Hegel - Filozofia dejin (socfil 2004)

V podstate autor navrhuje totalitny stavovsky stat. Dejiny su zalozene na rozvoji objektivnej slobody. Ide o potlacenie osobnei vole v prospech vseobecneho ducha, Boha, ktory sa sam buduje. Dejiny su teda jeho praca.

Vychadza z predpokladu, ze kazda udalost v dejinach je umyselna, a to nielen pragmaticky, ale v ramci celej historie. Dovod je vobec substancia. Z Dovodu vsetko vzislo a ide. Sam je ale mimo reality (hegelianska logika).

Tento Dovod je rovnako ako princip ako aj ciel. Ciel dejin, ako aj skumania Heglovej knihy. Umyslom je skumat prejavy Dovodu v minulosti i teraz. Aj toto skumanie ma svoj rozvoj.

Anaxagoras vravel, ze priroda je nosickou Dovodu. Pre neho to ale nebol samotvoriaci duch, svet tu bol ako samovylepsujuci sa stroj. Dovod bol teda najdeny. Prozretelnost je teda zavedena ako pojem, ktorym nachadza syntezu Vole a Dovodu.

Svet je miestom pre realizaciu Dovodu. Realizacia je postupna, vyvrcholuje vznikom Statu. Hmota z prirodzenosti pritahuje ducha, avsak duch je zase prirodzene slobodny. Tu priehadzame k tomu, ze ked sa spoja zanikaju, a vznika idealno.

Vychodne narody povazovali slobodu za schopnost zotrocit, naplnovat tak tuzby. Clovek osebe nebol brany ako slobodny. Greci tiez, no otroctvo tu bolo uz ako institucia, nie dosledok kultury. Germani podla neho ako prvi brali cloveka ako slobodneho uz od prirody, kedze duch osebe je sloboda. Staty az postupne prijimaju samo- organizaciu, do ktorej sloboda moze zapadnut.

V kratkosti, u Vychodnych bol uplne slobodny jeden, u Grekov viaceri a v State budu vsetci. Slobodny clovek ma mat 'charakter', spajat volu a rozum tak, aby formoval Stat. Chut nema mat. Otoci sa Dovod tak, aby naplnal 'seba', a pritom naplnal volu ludi.

Idea je substancia, Limit je jej proti- pol, definitivna existencia. Idealny svet - koniec dejin - je ked Idea je naplnena limitmi. Ako ked demagog vyhra volby, alebo ked vyuzijeme veci, ktorych sa bojime na obranu pred ich zhubnostou.

Objekt a subjekt u cloveka sa spaja v nabozenstve, umeni a filozofii. Ide o spojenie univerzalneho a osobneho. Najvyssim spojenim je Stat. Boh, teda svetovy duch, je ucteny nabozenstvom, vnimany umenim, vysvetleny filozofiou a prezity v state.


cas ( http://tribes.tribe.net/thinkingplace/thread/8b396927-cd81-4aa7-8fee-1e773485bbea )


Heidegger begins his analysis of Hegel's concept of Time by citing the Philosophy of Nature.1 He speaks of how Hegel puts “Space and Time together”, in the sense that “Space is time, that is, time is the truth of space”(Heidegger 429). Since time is the truth of space, it is apparent that space will need to be thought first, and its truth will express itself as time. Heidegger begins describing Hegel's idea of space as “the abstract multiplicity of points distinguishable in it”(ibid). Space is not a point, however, because it is “absolutely continuous”, and “contains no specific difference within itself”(Hegel, Nature 254). It is therefore “not permissible to speak of points of space...on account of its lack of difference”(Ibid), and therefore “space is not a point”, but “punctuality”2(Heidegger 429). Each possible point out of which space is made up is a negativity which determines itself as not all the other possible points, and develops its spatial determinations as lines and surfaces. Space appears as for-itself inasmuch as it negatively determines itself, however, it at the same time appears indifferent to the space to which it is “side by side at rest”(Hegel: Nature, 257). In a veritable fit of clarity, Hegel deduces Time from this contradiction:

