from nature.

The condition of the knowledge of appearances for Kant is the ‘transcendental subject’, but what sort of ‘condition’ is the transcendental subject? The perception that Kant has no proper answer to this problem initially unites Schelling and Fichte. Fichte insists in the Wissenschaftslehre (1794) that the unconditioned status of the I has to be established if Kant's system is to legitimate itself. He asserts that ‘It is (...) the ground of explanation of all facts of empirical consciousness that before all positing in the I the I itself must previously be posited’, thereby giving the I the founding role which he thought Kant had failed adequately to explicate. Fichte does this by extending the consequences of Kant's claim that the cognitive activity of the I, via which it can reflect upon itself, cannot be understood as part of the causal world of appearances, and must therefore be part of the noumenal realm, the realm of the ‘unconditioned’. For Fichte the very fact of philosophy's existence depends upon the free act of the I which initiates the reflective questioning of its own activity by the I.

Schelling takes up the issues raised by Jacobi and Fichte in two texts of 1795: Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or on the Unconditional in Human Knowledge, and Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. In a move which prefigures aspects of Heidegger's questioning of the notion of being, he reinterprets Kant's question as to the condition of possibility of synthetic judgements a priori as a question about why there is a realm of judgements, a manifest world requiring syntheses by the subject for knowledge to be produced, at all. In Of the I Schelling puts Kant's question in Fichtean terms: ‘how is it that the absolute I goes out of itself and opposes a Not-I to itself?’. He maintains that the condition of knowledge, the ‘positing’ by the I of that which is opposed to it, must have a different status from the determined realm which it posits: ‘nothing can be posited by itself as a thing, i.e. an absolute/unconditioned thing (unbedingtes Ding) is a contradiction’. However, his key worry about Fichte's position already becomes apparent in the Philosophical Letters, where he drops the Fichtean terminology: ‘How is it that I step at all out of the absolute and move towards something opposed (auf ein Entgegengesetztes)?’. The problem Schelling confronts was identified by his friend Hölderlin, in the light of Jacobi's formulation of the problem of the ‘unconditioned’. Fichte wished to understand the absolute as an I in order to avoid the problem of nature ‘in itself’ which creates Kantian dualism. For something to be an I, though, it must be conscious of an other, and thus in a relationship to that other. The overall structure of the relationship could not, therefore, be described from only one side of that relationship. Hölderlin argued that one has to understand the structure of the relationship of subject to object in consciousness as grounded in ‘a whole of which subject and object are the parts’, which he termed ‘being’. This idea will be vital to Schelling at various times in his philosophy.

In the 1790s, then, Schelling is seeking a way of coming to terms with the ground of the subject's relationship to the object world. His aim is to avoid the fatalist consequences of Spinoza's system by taking on key aspects of Kant's and Fichte's transcendental philosophy, and yet not to fall into the trap Hölderlin identified in Fichte's conception of an absolute I. In his Naturphilosophie (philosophy of nature), which emerges in 1797 and develops in the succeeding years, and in the System of Transcendental Idealism of 1800, Schelling wavers between a Spinozist and a Fichtean approach to the ‘unconditioned’. In the Naturphilosophie the Kantian division between appearing nature and nature in itself is seen as resulting from the fact that the nature theorised in cognitive judgements is objectified in opposition to the knowing subject. This objectification, the result of the natural sciences' search for fixed laws, fails to account for the living dynamic forces in nature, including those in our own organism, with which Kant himself became concerned in the third Critique and other late work, and which had played a role in Leibniz's account of nature. Nature in itself is thought of by Schelling as a ‘productivity’: ‘As the object [qua ’conditioned condition’] is never absolute/unconditioned (unbedingt) then something per se non-objective must be posited in nature; this absolutely non-objective postulate is precisely the original productivity of nature’. The Kantian dualism between things in themselves and appearances is a result of the fact that the productivity can never appear as itself and can only appear in the form of ‘products’, which are the productivity ‘inhibiting’ itself. The products are never complete in themselves: they are like the eddies in a stream, which temporarily keep their shape via the resistance of the movement of the fluid to itself that creates them, despite the changing material flowing through them.

