Kobi Michael1
Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian
Control in the Reality of Low Intensity
Conflict—The Israeli Case

Introduction
The reality of wars and violent conflicts brings the military to the
front of the stage and empowers its presence in public discourse as well as its
influence over public opinion due to its expertise and professional responsibility
for exercising military power. Under such circumstances, the challenge
of maintaining civilian control over the military increases dramatically.
Civilian control has troubled many scholars since the end of WW2.
During that time and the four decades following it, war was mostly characterized
by armed conflict between statist entities. Those conflicts can be
described as High Intensity Conflicts (HIC) or interstate conflicts, but since
the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the nature of warfare
has changed dramatically and most violent conflicts have been characterized
as ethno-national conflicts. Those conflicts can be described as Low
Intensity Conflicts (LIC) or intrastate conflicts2 with major components of
terror and guerilla warfare. This is the kind of conflict that Israel has faced
with the Palestinians since 2000 and the military’s implicit influence over
the conflict’s management has severely challenged the political echelon in
Israel regarding its relations with the military echelon and the efficiency of
its substantive civilian control.
The uniqueness of the LIC as a multifaceted conflict3 forced the military
echelon to develop a sophisticated knowledge infrastructure, going
far beyond the traditional and declared fields of military professionalism,
and positioning the military echelon as an important and critical actor in
the conflict theater. This developed knowledge became one of the military
establishment’s key assets, enhancing its centrality in managing the conflict
and leading toward its “functional expansion”.
The systematic development of military knowledge turned the military
echelon into an “epistemic authority” in the eyes of the public and
the political echelon in Israel regarding the conflict’s management. In the
absence of both similar processes of knowledge development among civilian
institutions (which basically are less appreciated by the public and the
political echelon) and the lack of a permanent, professional, staff in the
Israeli government, the knowledge gap between the military and the political
echelons was broadened. The discourse between the echelons became
an “unequal dialogue”, but contrary to the inequality claimed by Cohen,4
which is based on the superiority of the political echelon, the interaction
between the echelons in Israel was characterized by asymmetry in favor
of the military echelon and by the latter’s domination over the “discourse
space” between the echelons.5
In this article I will examine the source of this knowledge and its
influence over the interactions between the echelons in the reality of LIC,
assessing the necessity of knowledge as a crucial resource for efficient civilian
control. I will attempt to prove the premise that as long as the political
echelon was unable or unwilling to provide clear and distinct directives
defining their political goals, the military echelon’s “conceptual distress”
was increased, pushing it to develop an alternative “conceptual system”
and a more sophisticated “knowledge infrastructure”. Due to this course
of developments, the knowledge gap between the echelons was broadened;
the military echelon enhanced its position as an “epistemic authority” and
its influence over the “discourse space” nature.
Therefore, I begin the article by presenting the “discourse space” concept,
utilizing it later as an organizing concept to describe the main argument.
I then describe the development process of Israeli military knowledge
since 1998, clarifying the meaning of the process as a conceptual revolution
in the military’s organization. I emphasize the principle of civil control and
its implications by describing the main literature about this concept and
conclude with a description of the interactions between the echelons as a
“discourse space”, explaining how the knowledge gap between the military
and political echelons weakens the efficiency of civil control.

The Discourse Space and The
Political–Military Echelons’ Interactions
The discourse space is the organizing concept used here to describe the
interaction between the political and the military echelons. The concept was
first introduced by Michael6 and its essence is the exchange of information,
knowledge, and insights between levels concerning a specific subject. The
influence exercised by the echelons is a function of the inputs that each of
them contributes to the discourse space.
The nature and character of the discourse can be described as having two
dimensions, the dimension of content and the dimension of political directive.
These dimensions create a matrix of four main types of discourse spaces
(A, B, C, D) and are determined by three independent variables: inputs of
the political echelon, inputs of the military echelon, and the gradients of
interaction between the two. The interaction that takes place between the
echelons in the discourse space is, in fact, an intellectual encounter between
statesmanship and military strategy and reflects the relative power of each
of the echelons and its influence on the examined context.
The military’s influence is expressed by the content/conceptualization
dimension, while the political echelon’s influence is expressed by the political
directive dimension. The more the content dimension is characterized
as military (in the sense of concepts based on military knowledge) the more
the military’s influence is increased. On the other hand, the more clear
and distinctive the political directive dimension is, the more the political
echelon’s influence is increased.
The discourse space enables each level to gain a better understanding
of the limitations of the operative space of the other level, and facilitates the
articulation of directives by the political level. In a situation of coherent,
consecutive discourse, there is a better prospect that the circles of knowledge
of the two levels will be broadened. Such a dialogue also generates a
type of shared responsibility7 of the levels for the success of the process.

The Main Argument
The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward intrastate
conflict (which is known as low-intensity conflict) have challenged
the patterns of interaction between the political and the military echelons,
in general, and in Israel, in the protracted reality of such a conflict, in
particular. It seems that the political echelon’s superiority is maintained
at the institutional and formal levels; but on the substantive level, which
demands relying on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political
echelon’s position is weakened and the substantive civilian control loses its
validity. The years of violent confrontation indicate that the discourse space
between the echelons was characterized by military content and a blurred
political directive.
Elaborating my main argument and introducing the military echelon
in Israel as an epistemic authority (in the eyes of the public and the political
echelon) regarding the violent confrontation might clarify some fundamental
issues about the characteristics of the interactions between the echelons
and the weakness of the civilian control. I argue that the military echelon
arranged the discourse space and affected the way it was conducted by
using knowledge and a sophisticated conceptual system developed under
the circumstances of conceptual distress in the absence of clear and distinct
political directives.8 In addition, the military echelon influenced security
and public discourse in Israel and even arranged and shaped (“burned” in
IDF jargon) the Israeli public consciousness.
The IDF’s social status and the trust it earns from the Israeli public (to
distinguish from the mistrust the political echelon earns)9 leads the Israeli
public to appraise the military echelon as a certified knowledge source, professional,
reliable, and impartial, and to adopt the military echelon’s views.