Space is this contradiction, to be infected with negation, but in such wise that this negation falls apart into indifferent subsistence. Since space, therefore, is only this inner negation of itself, the self-sublating of its moments is its truth. Now time is precisely the existence of this perpetual self-sublation; in time, therefore, the point has actuality.(Hegel 257 Zurzats)

A point may have actuality in time, but this remains “merely academic”if neither space nor time can be represented or intuited by consciousness. The self-sublating time of a point cannot be represented by the indifferent subsistence of the distinctions between points. The truth of Space, which we have already shown to be time, can only be grasped as thought because only thought can grasp the self-sublating moments of the point as “a synthesis which goes through thesis and antithesis and supersedes them”(Heidegger 430). It is this very act of superseding done by thought which gives this idea of time its distinctively Hegelian character: since the super-session supersedes a contradiction, a contradiction is negated and Time is thus the negation of negation, which for Hegel is the very important concept of “Becoming”. “Becoming”, or the negation of negation, is the idea of being and non-being constantly superseding each other.

Heidegger finds Hegel's own analysis which moves from the self-negation of a point to time as lacking its own ground. He exclaims that should Hegel's discussion have “any demonstrable meaning at all”, the positing of the point for itself must be as a “now-here, now-here, and so on”(Heidegger 430). Furthermore, the “now”must constitute the “condition of the possibility of the point positing itself as the now”, which constitutes also “the being of the point”(Ibid). This “now” is of utmost importance to Heidegger's project of exalting Hegel as the pinnacle expression of the so called “Vulgar” theory of time. For this reason this move to find the now as the condition for the positing of the point must not be taken lightly. What evidence can we gather for or against this assertion, which seems at the same time both innocuous and outlandish? Our first clue should be the sentence which comes before the sentence which reads “if this discussion should have any demonstrable meaning at all”(Ibid). It reads “According to Hegel, this negation of negation as punctuality is time”(Ibid). We might thus interpret Heidegger's insertion of the “now” into the positing of the point as being the only way Heidegger can understand the positing of a point as time. But does this not simply assert the unit of time, which is according to Heidegger the “now”(Ibid), back before the event which is meant to give birth to time, namely the positing of a point for-itself thought dialectically? The “now” seems less like the “condition of possibility” of the point's self-positing, and more like the temporal determination which the punctuality of space enables in the self-positing of a point. Inasmuch as this line of thinking is true, Heidegger's placement of time as the ground of time begs the question.

Looking forward to his next paragraph, Heidegger employs his “now”in order to elucidate Hegel's analysis of time as “intuited becoming”. Beginning by defining “becoming”as it is defined in the first pages of Hegel's Science of Logic, (“a transition from being to nothingness, or from nothingness to being”) Heidegger executes a clever switch of language. Where Hegel spoke of non-being in the intuited becoming of time as the negation of space by the determinateness point, Heidegger, having asserted the “now” to be the “being of time”, inserts the “not-yet now” and the “no-longer now” to fit its place. Thus for Heidegger, Hegelian time is both “now-here, now-here, and so on”(429) inasmuch as it is, and “not-yet now ... no-longer now”(431) inasmuch as it is not. This switch further exposes the weakness of Heidegger's move, for he has taken what was meant to be merely the pure form of time, the “empty intuition”given to conscious in the pure apprehension of space which enables space to express itself in it as pure difference (Hegel Phenomenology 801), and reformulated it to already include that very temporal structure. However, it may be the case that Heidegger's imposition of a time-structure into what for Hegel is only the ground for any possible time structure is both outlandish and innocuous, because it may simply be that the “now”structure which seems to be not at home with intuited becoming,might be very at home with time once it has received its content of Spirit expressed as pure difference. Thus, we should for the moment continue with our exposition of Hegelian time through Heidegger's critique into it's second part - “Hegel's Interpretation of the Connection between Time and Spirit”.