Schelling next tries to use the insights of transcendental philosophy, while still avoiding Kant's dualism, to explain our knowledge of nature. The vital point is that things in themselves and ‘representations’ cannot be absolutely different because we know a world which exists independently of our will which can yet be affected by our will:

one can push as many transitory materials as one wants, which become finer and finer, between mind and matter, but sometime the point must come where mind and matter are One, or where the great leap that we so long wished to avoid becomes inevitable.

The Naturphilosophie includes ourselves within nature, as part of an interrelated whole, which is structured in an ascending series of ‘potentials’ that contain a polar opposition within themselves. The model is a magnet, whose opposing poles are inseparable from each other, even though they are opposites. As productivity nature cannot be conceived of as an object, since it is the subject of all possible real ‘predicates’, of the ‘eddies’ of which transient, objective nature consists. However, nature's ‘inhibiting’ itself in order to become something determinate means that the ‘principle of all explanation of nature’ is ‘universal duality’, an inherent difference of subject and object which prevents nature ever finally reaching stasis. At the same time this difference of subject and object must be grounded in an identity which links them together, otherwise all the problems of dualism would just reappear. In a decisive move for German Idealism, Schelling parallels the idea of nature as an absolute producing subject, whose predicates are appearing objective nature, with the spontaneity of the thinking subject, which is the condition of the syntheses required for the constitution of objectivity, thus for the possibility of predication in judgements. The problem for Schelling lies in explicating how these two subjects relate to each other.

In the System of Transcendental Idealism Schelling goes back to Fichtean terminology, though he will soon abandon most of it. He endeavours to explain the emergence of the thinking subject from nature in terms of an ‘absolute I’ coming retrospectively to know itself in a ‘history of self-consciousness’ that forms the material of the system. The System recounts the history of which the transcendental subject is the result. A version of the model Schelling establishes will be adopted by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind. Schelling presents the process in terms of the initially undivided I splitting itself in order to articulate itself in the syntheses, the ‘products’, which constitute the world of knowable nature. The founding stages of this process, which bring the world of material nature into being, are ‘unconscious’. These stages then lead to organic nature, and thence to consciousness and self-consciousness. Schelling claims, in the wake of Fichte, that the resistance of the noumenal realm to theoretical knowledge results from the fact that ‘the [practical] act [of the absolute I] via which all limitation is posited, as condition of all consciousness, does not itself come to consciousness’. He prophetically attempts to articulate a theory which comes to terms with the idea that thought is driven by forces which are not finally transparent to it, of the kind later to become familiar in psychoanalysis. How, though, does one gain access by thought to what cannot be an object of consciousness? This access is crucial to the whole project because without it there can be no understanding of why the move from determined nature to the freedom of self-determining thinking takes place at all.

Schelling adopts the idea from the early Romantic thinkers Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, whom he knew in Jena at this time, that art is the route to an understanding of what cannot appear as an object of knowledge. Philosophy cannot represent nature in itself because access to the sphere of the unconscious must be via what appears to consciousness in the realm of theoretical knowledge. The work of art is evidently an empirical, appearing object like any other, but if it is not more than what it is qua determinable object it cannot be a work of art, because this requires both the free judgement of the subject and the object's conveying of something beyond its objective nature. Although the System's own very existence depends upon the transition from theoretical to practical philosophy, which requires the breaking-off of Jacobi's chain of ‘conditions’ by something unconditioned, Schelling is concerned to understand how the highest insight must be into reality as a product of the interrelation of both the ‘conscious’ and the ‘unconscious’. Reality is not, therefore, essentially captured by a re-presentation of the objective by the subjective. Whereas in the System nature begins unconsciously and ends in conscious philosophical and scientific knowledge, in the art work: ‘the I is conscious according to the production, unconscious with regard to the product’. The product cannot be understood via the intentions of its producer, as this would mean that it became a ‘conditioned’ object, something produced in terms of a pre-existing rule, and would therefore lack what makes mere craft into art. Art is, then, ‘the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which always and continuously documents what philosophy cannot represent externally’. The particular sciences can only follow the chain of conditions, via the principle of sufficient reason, and must determine any object via its place in that chain, a process which has no necessary end. The art object, on the other hand, manifests what cannot be understood in terms of its knowable conditions, because an account of the materials of which it is made or of its status as object in the world does not constitute it as art. Art shows what cannot be said. Philosophy cannot positively represent the absolute because ‘conscious’ thinking operates from the position where the ‘absolute identity’ of the subjective and the objective has always already been lost in the emergence of consciousness.