In other words, military knowledge affects societal judgment regarding
management of the core issues of the violent confrontation.
The military is a task-oriented entity that acts toward defined goals and
cannot operate in a vacuum.10 Due to the blurred political directive, or its
absence, the military echelon found itself in a blurred and unbearable reality.
In order to ensure the efficiency of military force and its effectiveness,
the military echelon was forced to interpret the political echelon’s intentions
and directives and to create the political context for the violent confrontation
by developing and elaborating relevant knowledge.11 Those military
operations that were exercised according to the military’s interpretation of
political intentions shaped the violent conflict environment and the conflict
management strategy, and were perceived by the political echelon as well as
by the most of the public as justified. The military’s hegemonic performance
in the conflict theater and its implicit influence are both a result and an
indication of weak political control, which is the result of a breakdown in
political thought. This weakness is a threat to the substantive superiority of
the civilian level and its ability to delimit the military’s influence over the
political process and the conflict management strategy.

What Is Epistemic Authority?
The source of the concept “epistemic authority” is found in social psychology.
Kruglanski,12 based on the early research of Hovland and McGuire13
about learning theory, presented it as a unique perspective that can be used
to assess the implications of social judgment. He attributes supreme importance
to the information sources that are adopted by the individual and
influence his positions and judgment regarding different issues. Kruglanski
defines epistemic authority as the information source that the individual
relies on while he tries to acquire and internalize knowledge about defined
issues. Individuals tend to believe that experts are right because they are
experts. Consequently, individuals tend to appraise expert views as valid
and reliable. A certain overlap can be found between Kruglanski’s premise
and Foucault’s argument that social discourse is composed of propositions
that function as a means for defining the truth: “not everyone can produce
propositions . . . Some propositions are more authoritative than others in
the sense that they are related with those who hold institutional positions
of power.”14
The epistemic authority’s influence will increase when it functions as
what Kruglanski calls a “stopping mechanism”.15 This mechanism affects
the individual’s cognition; individuals tend to freeze their quest for information
and information sources to solidify their attitude regarding an issue.
They prefer relying on what they perceive as an epistemic authority.
Epistemic authority affects public opinion and therefore has unique
importance and social implications in democratic societies that face violent
conflict and social and security crises. The importance increases when
individuals and groups suffer from cognitive and mental difficulties from
being exposed to diverse and contradicting information. In such situations,
the epistemic authority can block individuals from accessing alternative
information and create an “informational dependence”, leaving the individual
dependent on the epistemic authority as the only reliable source
of information. The dependence creates a psychological convenience that
leads to positions and behavior consistent with the recommendations of
the epistemic authority.16
Trying to find the political implications of the concept, Bar-Tal and
Kruglanski17 pointed to similar findings regarding the tendency of rightwing
voters and self-defined conservatives to rely on epistemic authorities.
Their findings indicate a tendency for decreased critical appraisal
of the epistemic authority as well an increase in “closure”. This is the
reason why Kruglanski and others attribute significance and even metacognitive
importance to epistemic authority as an information source and
as a convincing factor.
An interesting conceptual development was added by Halperin and
Bar-Tal,18 who analyzed Ehud Barak’s influence over public opinion and the
peace camp in Israel. They clarify the influence of “major events” on public
opinion but conclude that this is not enough to generate dramatic changes,
or “psychological earthquakes” in their terminology. In order to generate
such changes in public opinion, there is need for a communicator who
is estimated by the public as reliable and can be considered an epistemic
authority regarding the information and its interpretation and implications.
They conclude that Prime Minister Barak was perceived by the public
in Israel as such an authority and that is the reason that he was able to
engender a turnaround in Israeli perceptions towards the Oslo process.
Ehud Barak was able to enjoy a positive public perception because
of, inter alia, his military service and his former position as the IDF Chief
of General Staff (CGS). Furthermore, his strict position and explanations
about Arafat’s refusal of his generous offers at Camp David were robustly
backed by the military echelon, at least until the beginning of 2003.19
The military echelon in Israel, maybe even more than Barak, benefits
from a good public reputation. It is perceived by most of the public as
professional, expert, reliable, and impartial regarding partisan interests. Its
involvement in political processes is perceived by the public as legitimate
and even required.20 In the terms of concordance theory,21 there is an agreement
between the military, the civilian authorities, and the citizenry about
the active participation of the military establishment in the political decision
making process. It can be deduced that the military echelon in Israel
is perceived by the public as an epistemic authority regarding the violent
conflicts. The political echelon acknowledges this fact and even relies on
and is dependent on the military echelon as a knowledge authority in
decision-making processes.

Military Knowledge Development Since 1998 and
The Characteristics of Its Methodology22
The buds of military knowledge development in the context of LIC can
be found at the end of 1998 in the IDF’s Central Command. The process
began as a result of severe conceptual distress. In 1998, MG (Maj. General)
Ya’alon as the Central Command General Officer Commanding (GOC)
understood that the EOS (Estimation of the Situation) process, which
should have been the most important component in knowledge creation
for the decision making process, was practically irrelevant:
I felt that we were missing tools; I felt that the discourses in the Central
Command as well as in other places were not deep enough. They dealt with
foam on water . . . I felt it was wrong . . . I understood that we had to build a
different process of EOS. (MG Ya’alon, personal interview, July 10, 2005)
Ya’alon internalized the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does
not occur in a vacuum, but in a political and international context. In an
independent process, almost subversive (in the sense of swimming against
the tide)—without direction or initiative from IDF Headquarters—Ya’alon
decided to begin developing methodology and tools for a different kind of
EOS, which would later be found to be revolutionary.
Ya’alon established a think tank composed of some senior officers from
the Central Command Headquarters as well as from the subordinated
field divisions’ headquarters and began training them to acquire the new
methodology and tools, actually a new language and concepts. After some
months, the newly established think tank began leading the EOS process.
