1.Preface

For many scientists - either of humanities or of natural disciplines - is Francis Bacon known primarily as one of the pioneers of the modern research methods. He didn't only critically reflected contemporary scholastics, thus at least paving the way for these methods, but also helped to spread a new way of thinking in a much wider society, repelling superstition and mythical thinking in general. In his time, a superstitious worldview wasn't characteristic only for the uneducated folks, but also for the elite, which could afford good schools for their children. Bacon himself, as many contemporary scientists, was studying various occult disciplines like alchemy or astrology, which still seemed to be of a serious importance those days1.

These problems, of course, weren't bound to those, whom Bacon considered as real scientists of his time. Despite all the harsh critics, which he imposed on their methods, aristotelian scholars were similarily hostile to superstitious thoughts of their contemporaries. Bacon's methods have proven, however, to be not only much more effective, but also more accessible and motivating to those, who tried to study nature. The main problem of these was perhaps not as much the nature of their studies as the fact it was neither presented for public nor it gave way for a technical application. The first problem was, of course, not linked to the scholars only. Various solute experimenters, like alchemysts or engineers, often weren't very eager to publish their discoveries, nor merely to share it with other collegues, speaking only cryptically about them with their students2.

Superstitious thoughts and occult sciences are bound together, supporting each other. By hiding (or simply avoiding) the true nature of a presented process, the "scientist" himself tries to call this superstition upon the observers, who then can't help themselves not to describe the process in a fantastic way. The fantasy spreads unless it is refuted by somebody learned enough to counter it. This image of a "scientist", who presents his work as a "magic", is built by the cooperation of both sides - the observer and the "scientist". The magical science was of a spectacular character, which seems to be changed by Bacon, who described a new way how to experience its discoveries by its widescale technical application. The technology isn't aimed at thoughts and fantasy of an observer, but to the matter itself. How could this preference of a harder and more risky way develop? And what kind of development did Bacon expect?

1 - Zagorin p.29; Bacon himself (NO II §9) defines "magic" as a practical division of metaphysics, the science of eternal, immutable forms.
2 - Rossi p.44; As Zagorin writes (p.43), Bacon was inspired by this esoteric aspect of occult sciences too. He was aware that an unlimited spread of scientific knowledge would cause its misunderstanding and abuse. It was



2.Arguments

Paolo Rossi in his "Geburt der modernen Wissenschaft in Europa" doubts the role of Bacon in the establishment of modern ways - both methodical and ethical - of technological research. In his age there were thousands of technical manuals and studies being published already, and only few of them were referring to his ideas of "neutral technicism"1. Also, his main credit isn't the creation of modern methods in science and formulation of motives, why we should apply them, but more the sole fact, that he was the first who handled the phenomenon of "mechanical art" as a subject of philosophy2. In a machine he didn't see only a means of attaining a concrete end unattainable by bare hands, but also a form, a depiction of clear natural laws; he also gave attention to its rapid development and universal accessibility of its theories, bound more to hard physical work than to a peaceful study3. Nevertheless, the progress and spreading of technology itself began sooner, with the engineers and inventors, and also with new means of information, like press4.

A similar stance, though from another point of view, is presented by Perez Zagorin. According to him, many of our contemporary epistemologists - and most notably Popper - didn't give very much credit for development of science to the inductive research methods, for which propagation was Bacon deeply respected in the previous centuries5. According to those, Bacon didn't comprehend the meaning of theoretical presumptions, even if based on empirical data, and thought that by amassing the observations one doesn't need to make any hypotheses at all. Zagorin consideres this a myth based on an overseeing of Bacon's distinction between "anticipation" and "interpretation" (of nature)6. Similarily to modern deductivists, even Bacon wasn't limited to a thought, that the hypotheses, which become the object of inquiry, should be merely intuitive; their testing should be complex and refined by every instance of experiments, thus not repeating the same situation over and over again7.

However, it is clear that even a superstitious desription would be based on a loose observation; no other source than empirical sphere can be imagined. It is the systematic interpretation of observation on which useful conclusions and new theories may be based; without any observation, no idea about a phenomenon (even if only "rash and premature") can be made at all. Zagorin's point is to show Bacon's inductive method as perfectly empiric, without need of intuitive or by tradition acquired knowledge.

To sum up, we have two main arguments against Bacon's credit. On the one hand, we can see Bacon's work as a result, or as a reflection of contemporary technological progress. His contribution was the theoretical review of it. On the other, we have an idea, that as he didn't recognize the value of intuition, his method is suitable for particular experiments. He could contribute to the experimental method, but not to the theoretical process preceding the experiments. If Rossi's view was to show Bacon as a theoretist of technology, in the latter we may see his work vice-versa as a technical supplement for theories. Both views try to find a positive knowledge in Bacon's work. However, his true role may be much better understood, when we would read his epistemological works not as a primary literature, but as a critique of what we may call his contemporary scientific worldview.