Although Schelling's early work did not fully satisfy either himself, or anybody else, it manages to address, in a cogent and illuminating fashion, a great deal of topics which affect subsequent philosophy. The model presented in the System impresses not least because, at the same time as establishing the notion of the history of self-consciousness that would be decisive for Hegel, it offers, in a manner which goes beyond its sources in Fichte, a model of the relationship between the subject and its conceptually inaccessible motivating forces which would affect significant parts of nineteenth century thought from Schopenhauer, to Nietzsche, to Freud.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/

texty

Phänomenologie des Geistes
Wissenschaft der Logik

BAUMGARTEN, Alexander Gottlieb, Philosoph, * 17.6. 1714 in Berlin, † 26.5. 1762 in Frankfurt an der Oder. - B. gilt als Begründer der von ihm so bezeichneten `Ästhetik' als philosophischer Disziplin. Seine Gymnasialzeit verbrachte der Sohn eines kinderreichen Garnisonspredigers zunächst in Berlin, wo er an der Schule zum Grauen Kloster Unterricht bei Martin Christgau, einem gelehrten Pädagogen, Philologen und Gelegenheitsschriftsteller, erhielt. Nach dem frühen Verlust seiner Eltern besuchte er das von August Hermann Francke im Geiste des Pietismus geleitete Seminar in Halle und studierte an der dortigen Universität Theologie, Philosophie und die `schönen Wissenschaften' (Rhetorik und Poetik). Wie sein Bruder, der Theologe Siegmund Jacob B. (1706-54), stand er unter dem Einfluß der rationalistischen Philosophie Christian Wolffs, dessen Vorlesungen er in Jena hörte. Die Absetzung und Ausweisung Wolffs durch den preußischen König hatte B.s Schuldirektor, der auch der Vorgesetzte von B.'s Vaters gewesen war, als Kopf der pietistischen Hallenser Orthodoxie maßgeblich betrieben. Nach dem Magisterexamen und eigenem Unterricht in Poetik und Logik an dem von ihm besuchten Waiseninstitut lehrte B. ab 1737 Philosophie (`Weltweisheit') an der Universität in Halle. Im Jahr der feierlichen Rückkehr Wolffs nach Halle (1740) wurde B. zum `Professor der Weltweisheit und der schönen Wissenschaften' in Frankfurt an der Oder berufen, wo der wiederverheiratete Witwer und Vater eines Sohnes und einer Tochter bis zu seinem Tode mit großem Erfolg wirkte.