The EOS process was characterized as a knowledge generation and
analysis process, based on brain storming. Effort was devoted to clarifying,
interpreting, and conceptualizing the changing reality on the ground. Its
declared objective was to: “. . . look for phenomena that are not seen by the
binoculars and are not connected to the tactical dimension, but in the end
cause violent outbreaks.” (Ya’alon, personal interview) The assumption was
that if it was possible to locate these phenomena and conceptualize them,
they could be used as indicating signs and even as an intelligence alert to
prevent violent outbreak.
The thinking process led towards the development of an understanding
about the nature and the characteristics of different phenomena in the
conflict theater and to classifying them into two major groups: “Phenomena
that influence events and can be influenced (by the IDF) were designated
inside campaign boundaries, while phenomena that influence events but
cannot be influenced, were designated as phenomena within the system
boundaries.” The traditional borders between the military and the political
spheres became more permeable by defining the system boundaries as a
relevant parameter for the estimation of the situation: “You, as the military
commander, should make these classifications and clarifications knowing
that essentially this process is a knowledge generation process.” (Ya’alon,
personal interview) From this stage, the elections in the US, the EU positions
regarding the PA, and international political and economic trends
become relevant inputs in the military EOS processes at all levels.
The knowledge generation procedures facilitated the conceptualization
of phenomena in the conflict arena. The conceptualization process
compelled continuing brain storming; in order to assure its effectiveness,
the process had to be released from the military’s organizational hierarchy
as well as from the traditional military approach to the EOS processes.
The brain storming process took place in regular gatherings of the think
tank every few days and, in exceptional times, every day or even several times
a day. This dynamic led to the development of a rich conceptual system and
deep insights regarding the reality of a political process in the shadow of
a conflict. Those capabilities were translated to military operations at the
Territorial Command level and later on in the General Headquarters.
The new thinking and EOS processes were gradually adopted by the
territorial divisions and brigade levels throughout the Central Command.
This was done through advanced studies, special guiding and training
events, and by developing the Command discourse framework and unique
language. The ideas and concepts were presented as “knowledge maps,” a
sophisticated graphic expression, sometimes too complicated and unclear
for the unskilled reader.
In its new form, the EOS engendered the systematic development of
knowledge and anchored fundamental concepts in the military language
and training methodologies. When Ya’alon began his duty as the CGS
Deputy, he turned the process into “the main axis of the General Headquarters’
EOS.” After his nomination as the IDF CGS, Ya’alon decided to
create a new role in his bureau: the CGS Assistant for Analytic Processes.
Together, they acted vigorously to diffuse the new EOS methodology to all
General Headquarters’ levels, “Not only regarding force operation dimensions,
but force building processes as well.” (Ya’alon, personal interview)
One of the salient outcomes of the process was a mandatory methodology
training booklet (about the limited conflict) published by the General
Headquarters’ Training Division.
Many in the Central Command and the IDF perceived the new language
as arrogant, meaningless, and even irrelevant. EOS documents that
were written in the new language and that relied on the new conceptual
frameworks were found to be obtuse and esoteric.23 Col. (Ret.) Yehuda
Vagman warned about the dangers of the new language and its resulting
faulty operational patterns. He deemed it a strategic failure that would
endanger the IDF’s deterrence ability and its ability to determine the
campaign against Palestinian terror:
The most prominent expression of the [new] systematic training of the IDF
officers was not in their operational success against terror, but mostly in
their ability to use the concepts . . . This language enabled manipulations in
presenting the reality . . . false presentations of success . . . The more those
ideas were more blurred, incomprehensible and non-implementable, the more
creative they were considered, and accordingly, the more they enhanced their
producer’s status in the organization.24
Ya’alon was aware of the criticism, but viewed the process as a conceptual
and organizational revolution, which drastically improved the IDF’s
performance in LIC. He agrees that the language was sometimes esoteric
and that, “Language should be understood, and there is no need to invent
new words if there are words that can be used for the same purpose.”
(Ya’alon, personal interview)
According to Ya’alon, the characteristics of LIC compel an understanding
of the broader context. Military operations on the tactical level have
strategic implications. Under the conditions of LIC, “. . . even the soldier
at the roadblock is a strategic soldier. If he doesn’t understand the context,
he might make a tactical mistake that will become a strategic problem.”
Thus, it was necessary to expand the new knowledge generation process to
all levels; “I expect that the brigade commander will provide the division
commander and me with relevant knowledge in order to enable us to make
the right decisions, therefore the knowledge generation is at every level.”
(Ya’alon, personal interview)
Whether the revolution led by Ya’alon will last remains to be seen, but
it seems there is no doubt that he made a strong impact on the military
establishment in Israel. This influence is visible in procedural outcomes
(concepts, insights, language, and knowledge) as well as in the military
echelon’s inputs to the discourse spaces with the political echelon and
the public in Israel. The military’s knowledge infrastructure, developed
during the years of violent confrontation, has gone beyond the traditional
professional military sphere and become richer and multidimensional; it
has been a unique input that deepened the knowledge gaps between the
echelons and between the military establishment and civilian institutions.
This process established the military echelon as an epistemic authority
and deepened its involvement in the political process in parallel with the
increasing weakness of the substantive civilian control.

The Essence Of Civilian Control
As the following review of the concept of civil control will demonstrate,
most scholars explain and analyze the interaction between political and
military echelons under the assumption of civil control ascendancy. Civil
control is thought of as the theoretical organizing concept of the discipline
of civil-military relations, with different scholars focusing on different
angles and aspects.