1 - Rossi p.70
2 - Rossi p.67
3 - ibid
4 - Rossi p.72
5 - Zagorin p.90
6 - ibid, NO I §26
7 - Zagorin p.91; NO I §70: "no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself; the inquiry must be enlarged so as to become more general"



3.Bacon's Model

From previous, it would seems Bacon commented either engineers or scientists of theoretical disciplines, like mathematicians. However, in Novum Organum he primarily faced the methods employed by scholars. The theoretical knowledge, which he criticized, was in no way of an intuitive, but of traditional nature. Scientific dogmas of his age weren't original projects like for example those of present theoretical physics, but norms defined by the works of Aristoteles. It seems he thought the humans are somehow creating knowledge at any time, while the problem is in the way how they interprete it1. That was the base of Bacon's famous theory of Idols. The first category (idola tribus) reflected human nature, its limits or general setting2. They reflect a material, corporeal form, whose abilities can be partially enhanced through various tools. The others (idola specus, fori and theatri) were more of a social or didactical character.

The first class, tribal Idols, doesn't reflect only the incapability of senses of perceiving subtleties in the structure of particles or spiritual activity, but also the effects of passions3. People were simply impatient to make deep inquiries into the things they didn't comprehend by mere sight, and thus they imagined the solution4. Specular Idols are similar in the way they are caused by passions as well. They are caused by individual differentiation of setting, as everybody lives his own life. The people tend to focus on one thing and describe by its means the whole world. When we discover a system between few particular phenomena, we tend to apply it on the others as well. Most notably Aristotle was the main victim of these Idols, while the Atomists, being fascinated by the true substance of matter, are perfectly avoiding the problem, not speaking of any systems at all5.

The third class of Idols could are at most the immediate result of "premature anticipation" - and as Bacon says, they are the worst of problems6. The problem had to be in definitions, first objects of contemporary science7. The problems of language, interchanging of a sign and signified object, are still problematic nowadays. Similarily to the root of the problem, seen in the tribal Idols, people tend not only to choose more simple and familiar descriptions of the material phenomena, but also of cultural ones. Either in a way of the specular Idols - to adapt a thought onto an own worldview - or in various possible errors provided by the structure of language, like homonyms and vaguely defined terms; in short vain or ill-chosen words8. Theatrical Idols then present a worldview, culturally accepted mistakes, which reflect themselves on philosophies and, especially, speculative theologies9.

1 - NO I §28
2 - NO I §41: "all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe"; According to Zuna, these words are taken from Protagoras, reflecting more a skeptic, negative nature of this problem. Impossibility to fully comprehend an object of experience by senses only is matter of a major importance in the New Organon, but surely not its foundation. Actually Bacon himself criticizes the Platonists of making the skepticism towards sensual knowledge a tenet (NO §67), an idea presented by many thinkers of renaissance as well.
3 - Zagorin p.83
4 - NO I §49; but as the next aphorism says, of course "by far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the senses"
5 - NO I §54 and 57
6 - NO I §59
7 - NO I §30: "Though all the wits of all the ages should meet together and combine and transmit their labors, yet will no great progress ever be made in science by means of anticipations; because radical errors in the first concoction of the mind are not to be cured by the excellence of functions and subsequent remedies."
8 - NO I §60
9 - NO I §62



4.New Theater

Of course, if Bacon would just skeptically question the present state of science and call all the contemporary technological progress a mere "chance"1, then we wouldn't speak of him as the one, who gave the "for long time an unmatched program of a massive and glorious scientific and technological struggle"2. Theory of Idols was to show the causes of his contemporary state of science. Its goal was to clear the way for induction as the "only hope" for creating true image of things3. This view, to show New Organon as a work of scientific methodology, is the one questioned by Rossi and questioned by Zagorin. However, to call it a methodology wouldn't suffice; it tries to affect a much wider field, like worldview.

It doesn't see a qualitative distinction between a theoretical text and an experiment. It evaluates both as same category of a source of knowledge; both are being affected by different Idols, but both may lead to truth, when these Idols are recognized and overcome. Bacon saw a text as a collection of empirical data, composed of a personal experiences and opinions. People tend to prefer expertise from general overview, what reflects, due to the Idols of Cave, on any of their opinion about the general nature. Bacon remarks, that this is because of the social nature - no artisan nor philosopher works for some abstract truth, for comprehension of the nature, but is motivated by the fruits of the work in which he is an expert, and which he tries to present4. A natural philosophic opinion (be it in a form of an axiom or of a wider system of metaphysics) is not the end, a goal of their study, but, inversely, a tool for justification of their real work. Knowledge was always reflecting an individual skill.

