hm, gyurcsany narieka preco treba byt v ERM2 az 2 roky, vraj aj madarsko chce euro ASAP. Cry me a river. Ale toto je dobre napisane:

The case for immediate Euroisation

The new EU members treated eurozone membership as a voluntary policy choice. This is a misinterpretation of their own accession treaties. When they signed up to EU membership, they signed up to the euro as well. Only the UK and Denmark have a legal opt-out. Of course, as newly industrialised economies, they were not under an obligation to join immediately, but they were under an obligation to conduct policies consistent with eventual membership. If they had pursued such policies, they would almost all be members by now. Slovenia and Slovakia have demonstrated that, given the right policies, it was possible to enter the eurozone early on. Both these countries are now safe. For the others, the decision to procrastinate turned out to be a financial stability disaster. If confronted with a crisis such as this, you do not want to be a small open economy, on the fringes of the eurozone, with an irrelevant currency and lots of Swiss franc mortgages.

But the central and eastern Europeans got one thing right. They made sure their banks were owned by foreigners. If Hungarian households default, it is not Hungary that will go down, but Austria. Italy and Sweden are also exposed.
...the smartest answer to the prospect of meltdown is the adoption of the euro as quickly as possible. There is no need to switch over tomorrow. All we need tomorrow is a credible and firm accession strategy – one for each country – which would include a firm membership date and a conversion rate, backed up by credible policies.

Obviously, this would require the long overdue abandonment of the eurozone’s defunct entry criteria. Of those, the most nonsensical is the reference rate for inflation, calculated as the average of the lowest three national rates. Soon, this will be a deflation rate. So an aspiring member state would be in the absurd position of having to deflate as a precondition for euro entry.

The inflation criterion is not only insane, it is also in conflict with other parts of European law. Since price stability counts as an important overriding goal of EU economic policy, enforcing a deflation criterion would be a clear breach of this objective. The same goes for the exchange rate criterion. Forcing a country into a two-year sentence of membership of the exchange rate mechanism – in which its currency would fluctuate against the euro in a fixed band – is an open invitation to speculators and would risk further instability. The accession criteria are inconsistent with basic stability rules. They should be declared invalid and certainly not be abused as a bureaucratic hurdle to prevaricate in a dangerous crisis.

If calamity strikes, the EU will pay up. This is laudable, but will probably not solve the problem, especially if the crisis spreads. Granting financial aid without a firm commitment to euro membership would be irresponsible. Euroisation is the way to go.