The spectrum of definitions, broadened since the beginning of the
discipline in the early 1950s,25 can be characterized by the transition from
absolute26 and structural27 definitions toward softer and more dynamic
ones. The latter identify civil control as a process or an expression of partnership28
or shared responsibility29 between the echelons. Civil control is
seen as a dialogue, albeit an unequal one,30 and as an intellectual encounter
between the echelons, meaning that statesmen take part in the military’s
policy formulation process only “. . . as far as they can contribute substantial
inputs in thought and directive.”31
It seems that the common denominator of all the definitions is the
expectation that civilian control provides aim and objective, that it sets
limits to the military’s influence and ensures concordance between that
influence and the political echelon’s objectives. This is done in a way that
also insures the elected political echelon’s superiority and the implementation
of its defined goals. Civil control can be defined as a process whose
efficiency is best measured by evaluating the relative influence of military
officers and civilians over state decisions.32
Civil control can be defined as a means for establishing the “rules of
the game:” the mechanisms of accountability that enable control of the
way authority is activated and the way the game will be run.33 In fact, civil
control arranges the division of responsibility between the echelons while
the political echelon defines national interests and goals and controls their
implementation by allocating security resources, including the authority
to use force; the military has the authority to determine military doctrine
regarding the management of that force. The abovementioned definition
can be considered a normative definition that establishes order in the democratic
state. The Israeli case is an exception in that civil control becomes
blurred. Many times we find the military echelon present in decisions
regarding national policy, far beyond the boundaries of military doctrine.
Feaver34 would claim in this regard that civilian control efficiency is a
function of the possible combinations between the variables of work and
shirk (on the military’s part) and its identification or non-identification (on
the political echelon’s part). The least effective civilian control according to
this matrix occurs when the military shirks its duties and the political level
does not identify the shirk. However, civil control can also be maintained
through the principal’s use of punishment; when the political echelon, the
principal, recognizes that the military echelon, the agent, is shirking its
duties, it can punish the military echelon, thus reinforcing civil control.
The challenge of democratic governance is to exercise civil control while
providing for the military’s legitimate needs in the context of national security,
facilitating its ability to function effectively. This is a challenge as the
military establishment naturally tends to maximize its autonomy in order
to achieve the resources it considers necessary for successfully carrying out
its operational missions. The conflict between internal needs and defense
and security needs obliges decisions regarding priorities. Such decisions are
political in their essence; therefore, it is elected representatives (politicians in
the executive branch as well as in the legislative) who should make them, not
those in uniform. Referring to the Israeli case, Ben-Meir described at length
the problematic and negative implications and consequences of a civil control
that lacks sufficient parliamentary control over the IDF because of the Israeli
parliament Foreign Affairs and Security Committee’s weaknesses.35
The characteristics of civil-military interaction are determined as well
as by the boundaries between the military and the civilian spheres. These
boundaries should be drawn by the civil control. As will be demonstrated
in this article’s next section, the evidence shows that the existing distinctions
are not entirely clear, and in most cases we find blurred boundaries
between them. Politicians are involved in military strategy and officers are
involved in politics.
Because open discourse between the political and the military echelons
has significant importance regarding issues of war and peace, the expectation
is not to limit the military’s freedom of thought and expression: “. . .the
line between the civil and the military echelons . . . passes in the spheres of
authority and responsibility and not in the districts of spirit and mind.”36
However, when the military echelon approaches the discourse with both
professional and psychological advantages that generate information dependence
within the political echelon, open discourse between the echelons
can blur the boundaries between the spheres of responsibility and authority.
Williams37 warned about the danger of the military, professional strategy
domination over the designation of national interests and objectives. Such
boundary blurring can easily lead to the intervention of the military echelon
in civilian spheres and to a weakening of the latter’s authority.
It seems that civil control effectiveness in general, and specifically in
the context of violent confrontation, is a function of four major elements: 1.
contextual knowledge and historical perspective; 2. public legitimatization
in the sense of trust in the political leadership and its abilities, skills and
qualifications and in the decision making processes; 3. governance culture;
and 4. political leadership that presents a clear vision, defined by clear
political directives, to the military echelon regarding the implementation
of its political goals.38
The political directive is the organizing mechanism of substantive civil
control and its distortion or absence will broaden the military echelon’s
interpretation of its scope of action in relation to the political echelon’s
intentions.39 The political echelon in Israel lacks the capability and institutional
infrastructure to generate the kind of systematic knowledge that can
produce viable alternatives to the military’s recommendations for managing
violent conflict. Actually, military knowledge becomes a shared knowledge
basis for the political and military echelons:
On important issues regarding the military such as the annual estimation
of the situation or defense policy, the discussion doesn’t exceed the military
presentation and questions about it. The military’s ability to prepare a nice and
convincing presentation provides its position with an a priori advantage.40
Therefore, the knowledge becomes a significant input in the discourse
spaces between the echelons and affects the nature of the discourse space
and the civil control as will be described in the following section.

Civil Control and The Nature of Discourse
Under the Shadow of Developed Knowledge
Since the country’s establishment, the interaction between Israel’s echelons
has been characterized by permeable borders. It is common for senior
officers to enter the political arena after retiring from military service,41
which in practice makes it sometimes difficult to discern just who belongs
to which group. The political echelon in the Israeli context shrinks to the
political-security cabinet and primarily to the triangle of the Prime Minister,
Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs.42 Although in
many cases, even this definition is not totally accurate and remains only
formal. In some coalitional compositions, we find the Prime Minister
holding the position of Minister of Defense. In other cases, the Minister
of Defense or Minister of Foreign Affairs, or both of them, are the Prime
Minister’s political adversaries or each others’ political adversaries.43
Due to Israel’s governance culture, its lack of a tradition of staff work at
the political level44 and the absence of professional civilian staff other than
the government (although in recent years the status of the NSC has been
elevated) there occurs a reversal of the normal order; the military echelon,
with detailed preparations for the possible political-security contexts in
hand, precedes the political echelon. The military echelon tries to understand
and interpret the political echelon’s intentions and directives and, in
some cases, the political directives only become clear as the political echelon
relates to the military echelon’s plans.
Such an order shapes the discourse space between the echelons and
releases the political echelon from the obligation to develop knowledge
infrastructures of its own as alternatives to the military’s. The unbalanced
encounter between the echelons leads to military domination over the discourse
space, which becomes Type A discourse space (e.g., characterized by
military contents) in the model, presented earlier,45 and the perpetuation
of an “intellectual vacuum:”
When I generate this knowledge and reach insights, I bring them to the political
level. The political level will not do it by itself. It is not familiar with this
knowledge, and I have to provide the knowledge . . . what I found there was
a vacuum and, therefore, the things I brought dominated the discourse . . .
eventually, my recommendations were accepted. I dominated the discourse.