Having already found the essence of time in Hegel to be the the negation of negation, Heidegger embarks on an exposition of the essence of Spirit in order to interpret the connection between the two terms. He begins “The essence of Spirit is the concept3”(Heidegger, 1927: 433). He claims that by “concept”, Hegel means the form of thinking which “thinks itself”(Ibid). This thinking, according to Heidegger, requires the self to grasp itself as “the non-I”, which is a grasping of a differentiation (Ibid). But since this grasping must also be grasped, the grasping of the pure concept – which is its essence (to “think itself) - also presents a differentiation, the pure concept is a differentiation of a differentiation (Ibid). Thus, the pure concept is “absolute negativity”(Ibid), or we might as easily say “becoming”. This absolute negativity gives freedom to the self because the I, having grasped the Spirit's pure concept, is both “universality and individuality just as immediately”(Heidegger, 1927: 433). It can be both “just as immediately” because its relation to itself does not relate directly but rather “in abstracting from all determinateness and content and going back to the freedom of the limitless identity with itself”(Heidegger, 1927: 433).4 Heidegger goes on to say that the negation of the negation is both the “absolute unrest” of spirit, but also it's “self-revelation” because the actualization of Spirit in history always the surmounting of the exclusionary part of the negation, and thus the history of Spirit must be understood as none other than a history of qualitative progress (Heidegger, 1927: 434). Freedom is thus an act for Hegel: “Making itself in overcoming... characterizes the freedom of the spirit”(Heidegger, 1927: 434). Thus prepared, Heidegger can reveal how it is that Spirit must “fall into”time: since the development of Spirit is a negation of negation, it is in accordance with this development for it to “fall into time”, which is the intuited form of becoming (negation of negation) given to consciousness in the pure apprehension of space (Heidegger, 1927: 434). Furthermore, Spirit will appear in time until it has grasped its pure concept, “that is, has not annulled time”(Heidegger, 1927: 434). This connection between Time and Spirit compares favorably to Hegel's own statement concerning the connection in the Phenomenology of Spirit:

Time is the concept itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Concept, i.e. has not annulled Time.(Hegel, 1807: 801)

Now that Spirit has “fallen into Time”, Time has been endowed with content. This content is the imminent differentiation of Spirit, which appears over-against self-conscious as Time just as long as Spirit has not completed itself (Hegel, 1807: 802). Thus endowed with content, points of space are no longer merely possible differentiations but express actual difference. For example, self-conscious can see a bush covered in leaves, but cannot percieve the leaves as subsisting in absolute indifference to each other. Rather, it must grasp each each individual leaf only after grasping another leaf and before grasping a third. Each of these points, or leaves, is a now-here, now-here, and so on. Thus Heidegger is not wrong when he thinks that Hegel's time is a world-time made up of nows, not-yet nows, and no-longer nows, but he is wrong inasmuch as he thinks that these nows are the ground for the possible actualization of the point. Rather, the nows are the product not simply of intuited becoming but of the actual grasping of points in space. Technically speaking, there need not even be a bush but only pure space, for even pointing out a point in space means that point is no longer merely possible and self-positing, but rather actually determined by negating other points in an act of conscious thought. Heidegger's outlandish supposition of “nows” as the being of time is therefore in the end innocuous, since the “world-time”which he accuses Hegel's concept of Time as pointing towards (Heidegger, 1927: 435), in infact pregnant with “nows”at the same moment as it becomes “world-time”; the moment which Spirit falls into it. We are thus free to interpret Heidegger's response to Hegel's concept of time without perceiving Heidegger to be in grave error about it, although it is perhaps the case that this error is in aid of his polemic.

From the language he employs, it is apparent that Heidegger's response to Hegel's concept of time is one of specific dissatisfaction. He states that the “now” which is “presupposed”is the being of time remains “covered over and leveled down”in Hegel's system, so that it can be intuited as something merely “objectively present”(Heidegger, 1927: 431). Furthermore, he declares that the kinship between space and time is made possible only through“the most empty, formal-ontological and formal apophantical abstraction into which spirit and time are externalized”(Heidegger, 1927: 431). Such accusations lead us to believe that Heidegger interprets Hegel's theory of time as a theory which is meant to express the truth of time, and not merely a manner in which consciousness comes upon it. Heidegger himself acknowledges that da-sein as thrown-being-in-the-world comes across time as a series of “nows”