Schon in seiner Magisterarbeit, welche die philosophischen Bedingungen eines Gedichts zum Thema hatte, versuchte B., dem Verhältnis von Poetik und Aisthesis, d.h. der Beziehung von Dichtkunst und sinnlicher Wahrnehmung, eine systematische Basis zu verleihen. Die Erweiterung des Wolffschen Systems durch eine philosophische Ästhetik als Wissenschaft sinnlicher Erkenntnis (»scientia cognitionis sensitivae«) bildete auch den bestimmenden Grundgedanken seines unvollendeten Hauptwerks, der zweibändigen »Aesthetica«. Das unvollendete Opus ist aus seinen Frankfurter Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik - den ersten dieser Art - hervorgegangen. B. wollte Aufklärung darüber geben, wie die Schönheit eines Kunstwerks den Sinnen als die Übereinstimmung der Teile zu einem Ganzen deutlich werde, und zwar analog zu den Prinzipien der Verstandeserkenntnis. Indem er Metaphysik, Psychologie und Poetologie miteinander verband, nobilitierte B. nicht nur das von Wolff als inferior klassifizierte `untere' Erkenntnisvermögen der Sinne (»gnoseologia inferior«), sondern auch die Dichtung, der er Wahrheitscharakter zuschrieb. Die Wahrnehmung des Schönen, d.h. die Erkenntnis der Vollkommenheit mannigfaltiger Erscheinung (»perfectio phaenomenon«) durch einen ästhetischen Sinn sei auch in metaphysischer Hinsicht analog zum objektiven Wahrheitsgehalt der »cognitio rationalis«. Seine Theorie der `freien Künste' (»theoria liberalium artium«) verstand B. nicht subjektivistisch, sondern als die Kunst, die sinnliche Erkenntnis des Schönen analog dem rationalen Denken darzustellen (»ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis«). B.'s wissenschaftliche Ästhetik steht im Zusammenhang mit der anthropologischen Rehabilitation der Sinnlichkeit im 18. Jh. Ihr rationalistischer Sensualismus vermittelte im Unterschied zur Poetik seiner Zeit einen autonomen Kunstwerkbegriff, ohne jedoch das traditionelle Prinzip der Naturnachahmung vollständig preiszugeben. Grundlegend für B.'s Schönheitsbegriff war Leibniz' Vorstellung einer »prästabilierten Harmonie«, deren Parallelitätsprinzip B. auf das Verhältnis von Schönheit (sinnlicher Anschauung) und Wahrheit (intellektueller Erkenntnis) sowie von gesetzmäßiger Ordnung und subjektiver Produktion bzw. Rezeption des Kunstwerks übertrug. Indem B. die Dichtung als sinnlich vollkommene Rede (»oratio sensitiva perfecta«) definierte und den Dichter als »felix aestheticus« verstand, überwand er die Grenzen rhetorischer Pragmatik durch ein ästhetisches Ideal. Der damit verbundene Gedanke einer Synthese von Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit zu humaner Ganzheit, die in der ästhetischen Erfahrung und Praxis möglich sei, ging in die Kunstauffassung der deutschen Klassik ein, insbesondere in Schillers Briefe »Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen«.

B. kann somit als Vorläufer der modernen Ästhetik gelten: Er leitete die Subjektivierung und Ästhetisierung des Wahrheitsdiskurses ein, ohne Willkürlichkeit zu postulieren. Sein fragmentarisches System impliziert die sinnliche Repräsentation einer ontologischen Ordnung, jedoch in analog-zeichenhafter und nicht in symbolisch-identischer Beziehung. Im Anschluß an B. vertieften Moses Mendelssohn und Johann Georg Hamann die ontologischen und metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des autonomen Schönen und setzten den Übergang von der rationalistischen Poetik der Aufklärung zur Ästhetik der Goethezeit und des deutschen Idealismus fort. Noch Hegel bezog sich in seinen Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik auf B. Verbreitung hatten dessen poetologische Gedanken durch die popularphilosophische Hermeneutik seines Schülers Georg Friedrich Meier gefunden (»Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften und Künste«, I-III, Halle 1748-50, Reprint Hildesheim/New York 1976). Die philosophiegeschichtliche Bedeutung von B.'s »Metaphysik« und »Ethik« liegt in der Methode begrifflicher Analytik. B.'s Terminologie legte namentlich Kant seinen eigenen Vorlesungen zugrunde.


http://www.bautz.de/bbkl/b/baumgarten_a_g.shtml

The Wolffian philosophy held almost undisputed sway in Germany till it was displaced by the Kantian revolution, due partly to his distinctive habit of writing in both Latin and German. Wolff's philosophy has, until a reevaluation set in the 1960s, often been held to be a common-sense adaptation or watering-down of the Leibnizian system; or, more charitably, Wolff was said to have methodized and "reduced" to dogmatic form the thoughts of his great predecessor.