(Ya’alon, personal interview, July 10, 2005)
The developed military knowledge infrastructure includes information
and knowledge about dimensions and domains that prima facie are perceived
as external to the military’s professional realm. The military echelon
takes into consideration political, media, economic, and societal concerns
as it relates to the spectrum of options for military operations in the conflict
arena. Trying to understand the broad context of the violent conflict, the
military echelon is pushed to introduce plans and recommendations that
contain salient political elements. As it does so, the military becomes the
political echelon’s partner or antagonist, rather than its instrument, and
the discourse space becomes one with characteristics that deviate from the
military’s traditional realm of responsibility:
At the highest political-military levels, there were disputes . . . Ya’alon supported
more openness during Abbas’s term as Palestinian Prime Minister. He
objected to the attack on the Muqata’a . . . He rejected Sharon’s suggestion
regarding shelling the Gaza Strip and succeeded in influencing the Prime
Minister. Ya’alon didn’t reject the disengagement plan but the way it was
conducted. He claimed that by negotiating correctly we could get a return
for such a move.”46
The GCS is a respected public figure in Israel who often appears in
civilian, public forums. He uses these occasions to introduce assessments
and express professional positions. These appearances are also another
kind of discourse, external and parallel to the political-military discourse
but with indirect influence on it. This other discourse space becomes, on
some occasions, a ramming tool used by the military echelon to pressure
and influence the political echelon. By influencing and even shaping the
public consciousness, the GCS generates public pressure that undoubtedly
influences the political level:
In a short piece that was leaked from his speech at the Institute for Democracy,
Ya’alon stung those who see the disengagement as “Messiah Now” . . .
Ya’alon doesn’t see any prospect for permanent agreement but only a potential
for interim agreement, but [thinks] that even such an outcome should be
promoted.”47
In the discourse between the military echelon and the public in Israel,
the former defined the violent confrontation as the continuation of the War
of Independence,48 the Palestinian Authority as a terrorist entity,49 the need
to “burn” the Palestinian consciousness, and the need to ensure the hardening
of Israeli society as a necessary key for resisting Palestinian terrorism.
In such a reality, with the Israeli public experiencing fear and threat, the
internalization of such an interpretation became easier, especially coming
from a source perceived by the public as a reliable expert. In this sense, the
public developed informational dependence on the military echelon, causing
it to perceive the military echelon as an epistemic authority as well. And,
indeed, the military echelon succeeded in generating informative influence
and facilitating the “burning” of the Israeli consciousness: portraying terror
as an existential threat50 and the confrontation as an inescapable but just
war. It seems that the military echelon had more success in “burning” the
Israeli consciousness than the Palestinian one.
Some senior civilians severely criticized the salient presence of the military
echelon in this discourse and argued that civilian institutions should
be more involved in the political process. Ya’alon tends to accept this criticism
and adds that there exists a shortcoming in this regard, “Such strong
centers of knowledge should be everywhere: the NSC, the Foreign Affairs
Ministry and all of those who complain that the military is too strong, let
them strengthen themselves.” He adds that with the absence of additional
centers of knowledge, government and cabinet discussions remain at the
operational level, lacking sufficient depth, “Is this the way that a discussion
should be held in the government, in the cabinet? Are they approving
an operation or not? This is a tactical discussion . . . they come to the
discussions without insights, without basis.” (Ya’alon, personal interview)
The encounter between the echelons, which should be conducted as
an intellectual discourse characterized by the merging of different ideas,
becomes an encounter in which the military echelon presents its “knowledge
map,” with inlaid interpretations of the political echelon’s intentions
and its directives formulated through inference: “The politicians avoid
direct, clear and compelling wording . . . the IDF is pushed to decode the
political echelon’s intentions by guesswork and information garnered from
media interviews and indirect citations in newspapers articles.”51
Ya’alon concurs with Oren’s description explaining that “there is no
doubt that there are such cases. The political echelon avoids clear wording
and taking responsibility.” On the other hand, Ya’alon perceives this reality
as given and even natural: “We have to assume that in a democratic state,
we will not hear clear wording from the political echelon, especially in
the Israeli reality. I term it fuzziness, yes creative fuzziness.” Ya’alon thinks
that fuzziness is a political tool that affords the political echelon flexibility:
“Once you say something clear, it is done. When you leave it open it is in
flux.” Ya’alon thinks that sometimes “. . . there is a need to only signal direction
and not an objective because you cannot be sure that you can achieve
it. This is the reason we call it political directive, and I can accept it.” But
the Israeli case shows that there are many instances in which the directive is
not there. “Sometimes they hold the cards so close to their chests that even
they don’t know what the cards they hold.” (Ya’alon, personal interview)
In Ya’alon’s view, the discourse between the echelons is the means to
clarify what should be done. He assumes that even if the political echelon
decides that something should be done, it does not necessarily know if the
military can do it “. . . because it doesn’t really know the military’s capabilities.”
The responsibility of the military echelon in this regard is to present
the political echelon with the possible implications of the military operations
that are required to implement its objectives. Military knowledge
should combine with civilian knowledge, and the outcome should be new
knowledge:
[The combination] generates knowledge by itself, and this is a fertilizing process.
This is what I term ‘creative fuzziness.’ While everyone contributes their
own knowledge, it creates a new knowledge that enables the political echelon
to reach an understanding about what is achievable and what is not. Then we
can reach an agreement on objectives. (Ya’alon, personal interview)
This definition shows that Ya’alon tends toward the concept of civil
control following the “shared responsibility” approach.52 Ya’alon, much like
Harkabi,53 expects the active participation of the political echelon in formulating
thought and directive. However, his remarks leave a definite impression
of a flawed partnership between the echelons; the political echelon is
not deeply involved in formulation of thoughts and directives. It seems that
in the absence of an alternative to military knowledge, the discourse space
shrinks to operational dimensions, and the burden of defining objectives
inside the conflict falls squarely on the IDF’s shoulders. Once again, the
discourse space becomes a Type A discourse.