The sun dates the time interpreted in taking care. From this dating arises the “most natural” measure of time, the day. And since the temporality of da-sein that must take its time is finite, its days are also already umbered. ... da-sein, thrown into the world, temporalizing and giving itself time, takes account of its regular recurring passage. The occurrence of da-sein is a daily one by reason of interpreting time by dating it – a way that is prefigured in its thrownness into the there”. (Heidegger, 1927: 413)

The major difference is that for Heidegger, world-time arises out of the content or significance of each moment of time, or as he would write, its place in the structure of relevance. This stands opposed to Hegel's theory of time in Heidegger's own analysis because Hegel presupposes the Now as the condition of the point's self-positing. However, our analysis shows that placing the “now” as the being of time is both unnecessary for Hegel, and furthermore, begs the question because it presupposes the conclusion as the ground of the derivation. Rather, time is only intuited as world-time inasmuch as Spirit falls into it, which is to say, so long as it obtains determinate content. However, there is still a difference: for Hegel it would seem that any determinate content (even empty space) is enough for the Self to think Time, whereas for Heidegger the initial “nows” of time bear special significance (such as day break, sunset, seasons etc..), and the “now-here, now-here, now-here”of time ticking along only comes to pass when da-sein discovers the clock as a “handy thing that has become accessible in its regular recurrence in a making present that awaits”(Heidegger, 1927: 413). However, a more thoughtful reading of the Phenomenology reveals that while the form of time may be initially there and present itself to consciousness as “empty intuition”(Hegel, 1807: 801), Time as now-here, now-here, now-here does not reveal itself to consciousness in any given experience. If it this were the case, Time would appear at the very beginning of the Phenomenology in “Sense-Certainty”, the first section of Consciousness, in which the conscious knower attempts to have immediate knowledge of any given experience as immediate and receptive. Furthermore, time does not even reveal itself in “Perception”, where consciousness attempts to hold an object in its perception in terms of its qualities, nor in “Force and the Understanding”, where consciousness attempts to hold an object as distinct from other objects through forms of negative and indifferent unities which collapse into each other. Despite these experiences of consciousness being paradigmatic examples of the transition from “intuited becoming” to the now-time of a ticking clock in Heidegger's analysis, Time does not appear to self-conscious until the beginning of History, which for Hegel is identical to the beginning of Culture because he understands history as only existing when groups of people live together in a community. Thus it is only after the individualistic moments of Spirit (Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason) that Time appears to self-consciousness. Furthermore, the manner in which Time is given to self-consciousness is not explained until the very last chapter, “Absolute Knowing”. The cause of this failure of alignment between Hegel and Heidegger's analysis of Time in Hegel stems from the difference between their phenomenological methods, which, according to Heidegger's own course on the Phenomenology, have nothing to do with each other. (Heidegger, 1931: 28).

The difference between Hegel and Heidegger's Phenomenological method is pointed out by Heidegger at the end of his analysis of Hegel's concept of Time. He asserts that Hegel's “construction” of time is motivated by his “arduous struggle to conceive the “concretion” of the spirit”(Heidegger, 1927: 435). (It may be noted as an aside that a later Heidegger praised Hegel's Science of Logic for accomplishing a very similar task – namely the elevation of being from an empty concept to the most concrete concept as actualization of Spirit (Heidegger, 1962: 6). This stands opposed to Heidegger's own method, which begins with “the concretion of factically thrown existence, and reveals temporality as what make such existence primordially possible”(Heidegger, 1927: 435). But this simple dichotomization does little to reveal the phenomenological difference between these two philosophers because all Heidegger really opposes is the goal of Hegel's analysis to the ground of his own. I will thus attempt to elucidate a more revealing analysis of the difference both of their phenomenological methods and of their goals in order to clarify the grounds on which we might allow ourselves to think these thinkers thoughts together, and discern the innermost tensions which come of attempting to insert Heideggerian temporality into Hegel's system.