These are mainly his comprehensive view of philosophy, as embracing in its survey the whole field of human knowledge, his insistence everywhere on clear and methodic exposition, and his confidence in the power of reason to reduce all subjects to this form. The Wolffian system retains the determinism and optimism of Leibniz, but the monadology recedes into the background, the monads falling asunder into souls or conscious beings on the one hand and mere atoms on the other. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony also loses its metaphysical significance - while remaining an important heuristic device - and the principle of sufficient reason introduced by Leibniz is once more discarded in favor of the principle of contradiction which Wolff seeks to make the fundamental principle of philosophy.

Philosophy is defined by him as the science of the possible, and divided, according to the two faculties of the human individual, into a theoretical and a practical part. Logic, sometimes called philosophia rationales, forms the introduction or propaedeutic to both. Theoretical philosophy has for its parts ontology or philosophia prima, cosmology, rational psychology and natural theology; ontology treats of the existent in general, psychology of the soul as a simple non-extended substance, cosmology of the world as a whole, and rational theology of the existence and attributes of God. These are best known to philosophical students by Kant's treatment of them in the Critique of Pure Reason. Practical philosophy is subdivided into ethics, economics and politics. Wolff's moral principle is the realization of human perfection - seen realistically as the kind of perfection the human person actually can achieve in the world in which we live. It is perhaps the combination of Enlightenment optimism and worldly realism that made Wolff so successful and popular as a teacher of future states- and businessmen.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Wolff_(philosopher)
http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/WOLFF.HTM
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Wolff
http://www.nndb.com/people/265/000103953/

Johann Gottlieb Fichte is one of the major figures in German philosophy in the period between Kant and Hegel. Initially considered one of Kant's most talented followers, Fichte developed his own system of transcendental philosophy, the so-called Wissenschaftslehre. Through technical philosophical works and popular writings Fichte exercised great influence over his contemporaries, especially during his years at the University of Jena. His influence waned towards the end of his life, and Hegel's subsequent dominance relegated Fichte to the status of a transitional figure whose thought helped to explain the development of German idealism from Kant's Critical philosophy to Hegel's philosophy of Spirit. Today, however, Fichte is more correctly seen as an important philosopher in his own right, as a thinker who carried on the tradition of German idealism in a highly original form.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/fichtejg.htm
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/johann-fichte/

Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823), Austrian philosopher and first occupant of the chair on Critical Philosophy established at the University of Jena in 1787, first achieved fame as a proponent of popular Enlightenment and as an early and effective popularizer of the Kantian philosophy. During his period at the University of Jena (1787-94), Reinhold proclaimed the need for a more “scientific” and systematic presentation of the Critical philosophy, one based upon a single, self-evident first principle. In an effort to satisfy this need, he expounded his own “Elementary Philosophy” in a series of influential works between 1789 and 1791. Though Reinhold's Elementary Philosophy was much criticized, his call for a more coherent and systematic exposition of transcendental idealism exercised a profound influence upon the subsequent development of post-Kantian idealism and spurred others (such as J. G. Fichte) to seek a philosophical first principle even more “fundamental” than Reinhold's own “Principle of Consciousness.” After moving to the University of Kiel, Reinhold became an adherent, first of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and then of C. G. Bardili's “rational realism,” before finally proposing a novel “linguistic” approach to philosophical problems.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/karl-reinhold/
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Leonhard_Reinhold

He endeavoured to explain away certain of the contradictions which are found in Kant's system by saying that much of the language is used in a popular sense for the sake of intelligibility, e.g. where Kant attributes to things-in-themselves an existence under the conditions of time, space and causality, and yet holds that they furnish the material of our apprehensions. Beck maintains that the real meaning of Kant's theory is idealism; that knowledge of objects outside the domain of consciousness is impossible, and hence that nothing positive remains when we have removed the subjective element. Matter is deduced by the original synthesis. Similarly, the idea of God is a symbolical representation of the voice of conscience guiding from within. The value of Beck's exegesis has been to a great extent overlooked owing to the greater attention given to the work of Fichte. Beside the three volumes of the Erlauternder Auszug, he published the Grundriss der krit. Philosophic (1796), containing an interpretation of the Kantian Kritik in the manner of Salomon Maimon.