Ya’alon agrees that the political echelon is in a state of “strategic helplessness,”
a term used to denote a situation brought about by a conflict
stalemate in which an actor simply does not know what to do and how
to react to create desired change.54 This situation, according to Ya’alon, is
exacerbated by the absence of civilian knowledge centers. Ya’alon criticizes
the political echelon for failing to provide real partners in the intellectual
running and, therefore, finds it difficult to define the discourse between the
echelons as an intellectual encounter:
When you come with this knowledge to the political echelon . . . with such
strategic helplessness, the political echelon is happy to buy what you offer
it. Then you look for partners that will challenge you intellectually, and you
don’t find them. To call the encounter between the echelons an ‘intellectual
encounter’ is too pretentious. (Ya’alon, personal interview)55
The discourse space between the echelons is conducted without a
“discourse culture.” Ya’alon seeks a richer and broader discourse that is
not focused only on the operational level. He thinks that such a discourse
can not be conducted with delineations of the boundaries of responsibility
between the civil and the military spheres that are too sharp and focused:
The discourse must be much broader. It should refer to the broad context.
I definitely don’t see here cut and clear boundaries [between the echelons];
there should be a melting [of knowledge]. Eventually, you cannot discuss only
military issues without taking into account their political aspects and context.
(Ya’alon, personal interview)
The result is that the military echelon introduces political ideas and
recommendations regarding the way that the Palestinian Authority should
be treated and even suggests ways to strengthen it.56 The political echelon in
this situation tends to accept these recommendations, mostly without reservations
regarding the military’s involvement in the political process: “When
I came to him [Prime Minister Sharon] with the idea about Abu-Mazen
[his nomination for the role of Palestinian Prime Minister], he immediately
adopted it.” (Ya’alon, personal interview) Sometimes the administration
does have reservations, but usually they are not significant. Ya’alon himself
does not feel comfortable with such a discourse and thinks its content is
too militaristic and should have been more civilian: “I think it is bad that
there are too many participants in these discussions who wear military
uniforms, and I definitely think that in many cases the discussions were
too military-oriented, immediately going to the force operation. It should
be more civilian [in its contents].” (Ya’alon, personal interview)
In the reality since 2003, the military echelon has been a restraining
force, understanding that the military option alone cannot remain the
only means, nor even the major means, of managing the conflict: “These
things require answers other than using force. Using force should be the last
alternative.” This point of view leads the military echelon to embark upon
“political operations”: “I, as the CGS, conducted many political operations
together with the Foreign Affairs Ministry. I thought that including Hizbullah
on the terror list was worth more than a thousand attacks in Lebanon.
This is a political operation, not a military one.” But it seems that even
here the military echelon finds itself almost alone in the campaign: “Why
wasn’t the cabinet sitting and discussing the strategy that should be used? I
expect such discussion to be conducted by the NSC. This is a matter that
demands coordination between military, political, and diplomatic bodies
on one hand and economic and social ones on the other.” (Ya’alon, personal
interview)
The political operations mentioned by Ya’alon are an outcome of
thought processes conducted by the military that include such inputs as
the influence of US elections, US moves in Iraq, and the EU’s position
toward Israel. All of those issues became relevant for the military EOSs.
The EOSs resulted in unique knowledge and insights that were introduced
by the military echelon in front of the political echelon as part of what the
former perceived as its professional duty: “I should know to come to my
superiors, to the political level, and to explain to them how the elections in
the States might influence military aspects in the conflict theater.” (Ya’alon,
personal interview)
The findings regarding the discourse space characteristics indicate
the salient hegemony of military knowledge and the weakness of civilian
knowledge. The reversal of the “normal order” was institutionalized. In
the absence of political directives, the military was forced to expand its
domain of interests and developed ideas and alternatives for the conflict’s
management.
Such interaction fits the Type A discourse space, characterized by military
conceptualization and blurred and undetermined political directive.
These findings are indicative of the military’s hegemony over the discourse
space or, in other words, the military’s deep involvement in the political
process. The military echelon shaped the nature of the discourse space by
using its broad and rich knowledge, which was created systematically in the
intellectual vacuum left by the political echelon. The nature of the discourse
between the echelons, characterized by military hegemony, is a reflection
of the substantive civil control’s weakness.
Conclusions
The unique characteristics of the violent confrontation with the Palestinians
led the military echelon toward an understanding of the importance
and necessity of developing multi-dimensional knowledge that is more
sophisticated and reaches beyond the traditional sphere of military professionalism.
The outcome of this process was a conceptual revolution in the
military establishment, but not only there.
Following the continued weakness of civilian institutions in Israel, the
military echelon’s revolution gave it a significant advantage over the political
echelon in generating the required knowledge for managing the violent
confrontation. The fact that the military establishment earned the appreciation
of the public in Israel, facilitated the transformation of the military
echelon to an epistemic authority in the eyes of the public as well as in the
eyes of politicians, and created an informational dependency on the military
echelon. The military echelon’s ideas and viewpoints were clearly reflected
in the discourse space between the echelons. The nature of the discourse
became Type A discourse, indicating military hegemony.
This hegemony is an expression of the military’s influence over the
political process, and such an influence enhances, in its turn, the existing
functional arrangement in which the military echelon is responsible for
conceptualizing strategy, planning and executing all matters related to the
management of the violent confrontation. It is true that all of the military’s
activities are done with the permission and the authorization of the political
level, but in most cases, the political directives are derived from the
military knowledge infrastructure, hegemonic knowledge that has almost
no competitors.57
In Foucault’s terms, the military echelon becomes the “truth agent”
regarding information and knowledge about violent confrontation. In every
society institutions exercise practices that internalize among the society
members what they perceive as the “truth” and use other practices to
exclude from the discourse the propositions they perceive as untrue.58
Knowledge, according to Foucault, is a kind of social “truth regime,” which
enables the domination of some people or institutions over themselves and
others. The social discourse is a reflection of the knowledge structure, and
the knowledge structure is a reflection of the power structure, because it is
impossible to use knowledge without power and because knowledge necessarily
generates power.59
If the political echelon really seeks to effectively control the military
and to balance its influence over the decision making processes, it must
generate knowledge and provide challenging alternatives to the military’s
ideas. It has to establish its position as an epistemic authority in the eyes
of the Israeli public and should lead toward the construction of a strategic
thought culture among the civilian institutions. Such a change would facilitate
the government’s ability to release itself from dependence on military
knowledge and will strengthen the substantive civil control.

