Tvoje vyhrady su validne, tiez si myslim ze mu fakty nesedia, ale imho si si nevsimol (ani ostatni) principialny argument, tak sa ho pokusim zhrnut. A ako pisem vyssie, vnimam to ako trollovanie konzistencie jednej konkretnej skupiny vyhranenych nazorov, netreba brat prilis vazne:

1. Ethical consequentialist vegetarians believe that farmed animals have lives so bad they are not worth living, so that it is better for them not to come into existence. (If ethical consequentialist vegetarians believed that animals have lives that are unpleasant but still better than non-existence, they would focus on reducing harm to these animals without reducing their numbers.)

Toto mi pride uplne ok, radsej by mohol pisat o (ethical consequentialist) veganoch, ale co uz.

2. I will argue that if vegetarians were to apply this principle consistently, the suffering of wild animals would dominate their concerns, and would plausibly lead them to support reducing the number of wild animals, for instance through habitat destruction or sterilisation. (Overall, it seems plausible that wild animals have worse lives than, say, free-range cows. If vegetarians think it’s better for the latter not to exist, they must believe the same thing about wild animals.)

'dominate' a 'worse lives' je uplne mimo, ale otazka konzistencie je primerana. Ako velmi je akceptovatelne utrpenie?

3. An intuitive response to wild animal suffering can be that cycles of predation and starvation are natural, and therefore they must be neutral morally. But what is natural is not necessarily what is good, for instance, humans will routinely use technology to remove diseases which are natural.

Toto je pre mna najslabsia cast argumentu (alebo najvtipnejsia). Appeal to nature je sice vacsinou blud, ale ak ho odmietneme a sucasne akceptujeme ze clovek aj tak vyrazne ovplyvnuje prirodne procesy, tak ak chceme byt konzistentni, treba zabranit utrpeniu nielen zvierat, ale aj ludi, a dalej je to asi jasne.

4. Underlying some of these principled arguments is the intuition that harmful acts, like killing livestock, are worse than harmful omissions, like failing to avert wild animal suffering. Consequentialists should reject these intuitions. It is not my goal here to convince non-consequentialists to abandon the act-omission distinction. However, I offer them a thought experiment to suggest that harmful omissions matter at least somewhat. Imagine you see a fire spreading in a forest and, while walking away from the fire, you see an injured fawn: a broken leg prevents her from fleeing. You carry a rifle and could instantly kill the fawn at no cost to yourself, preventing her from the extreme suffering of being burned alive. In this situation, for vegetarians who care about harm to animals, it is clear that it would be immoral to omit to act and allow wild animal suffering to happen. So the general principle that allowing wild animals to suffer is morally neutral cannot hold.
viac zabavy s tymto: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing-allowing/