The first problem opened - the difference between the effectivity of mechanical and magical arts - could have been easily avoided, when the magician had the skill ("power") to fascinate and persuade the spectators. A mechanist could have set an opinion based on his works, but still it would be only in a competition with that of a magician5. What was needed, was a common language for both, which would reflect the nature of their works with one terminology and one set of axioms; like he says, to "pass from Vulcan to Minerva"6. And it could become effective only if the works of such art would bring fruits of higher effectivity than those of lone artisans, relying on their personal skills. The axioms have no value without application on the matter7, but when proven to be generally valuable, every artisan would have to be aware his work is reflecting it.

Such a possibility gave enough space and meaning to a new phenomenon: experiments with an abstract goal, "experimenta lucifera". In comparision to "experimenta fructifera", experiments which prove a particular quality of concrete object, these are touching that, what Bacon calls causes. They aren't dependant much on the theory, as any result of them would "enlighten" the understanding of the problem8. There has to be, of course, a certain theory behind the experiment. Their problem is, that they carry no definite meaning by themselves. It is hard to say, in how far the theories may be based on reason; what does exactly Bacon see as an inductive conclusion and what is already a mere expectation. How much is it needed for a conclusion to become an axiom, sufficient for being a base for practical (fruitful) experiments? The limits of this method weren't expected to show themselves at once. Also, we should be aware, that the induction is only a part of Bacon's method. What we seek for are "forms"9, whose definition seems to be purely nominal. His practical advice was to define terms basing on their presence or absence (as well as other relative qualities like degree or proximity) in the observed instance. By experiments we would find, in which instance the form doesn't appear, thus limit the number of cases relevant for studying the object.

When the As he himself couldn't comprehend all the possible instances of one form (ie heat), the projected method of tables was far from being influental, in comparision to the generally propagated ideas about induction. Not only the mere presence of a phenomenon did not mean a relation between its nature and the nature of an observed instance, but the number of all the instances, in which a form can be researched may not be always finite10. In so far remained Bacon a theoretist, not a practical experimenter, what Zagorin calls a "failure" of New Organon11. It didn't give a description of the process, in which empirical stimuli become knowledge, it remained a critical work, serving to make a new scientist aware of errors (Idols) he may encounter. That's why despite the efforts the expectations of the work to create some new "theater" of science weren't fulfilled.

1 - NO I §8: "Moreover, the works already known are due to chance and experiment rather than to sciences; for the sciences we now possess are merely systems for the nice ordering and setting forth of things already invented, not methods of invention or directions for new works."
2 - Zuna p.9
3 - NO I §14
4 - NO I §70
5 - NO I §74: "what is founded on nature grows and increases, while what is founded on opinion varies but increases not"
6 - NO II §7
7 - NO I §106
8 - NO I §99: "Now experiments of this kind have one admirable property and condition: they never miss or fail. For since they are applied, not for the purpose of producing any particular effect, but only of discovering the natural cause of some effect, they answer the end equally well whichever way they turn out; for they settle the question."
9 - NO II §1; "or true specific differences, nature-engendering natures, or source of emanation...", in short laws of physics; reasons explaining why one instance is different from another.
10 - It seems Bacon was quite an optimist: "Meantime, let no man be alarmed at the multitude of particulars, but let this rather encourage him to hope." (NO I §112)
11 - Zagorin p.101



5.Conclusion

At first, for Bacon himself it has no meaning, whether we find his work of greater or lesser value for the development of modern science. He didn't finish his work, and perhaps didn't even expected to do so. For us, it is important to discover, what were the methods of contemporary, or rather pre-Baconian science, what kind of inquiry was generally understood as "serious" and, perhaps of the highest importance, how and into what did he change these attitudes. What we could have find was at first the mistrust towards any knowledge but empirical. Abstraction had a meaning only when its relation to an empirical experience is clear and sufficient; also it should be proven to be a general for the most cases. Tradition was of no value when it can't be related to the empirical knowledge as well. Secondly there is a principle of insufficiency; no question may be answered without opening new ones. An individual knowledge doesn't have an ability to comprehend the whole science at once. A science becomes a cultural phenomenon, basing itself on a shared language and worldview, instead on an interest and skill.

What we have today of the New Organon is in no way a manual for amassing knowledge. Despite the fact, that the "great instauration" wasn't completed, and remained a process of numerous, usually autonomous changes in methods of individual disciplines, Bacon's work remained to be a text, which gave a single reason to question the contemporary methods as well as superstitious thoughts, handling them on a same level.

"For creation was not by the curse made altogether and forever a rebel, but in virtue of that charter "In the sweat of thy face shall thou eat bread," it is now by various labors (not certainly by disputations or idle magical ceremonies, but by various labors) at length and in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread, that is, to the uses of human life." NO (end)



Literature


Bacon, Francis - Advancement of Learning, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bacon/francis
Bacon, Francis - New Organon, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bacon/francis/ (quoted as NO)
Rossi, Paolo - Geburt der modernen Wissenschaft in Europa
Zagorin, Perez - Francis Bacon