Notes
1. The author thanks David Kellen for his comments and support, and Yagil
Levy, Daniel Bar-Tal, Tamar Herman, Gabi Sheffer, and Oren Barak for their useful
comments.
2. G. Allen Sens, “From Peace-Keeping to Peace-Building: The United Nations
and the Challenge of Intrastate War,” in Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher
(eds), The United Nations and Global Security (New York, 2004) 141–160; Martin
van Creveld, “The Transformation of War Revisited,” in J. Robert Bunker (ed),
Non-States Threats and Future Wars (London, 2003).
3. For detailed descriptions regarding the LIC, see Shmuel Nir, “The Nature of
the Limited Conflict,” in Hagay Golan and Shaul Shay (eds), The Limited Conflict
(Tel-Aviv, 2004) 19–44 [Hebrew] and Ido Hecht, “The Limited Conflict—Some
General Characteristics of Unique Warfare,” in Hagay Golan and Shaul Shay (eds),
The Limited Conflict (Tel-Aviv, 2004) 45–68 [Hebrew].
4. A. Eliot Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-
Military Relations and the Use of Force,” in D. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn
(eds), Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-military Gap and American National Security
(Cambridge, MA, London, UK, 2001).
5. Kobi Michael, “The Military’s Influence on the Transition Process from
War to Peace—the Israeli Case—Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with
Egypt and Oslo Process.” PhD diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2004;
Kobi Michael, “The Dialectic Interaction between the Military and the Political
Echelons During the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” in Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov (ed),
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Peace Process to Violent Confrontation 2000–2005
( Jerusalem, 2005).
6. Ibid.
7. Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed
Forces & Society, 26(1) (1999) 7–25.
8. Former Central Command GOC, MG Yitzhak Eitan said, “We have never
gotten a clear mission [from the political echelon] and things required interpretations
and trials in order to understand the mission,” Ma’ariv, March 29, 2002.
GCS Ya’alon said, “To demand the political echelon give the military echelon a
clear political directive is naivety,” at an Operational Theory Research Institute
(MALTAM) seminar about civil-military relations in the reality of LIC, February
24, 2003.
9. Asher Arian, David Nachmias, Doron Navot, and Daniel Shani, 2003
Democracy Index ( Jerusalem, 2003); Ephraim Ya’ar and Tamar Hermann, The
Peace Index, Ha’aretz, February 2005: “IDF is the entity which earns the highest
trust among the Israeli Public and the common appraisal is that its influence on
national policy making is appropriate. . . . The data indicate that the military earns
the highest trust of the Jewish population: 73% feel full trust and 21% trust, [for a]
total of 94%.” [Hebrew]
The Israeli Case • 49
10. In a personal interview with the author on May 27, 2003, former minister
Dan Meridor said: “Sometimes the military echelon has to fill the space left by the
political echelon. In most cases, the political echelon doesn’t determine a position
or has no position.”
11. “The politicians avoid direct and compelling formulation of their political
platform and avoid using civilian tools like the National Security Council. As a
consequence the IDF is pushed to decode the political echelon’s intentions . . .
In the IDF the process works upside down; it begins in the IDF and then it goes
up for the approval of the political echelon.” Amir Oren, Ha’aretz, July 15, 2005
[Hebrew].
12. Arie W. Kruglanski, Lay Epistemic and Human Knowledge: Cognitive and
Motivational Bases (New York, 1989).
13. Carl Iver Hovland, Irving L. Janis, Harold H. Kelley, Communication and
Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change (New Haven, CT, 1953); W.J.
McGuire, “The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change,” in Gardner Lindzey &
Elliot Aronson (eds), Handbook of Social Psychology (Reading, MA, 1969).
14. Sara Mills, Michel Foucault, trans. Ohad Zehavi (Tel-Aviv, 2005) [Hebrew].
15. Arie W. Kruglanski, Amiram Raviv, Daniel Bar-Tal, Alona Raviv, Keren
Sharvit, Shmuel Ellis, Ruth Bar, Antonio Pierro, Lucia Manneti, “Says Who?
Epistemic Authority Effects in Social Judgment,” in Mark P. Zanna (ed), Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology (San Diego, 2005) 346–392.
16. Ibid.
17. Daniel Bar-Tal, Amiram Raviv, Alona Raviv, “The Concept of Epistemic
Authority in the Process of Political Knowledge Acquisition,” Representative Research
in Social Psychology, 19 (1991) 1–14; Arie W. Kruglanski, “Motivated Social Cognition:
Principles of the Interface,” in E. Tory Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski (eds),
Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (New York, 1996) 493–520.
18. Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Fall of the Peace Camp in Israel:
The Determinative Influence of Prime Minister Ehud Barak on Israeli Public
Opinion—July 2000–February 2001,” Megamot, (in press) [Hebrew].
19. Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Peace
Process to Violent Confrontation 2000–2005 ( Jerusalem, 2005).
20. Ya’ar and Hermann, The Peace Index February 2005.
21. Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of
Concordance,” Armed Forces & Society, 22(1) (1995) 7, 18.
22. LG Ya’alon has a major role in this process and therefore the description
in this chapter is mostly based on a comprehensive personal interview on July 10,
2005. Furthermore, this chapter is based on the personal experience of the author
who was a member of the mentioned think tank.
23. Col. (Res.) Yehuda Vagman wrote one of the most critical essays in this
regard: “The ‘Limited Conflict’—The Failure,” in Hagay Golan and Shaul Shay
(eds), The Limited Conflict (Tel-Aviv, 2004) 251–298.