Hegel's philosophy is structured in such a way as it can be without presuppositions. The beginning of the Phenomenology intentionally does not assume, as Kant does, the form of experience which we have, and from this ground perform a transcendental deduction which assures the necessity of certain modes of perception (perhaps the most impressive being the deduction of causality). Rather, it begins with “immediate knowledge”, which is receptive, in which we must only apprehend an object and “refrain from trying to comprehend it”(Hegel, 1807: 90). This kind of immediate knowledge is literally the immediate apprehension of anything, before even its explicit demarcation as an object, distinct from other objects. The goal of the analysis as of the first page is to prove the truth of experience, the truth of immediate knowledge which is entirely receptive. As it turns out, in Absolute knowing we learn that the truth of experience, is in the end Spirit, which is therefore concrete in every lived experience: “For experience is just this, that the content- which is Spirit – is in itself substance, and therefore an object of consciousness”(Hegel, 1807: 801). Phenomenology is thus, for Hegel, the study of the manner in which truth can come to be known by self-consciousness. For Heidegger, on the other hand, phenomenology is the basis for his own kind of transcendental deduction: he assumes factically thrown experience of the kind that we have, and out of it deduces the kind of temporality which exist for experience to have this sort of structure at all. It must not be forgotten that it is out of modes of being which are initially and for the most part inauthentic, and which manifest themselves in the average everydayness of falling prey as idle-talk, curiosity and distraction, that Heidegger is able to derive authentic temporality as the ontological condition for these ontic states: “the temporal interpretation of everyday da-sein must begin with the structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself. These are understanding, attunement, entanglement, and discourse”(Heidegger, 1927: 335). This temporality, moreover, is to be deduced primarily for the purpose of clarifying “the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being”(Heidegger, 1927: 1).

This method of analysis is more than superficially at odds with Hegel. Not only does Heidegger embrace a kind of transcendental deduction (although one which is neither transcendental but rather ontological, nor strictly a “deduction” but rather a logic of“relatedness backward or forward”), but he rejects any possibility of a constructive ontology which arises out of any given experience. He states this clearly and powerfully in the opening to a section called “Temporality and Everydayness”, which I will cite at some length.

The primordiality of the constitution of da-sein does not coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate structural element. The ontological origin of the being of da-sein is not “less” than that which arises from it, but exceeds it in power from the beginning. Any “arising” in the field of ontology is degeneration. The ontological penetration to the “origin” does not arrive at things which are ontically self-evident for the “common understanding,”, but rather it is precisely this that opens up the questionability of everything self-evident”(Heidegger, 1927: 334).

While dense at first glance, the radicality of such a passage cannot escape a reader for long. Heidegger here veritably declares the impossibility of Hegel's project inasmuch as it endeavors to reveal the “primordial constitution” of the beings which we ourselves inasmuch as he attempts to do so by a path of thinking that rises up out of the most basic experiences (as in the Phenomenology) or up through logical analysis that begins at the most basic of all concepts (as in the Science of Logic). It is precisely for this reason that Heidegger declared, as we already mentioned in the introduction, the nonsensicality of any attempt to read Being and Time into the Phenomenology. (Heidegger, 1931: 145) However, and this will be key if we are to accomplish any sort of conversation between the two frameworks, the difference Heidegger declares in this passage need not be interpreted as a direct attack on the Hegelian system – but only on its failure in one respect. That respect: exposing the “primordial constitution of da-sein”, need not be seen as the goal of Hegel's Phenomenology. This can be accomplished, however, only if we take the grasping of Spirit in the Phenomenology not to be equivalent of grasping the meaning of being, which is to say that the grasping of Spirit as self-conscious would not reveal the truth of ontology but leave it covered over, setting forth only the possibility of any understanding whatsoever of the meaning of being. This will be made more difficult by the fact that the path of Hegel's Science of Logic elevates the being from the emptiest of all concepts to the concreteness of the reality of absolute Spirit (Heidegger, 1962: 6). In order to support such a claim, we must first undergo an exposition of the meaning of Spirit in Hegel's Phenomenology. However, since Heidegger from the very beginning asserts that an interpretation of Time is the only possible horizon for an understanding of Being (Heidegger, 1927: 1), we will also need to explore the annulment of time in the grasping of absolute Spirit, in order to detect what ground this annulment might leave open for a more fundamental temporality.