24. Idem.
50 • israel studies, volume 12, number 1
25. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New
York, 1971); Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics
of Civil-Military Relations (New York, 1957).
26. See H. Richard Kohn, “How Democracies Control,” Journal of Democracy,
8(4) (1997) 140–153, 142. Kohn argues that civil control should be absolute and
comprehensive, although he understands that it can never actually be absolute.
His definition can be considered as a normative definition
27. E. Claude Welch (ed), Civilian Control of the Military Theory and Cases from
Developing Countries (New York, 1976) found the basis for effective civil control in
the strength of the governmental mechanisms and the legitimacy they earn from
the public.
28. Yoram Peri, “The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy from Oslo
to the Al Aqsa Intifada,” in Peaceworks, No. 47 (Washington, 2002).
29. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.”
30. Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military
Relations and the Use of Force.”
31. Yehoshaft Harkabi, War and Strategy. 4th ed. (Tel-Aviv, 1994) 526.
32. Kohn, “How Democracies Control,” 143.
33. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.”
34. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servant: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA, 2003) and “Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation
of the Souring of American Civil-Military,” Armed Forces & Society, 24(3)
(1998) 407–435.
35. Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York, 1995).
36. Israel Tal, Few against Many (Tel-Aviv, 1996) 107 [Hebrew].
37. J. Allen Williams, “The Military and Modern Society: Civilian-Military
Relations in Post-Cold War,” America, World and I, 14(9) (1999) 306.
38. Michael, “The Dialectic Interaction between the Military and the Political
Echelons During the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.”
39. Ibid. and Michael, “The Military’s Influence on the Transition Process from
War to Peace—the Israeli Case—Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with
Egypt and Oslo Process.”
40. Aviezer Ya’ari, Memorandum No. 72—the Civil Control over the Military in
Israel (Tel-Aviv, 2004( 34.
41. Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots—Israeli Military in Politics, 1st paper
ed. 1985 ed. (Cambridge, UK, 1983); Peri, “The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian
Policy from Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada”; Uri Ben-Eliezer, “Do the
Generals Rule in Israel? The Military-Political Integration and the Legitimacy for
War in Nation in Arm,” in Hannah Herzog (ed), Society in the Mirror (Tel-Aviv,
2000); Eva Etzioni-Halevy, “Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case
of the Military-Political Elites’ Connection in Israel,” Armed Forces & Society: An
Interdisciplinary Journal, 22(3) (1996) 401–417.
42. Peri, Between Battles and Ballots—Israeli Military in Politics; Michael, “The
The Israeli Case • 51
Military’s Influence on the Transition Process from War to Peace—the Israeli
Case—Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with Egypt and Oslo Process.”
43. “The problem, as usual in Israel, begins with the definitions. Who is the
political echelon? The Prime Minister? The Minister of Defense? The cabinet? The
government? What if there is no agreement between all of those?” Amir Oren,
Terror Will Always Be, Ha’aretz, July 15, 2005.
44. Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel; Michael, “The Military’s Influence
on the Transition Process from War to Peace—the Israeli Case—Focused
Comparison: The Peace Process with Egypt and Oslo Process”; Ya’ari, Memorandum
No. 72—the Civil Control over the Military in Israel.
45. Michael, “The Military’s Influence on the Transition Process from War to
Peace—the Israeli Case—Focused Comparison: The Peace Process with Egypt and
Oslo Process.”
46. Zeev Schiff, Ha’aretz, May 13, 2005. Similar examples: Alex Fishman, Interview
with Ya’alon, Yediot Aharonot, December 25, 2003; Ben Caspit, Ma’ariv,
November 14, 2003; Amos Harel, Ha’aretz, April 22, 2005.
47. Amos Harel, Ha’aretz, April 22, 2005.
48. “I have no doubt that with historical perspective, people will say that the
War of Independence was the most important event in our national history, and
this war was the second most important one. . . . The Palestinians returned us to
the War of Independence.” Ari Shavit, interview with the GCS, Ha’aretz, August
29, 2002.
49. The updated IDF premises claimed that Arafat does not accept the existence
of Israel as a Jewish state; that he perceives the violent confrontation as the main
means to promote his political goals; that he is a terrorist, that the PA is a terrorist
entity and the conflict is the “war for a home.” For additional details, see Yaacov
Bar Siman-Tov (ed), As the Generals See It: The Collapse of the Oslo Process and the
Violent Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ( Jerusalem, 2003).
50. “The key point here is the Israeli society’s hardening . . . this is what the
campaign is about. Because here it is a matter of existential threat.” Ari Shavit,
interview with the GCS, Ha’aretz, August 29, 2002.
51. Amir Oren, Ha’aretz, July 15, 2005.
52. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.”
53. Harkabi, War and Strategy.
54. Michael, “The Dialectic Interaction between the Military and the Political
Echelons During the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 226.
55. Similar things were said by MG Eiland, see Kobi Michael, “The End of the
Deterministic Distinction—the Low Intensity War Era as a Paradigmic Challenge
for Civil-Military Relations in the Democratic State,” in Hagay Golan and Shaul
Shay (eds), The Limited Conflict (Tel-Aviv, 2004) 201–238, 226.
56. “. . .officers speak about the crucial importance of international legitimacy.
. . . Washington, said a senior officer is maybe the most important actor in the
disengagement operation. Indeed, the IDF in 2005 has flanked the Foreign Affairs
52 • israel studies, volume 12, number 1
Ministry from the left, trying to strengthen Abu-Mazen and the internal Hamas.”
Amir Oren, Ha’aretz, July 15, 2005.
57. Following the Rubenstein Committee’s recommendations (December 2004)
regarding the improvement of civil control, MK Yossi Sarid said, “Indeed, the
implementation of the committee’s recommendations will improve the current
control of the Knesset over the military, but even these . . . recommendations do not ensure that the Knesset will hear alternative positions,” Gidon Alon, Ha’aretz,
December 29, 2004.
58. Mills, Michel Foucault, 83.
59. Michel Foucault, “Prison Talk,” in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge
1972–1977 (Brighton, UK, 1980) 147–165, 152.